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SYNOPSIS 
The construction industry in South Africa is envisaged to play a pivotal role in the reconstruction of the 
South African economy, via the delivery of economic and social infrastructure. The skewed ownership I 
patterns prevalent in the construction sector, resulted in the South African government utilising public 
sector procurement as a mechanism to address these imbalances, and to promote wider participation I 
in public sector construction opportunities. 
This dissertation analyses the role of the construction industry in South Africa, and explores the 
rationale behind utilising public sector procurement as a mechanism to promote wider participation in 
the construction industry in South Africa. The research then focuses on the application of the 
Affirmative Procurement Policy (APP) on construction projects procured by the National Department of 
Public Works, in order to evaluate the impact which this policy has had on the growth and 
development of Affirmable Business Enterprises (ABEs). 
The research evaluates the primary policy outcomes, via the development of appropriate indices and 
a diagnostic quadrant comparator, and concludes that the application of the APP has had a positive 
impact on ABE participation, with levels of participation varying across construction sub sectors and 
categories. It was also found that financial premiums, borne by the State in adopting this policy, were 
nominal when compared with the initial projected outcomes and the overall benefits . 
The overall performance of ABEs, measured against that of non-ABEs, was then tested to ascertain 
whether the adoption of the APP was a necessary and sufficient condition for ABE enablement and 
empowerment. The research concludes that there is a difference in overall performance between J 
ABEs and non-ABEs, and that supply side interventions and capacitation programmes are required to 
mitigate the increased risk exposure by the State, when engaging ABEs on construction projects. The : 
research also analyses tbe variation in the levels of participation of ABEs, in the different construction 
sub sectors and concludes that the manner in which ABEs are structured and their internal business 
processes tend to establish operational l.!!:!!!!!tl2!)s, which influence their scope of activiti~s to a larger 
extent than the existence of eternal sub sector thresholds. Similar characteristics were ,observed in 
non-ABEs of a similar size, inferring that the problems encountered relate to business development 
and growth of small and medium enterprises, in general. 
The research also. analyses the impact that the APP has had on subcontracting relationships and the 
promotion of structured joint ventures. It concludes that whilst the requirements of the APP has seen 
the development of formalised subcontracting relationships, the form of subcontracts that are currently 
utilised do not comply with the requirements outlined in the APP, which are aimed at eradicating unfair 
subcontracting conditions. The adoption of the APP has seen an increase in structured joint ventures 
between ABEs and larger established contractors. The analysis of these joint ventures concludes that 
they provide an effective means of transferring expertise, provided that they are structured 
appropriately. 
The dissertation concludes with recommendations on APP policy refinements, mechanisms to 
enhance compliance and opportunities for international application. The recent enactment of the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Act (Act 5 of 20(0) in South Africa indicates that several elements of 
the APP are likely to be prescribed as mandatory requirements for public sector procurement by 
different government institutions and across the different industrial sectors. It is therefore important 
that the areas identified for further research be pursued, to ensure optimal policy outcomes across a 
range of industrial sectors. 
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In 1994, following the first democratic election in the Republic of South Africa" the South African 
government adopted the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), a comprehensive socio 
economic policy instrument aimed at eradicating the legacy of apartheid, which has left South Africa with an 
economy w'hich was inward focussed, distorted by growth inequities, inefficiencies and under developed 
resources and markets. The RD? could be equated to the Rooseveldt New Deal which was designed to 
pull the United States of America out of the Great Depression, and to the Marshall plan which was aimed at 
rebuilding the war ravaged economies of Europe after the Second World War. The RDP is underpinned by 
four primary program themes: viz meeting basic needs, the developing of human resources; building 
the economy and democratising the State and society in South Africa (Gounden 1997). 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (ANC, 1994) recognises the potential for human 
resource development through construction projects, and contains recurrent themes, which call for : 
1) The putting in place of a programme of affirmative action to address the deliberate 
marginalisation from economic, political and social power of black people, women and rural 
communities and to empower communities and individuals from previously disadvantaged 
sectors of society. 
2) The development of small business, particularly, those owned and operated by black 
entrepreneurs. 
3) The provision of jobs and the addressing of unemployment. 
There are definite relationship between employment opportunities, available skills, entrepreneurship 
and the use of small scale enterprises in the construction and maintenance of assets ie in the core 
business of the construction industry (Watermeyer and Band, 1994). The strength of these 
relationships and links is, however, dependent on the strategies which are adopted in programmes 
aimed at the provision of such assets; in particular, those strategies associated with construction 
contracts. The construction and procurement strategies which are adopted can be used to address 
social and economic concerns and, depending upon how they are structured, to facilitate the 
\ economic empowerment of disadvantaged sectors of society and to address unemployment in a 
focussed manner. Thus the process of constructing assets can be just as important as the provision 
of the assets themselves. 
j'( 
Immediately after the national elections in 1994, the Ministry of Public Works identified an urgent need for 
the transformation of public sector procurement of construction projects. After an initial review of the 
regulatory environment that impacted upon public sector procurement, it was concluded that public sector 
procurement refonn could not be undertaken on a sector by sector basis, but rather that there needed to be 
a fundamental review of the entire public sector procurement system. This then resulted in a joint initiative 
1.2 
being embar1<.ed upon by the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Finance, which aimed at 
transfofming public sector procurement policy and systems in SOuth Africa. 
The transformation of public sector procurement in South AfTica has had two primary objectives, (MOF and 
NPW, 1997) viz: 
1) To utilise public sector procurement as a ve~[c!~~ye ~9';~x;~icobjectivesc~uch as 
the promotion of targeted small and medium enterprises, enhanced job creation opportunities, skills and 
technoJogy transfer, and the like . 
.... _--,.-- - _ ..... 





A preliminary review of the existing procurement policies and systems indicated the skeYled nature of 
contract awards with the larger more established companies securing most of the public sector contracts. 
Further, the participation of small and medium enterprises, and in particular small and medium enterprises 
owned and controlled by previously disadvantaged individUa~~, ~ J~.~~c,.~or projects, was negligible. The 
process of transforming the public sector procurement was 't nderpinned by two cxmcurrent approaches. 
The first element of the strategy was to develop substantially new procurement policy for South Africa, 
linked to legislative reform. Concurrent with this approach, it was decided that a series of interim strategies 
would have to be developed and implemented within the short term, within the ambit of existing legislation. 
The outcome of the first strategy has been the development of the Green Paper on Public Sector 
Procurement, (MOF and MPW, 1997) whilst the outcome of the second strategy has been the interim 10 
Point Plan on procurement. The 10 Point Plan on Procurement (MOF and MPW, 1995) is a series of 
interim interventions primarily aimed at impacting positively on the participation of small and medium 
enterprises, in particular those enterprises owned by disadvantaged people, in public sector procurement 
opportunities. 
The 10 Point Plan on Public Sector Procurement reform was adopted by Ihe National Cabinet for 
implementation and after endorsement by the State Tender Board, actual implementation of elements on 
Ihe 10 Point Plan by Ihe Department of Public Worl<s commenced in August 1996. The Affirmative 
Procurement Policy was then developed, drawing on elements of the 10 Point Plan, to provide a 
comprehensive policy and specifications within which public sector procurement could be used to promote 
small and medium enterprises that operate in the construction sector and owned and managed by 
previously disadvantaged individuals. 
The constitutional basis for the development of the Affirmative Procurement Policy is found in Clause 217 of 
the Constitution of South Africa , viz: 
(1) "\Nhen an organ of state in national, provincial or local sphere of government or any other 
institution identffied in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so in 
accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost 
effective. 
1.3 
(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the organs of state or institutions referred to in that 
subsection from implementing a procurement policy providing for-
(a) categories of preference in the affocation of contracts; and 
(b) the protection or advancement of persons or categories of persons disadvantaged 
by unfair discnmination. 
(3) National legislation must prescribe a framework within which the policy referred to in 
subsection (2) may be implemented." 
The development of the Affirmative Procurement Policy derives its constitutional basis from clause 217 of 
the Constitution. 
1.2 THE USE OF PROCUREMENT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY 
Governments have traditionally used their extensive powers of procurement to promote a variety of 
objectives unconnected with the immediate objective of the procurement. Internationally. these have 
ranged from the protection and development of national industry to social policy goals such as the 
promotion of equal opportunity. The very size of government markets provides significant 
opportunities to influence the economy. The Atkins study for the European Commission concluded 
that in 1984, procurement of public bodies and nationalised industries accounted for 21 ,8 percent of 
gross domestic product in the United Kingdom and about 15 percent across the European Community 
(Arrowsmith , 1995). "' 
The use of procurement as an instrument of policy is not without controversy. Questions have been 
raised regarding its legitimacy and effectiveness. Certainly, many attempts to promote an industry or 
sector within an industry have failed, particularly where policies have been championed in an 
uncompetitive environment and isolated from national and international competition. Inefficiencies are 
also frequently encountered where policies seek to establish viable infant industries. All too often, the 
beneficial effects of policies which are promoted through procurement is doubtful or minimal. For 
example, the European Commission estimated that regional preference schemes in the United 
Kingdom applied to on ly 0,02% of government procurement and that there was no evidence that it 
had made a significant contribution in attain ing its objectives. Even where benefits can be achieved, 
these must be weighed against the cost of doing so through procurement, either in terms of a price 
premium or a compromise of other matters such as time or quality. Enforcement costs must also be 
considered. (Arrowsmith, 1995) 
There has been limited research on, and a lack of data regarding , most programmes to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the use of procurement as an instrument of social policy. Frequently, deliverables 
are ill defined or vague and requirements are not quantifiable or measurable. As a result, the auditing 
1.4 
and verification of the effectiveness of the use of procurement as a means to an end is simply not 
possible. (Watenneyer et ai, 1998) 
Noting the above concerns, the drafters of the Affirmative Procurement Policy, in the formulation of 
the policy, set about developing a cost effective procurement system which provides, encourages and 
promotes a government's socio-economic objectives in a definable, quantifiable, measurable, 
verifiable and auditable manner, within a fair, equitable, competitive, cost effective and transparent 
environment. without: 
• over-taxing the administrative capacity of government; 
• creating unfair competition within sectors of the economy; 
• abusing or lowering labour standards; 
• exposing government to unacceptable risks; 
• compromising value for money; or 
• compromising the efficiency and effectiveness of the private sector in their ability to deliver. 
(Watenneyer et a/1998) 
1.3 SOUTH AFRICA'S AFFIRMATIVE PROCUREMENT POLICY 
The AffilTTlative procurement policy (MOF and MPW, 1997), is a procurement policy which utilises 
procurement as an instrument of social policy in South Africa to affinn the changed environment, 
government's socio-economic objectives and the principles of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme. The conceptual framework for an Affinnative Procurement policy is set out in the Green Paper 
on Public Sector Procurement Refonn. 
The Affirmative Procurement Policy, without resorting to set asides and compromising competitive 
tendering: 
• Puts in place a programme of affilTTlative action. 
• Facilitates the development of small businesses, particularly those owned by Previously 
Disadvantaged Individuals. 
• Provides jobs in a targeted manner on engineering and construction contracts 
• Increases the number of employment opportunities per unit of expenditure where choices in 
teachnology can be made. 
~
The primary focus in the policy is currently on redressing the skewed business ownership patterns in 
South Africa ; hence the focus on AffilTTlable Business Enterprises Le. small businesses which are 
owned and controlled by Previously Disadvantaged Persons. 
1.5 
The Department of Public Works, being a national state institution, focused almost exclusively on the 
targeting of Affirmable Business Enterprises (ABEs) in its application of the policy. 
1.4 MONITORING AND EVALUATING POLICY OUTCOMES 
The authors of the Affirmative Procurement Policy in developing the Affirmative Procurement Policy 
looked both locally and internationally for some sort of bench marking around what have been the 
benefits of policies which link procurement to socio-economic issues and whether or not this 
information can be presented in scientific terms in a consistent and integrated manner. They found 
very limited examples of this nature and as a result were forced to develop the system which is now 
commonly referred to as Targeted Procurement. 1 This was necessary to ensure that the procurement 
regime which was established could through a rigorous process of monitoring and evaluation provide 
government with adequate data to enable policy positions to be defended. It is important in the current 
policy environment that there has to be a notion that policies do not simply appear as wish lists but 
rather that there have to be mechanisms whereby objectives are set, monitored and evaluated to 
enable policy makers to be provided with an instrument to reassess policy, modify where necessary, 
or have the policy fundamentally changed if it is inappropriate. 
The Department of Public Works piloted the application of an Affirmative Procurement Policy on the 
construction of the MaJmesbury Prison Complex, when tenders were first called for in 1996. This 
project was the first project where Affirmable Business Enterprises (ABEs) were targeted on a 
contract in any sector of the South African economy. At the time when this thesis was being 
formulated , the only published assessment on aspects of the policy outcomes was the SoderJund and 
Schutte (1998) report on the Malmesbury Prison Contract and a paper by Watermeyer et al (1998) 
which was accepted for publication during 1997. 
The Malmesbury Prison Contract was the first major project in which the Department of Public Works 
adopted a design and construct contracting strategy. It was also the first of the new generation 
prisons. Accordingly, the Soderlund and Schutte (Soderlund and Schutte, 1998) report examined all 
aspects of the project and as such only covered the Affirmative Procurement component to a limited 
extent. The paper by Watermeyer et al (1998) focussed on communicating the framework for policy 
implementation and confined its reporting to ABE participation for the period August 1996 to October 
1997. 
1 Targeted Procurement is a system of procurement which provides employment and business opportunities for marginalised 
individuats and communities, enables procurement to be used as an instrument of social policy in a fair. equitable. competitive, 
transparent and cost-effective manner and permits social objectives to be quantified, measured, verified and aUdited. It is an 
international version of the Affirmative Procurement Policy. 
The author was advised by the director of the Public Procurement Research Group , Professor S Arrowsmith of AberyStwyth 
University (Wales) in the U.K. that this group, at the time that this thesis was being formulated, was not aware of any 
programmes where use has been made of procurement as an instrument of social policy which can provide both Quantitative 
and qualitative data to support that the intent of a policy had been met. 
1.6 
The Author accordingly identified the need for a holistic quantitative and qualitative study on the 
impact of the policy from August 1996 to July 1998. 
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The research objective is to examine the impact of the National Department of Public Work's 
Affirmative Procurement Policy2 on the participation of Affirmable Business Enterprises3 in the South 
African Construction Industry 
1.6 THE HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis tests the following hypothesis: 
The public .ector In South Africa can contribute to Increa.ed participation of Afflrmable 
Business Enterprises In the construction Industry via the implementation of the Affinnatlve 
Procurement Policy. 
The above primary hypothesis has been dis-aggregated into the following sub-hypothesis which will 
be tested to validate the primary hypothesis. 
1. The National Department of Public Works can promote increased participation by ABEs in the 
construction economy, via its Affirmative Procurement Policy (APP). 
2. The adoption of the Affirmative Procurement Policy has resulted in the state bearing a 
nominal financial premium, when compared to the initial projected project outcomes and 
overall benefits. 
3. Increased procurement opportunities to Affirmable Business Enterprises via government's 
Affirmative Procurement Policy is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the full 
enablement of ABEs in the construction sector. 
4. Affirmable Business Enterprise participation varies according to subsector entry level' 
thresholds. 
+- 5. The Affirmative Procurement Policy promotes joint venture relationships between established 
contractors and Affirmable Business Enterprises. 
~ The Affirmative Procurement Policy is • procurement policy which uses procurement as an instnunenl or social policy in South Africa to 
affinn the changcd environment. government 's soci<H:conomic objccti~es and the principles of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme. 
l An Affinnable Business Enterprise is a business which is owned, managed and controlled by previously. disadvllfltaged persons and which 
has annual average turnover.; within prescribed limits (refer to pagc 4.4 ror full definition). 
1.7 
6. The application of the Affirmative Procurement Policy has resulted in better regulated 
relationships between prime contractors and sub-contractors. 
1.7 THE STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
Figure 1.1 sets out the logical framework for the research required to test the hypothesis. The 
chapters in this thesis follow the process flow set out in Figure 1. 
Researchers such as Masterman (1992), Cox and Townsend (1998), Rwelamila (1996), Rowlinson 
and McDermott (1999) and Miller (1995) have contributed to a body of knowledge concerning 
conventional procurement systems and practices. This thesis, however examines procurement from 
a different perspective viz as a vehicle towards growth of Affirmable Business Enterprises. This field 
of research has a very limited literature base. It is therefore necessary to provide sufficient 
background information in the first phase of the thesis, to enable the field work and subsequent 
research results to be contextualised and understood. 
Phase 1 of the research develops the theoretical framework for the resea rch, and as .such focuses on 
the nature of the industry and the role which the state can play in promoting the wider acceptance and 
improved functioning of the South African construction market by selective interventions. This phase 
develops the main argument for this dissertation and presents the background necessary to 
understand the phase 2 research. 
Accordingly, Chapters 2 to 4 focuses on : 
• The role of the construction industry in the South African context. 
• The constraints and opportunities in the South African construction industry, and the development 
strategy for the construction industry. 
• The rationale for the focus on ABEs in the South African Construction Industry. 
• The identification of problems facing construction related ABEs in South Africa, and the 
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Fig. 1 Schematic Representation of Theoretical I Conceptual Framework 
The phase 2 research focuses on the application of the Affirmative Procurement Policy on 
construction projects and the testing of the six sub-hypothesis. For convenience, the six hypothesis 
are grouped into 3 clusters, viz , : 
Cluster 1 : Sub-hypotheses 1 and 2 focus on analysing the primary policy outcomes of the 
application of the Affirmative Procurement Policy on the National Department of Public Works, 
construction projects and are tested and analysed in Chapter 5. 
Cluster 2 : Sub-hypotheses 3 and 4 focus on the Affirmative Procurement Policy being a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for ABE empowerment and are tested and analysed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
Cluster 3 : Sub-hypotheses 5 and 6, focus on the impact that the Affirmative Procurement Policy 
has had on the construction market in South Africa and are tested and analysed in Chapter B of this 
dissertation. 
Phase 3 of the research in Chapter 9, locates the significance of the research, outlines the problems 
encountered in the research and examines the research conclusions in the context of the desired 
outcomes of a policy of this nature. It accordingly makes recommendations for policy refinements 
and adjustments and pinpoints areas of future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
AN OVERVIEW OF ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
AND 
TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTEGRATED INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
2.1 
2.1 THE ROLE OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 
2.1.1 Definition of the Construction Industry 
The construction industry is, in any country, a complex sector of the economy, which involves a broad 
range of stakeholders and has wide ranging linkages with other areas of activity such as 
manufacturing and the use of materials, energy, finance, labour and equipment. Whilst elements of 
the construction industry have been researched rigorously over the past three decades, there is not, 
as yet, agreement amongst academics and researchers as to a definition of the industry (Hind le, 
1997). At present, two views on a definition of the construction industry prevail. 
The first view sees the construction industry as a single industry falling within a sector of the economy 
(Hiilebrandt, 1984). Whitst it may be argued that this approach takes a fairly narrow view of the 
impact of the construction industry, considering its wide linkages with other sectors of the economy, it 
does, however, provide a practical and manageable basis on which to analyse various elements 
within the construction industry. 
The second and more recent view, uses the market approach proposed by Hindle (1997). In order to 
address some of the inconsistencies that are likely to arise in conducting a business process analysis 
of the construction industry, Hindle suggests that construction should be described as a series of 
industries, markets, business entities and projects, inter-linked by a 'dynamic web' of common issues, 
resources and constraints. Whilst this approach does, indeed, provide a platform for a wider 
interpretation of the construction industry, it can be argued that the broadness of the definition could 
cause problems when conducting research on the industry using data captured on a sectora] basis. 
This definition therefore needs further scrutiny prior to acceptance. 
Accordingly, for the purposes of this dissertation, the author subscribes to the more traditional 
sectoral definition of the construction industry, whilst attempting to address some of Hindle's 
concerns. Drawing on definitions adopted in other countries, the adoption of the following definition of 
the construction industry is proposed : 
'The construction industry is a broad conglomeration of industries and sectors which add 
value in the creation and maintenance of fixed assets within the built environment. 1 , 
Whilst the above definition is primarily sectoraUy focussed, in that it clearly defines a specific output, 
namely, the creation and maintenance of fixed assets within the built environment, it does 
accommodate an interplay between different sectors and thus accommodates some of the concerns 
1 This definition was proposed by the author and adopted by the Inter Ministerial Task Team on Construction Industry 
Development in South Africa , to which the author is an appointee. 
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expressed by Hindle. Having proposed the adoption of a definition for the construction industry, it is 
now important to analyse the role of that industry in the economy of a country. 
2.1.2 The Role of the Construction Industry In National Economies 
Turin (1973) set the agenda for researching construction and development in the late sixties and the 
seventies. Most current research on construction activities and their relationship with the wider 
economy draw on the work done by Turin (1973). Turin's work centred on determining mechanisms 
through which the construction sector contributes to the processes of economic and social 
development. The main argument presented by Turin, on the basis of an analysis of global 
construction activity, was that there were measurable and predictable causal relationships between 
the main aggregates of construction activity and indicators of economic change (Drewer, 1997). In 
analysing data from various countries of different economic standings in the 1970's, Turin concluded 
that there was a predictable and causal relationship between construction aggregates and the wider 
macro economy and thus, by inference, presented the constructfon industry as being an engine of 
growth and as being central to the process of economic and social development in any country. 
The concept of the construction industry as an engine of growth has since been used by various 
researchers and policy formulators within the construction industry in various countries as their point 
of departure, when analysing, or defining, country specific policy as it relates to the construction 
industry. It is not the author's intention, in this section, to critically analyse the main arguments made 
by Turin, but rather to review these, as they have fonned the basis of the macro economic analysis of 
the construction industry and its impact on a country's wider economy. The writer does, however, 
beHeve that it is important to locate Turin's findings in the 1970's, within the context of the 1990's. 
During the 26 years, since TUrin initially postulated these relationships, we have seen the demise of 
the larger, centrally planned economies and an unprecedented globalisation of the world economy, 
which has had a significant impact on the delivery of construction services and products around the 
world. 
Drewer's most recent review of Turin's work on construction and development (Drewer, 1997) 
attempts to revisit the Turin macro economic hypotheSis, utilising updated global construction 
statistics. Drewer's analysis tends to indicate that over time an unstable relationship, subject to wide 
variations, exists between construction and the wider economy in a country. Greater stability is 
observed in developed countries and less in countries with lower levels of economic development, or 
smaller economies. It is the author's view that, whilst Drewer has highlighted some problems with 
Turin's macro economic argument, he has· not conclusively demonstrated that an economic 
relationship between the construction industry and the macro economy of a country is invalid. Rather, 
his analysis indicated that this relationship may be unstable, and needs to be treated with some 
caution. 
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It was important to review the work of Turin and the subsequent work of Drewer in order to 
demonstrate the significance of the construction industry in the economy of a country. The author is 
of the view that the concept of the construction industry as an engine of growth, as initially postulated 
by Turin, is somewhat overstated. The author considers, rather, that based on a review of 
construction industry development strategies that have been developed in various countries over the 
last two decades (Ofori, 1994a and 1994b; Latham, 1994), the construction industry can serve as a 
short term catalyst for growth, if incorporated into a country's broader industrial development strategy. 
Further, the construction industry, due to its multi-facetted nature, and its contribution to the GDP of a 
country, does indeed have a significant bearing on a country's economy, although not to the extent 
that Turin postulated. The construction industry's contribution to a country's economy may be broken 
down into the following components: 
• The production of specific, national, basic needs. 
• The provision of most of the country's fixed capital assets and infrastructure, thereby playing a 
pivotal role in national development and generating the necessary infrastructure to enable other 
industrial sectors to develop. 
• Direct contribution to the country's GDP, thereby stimulating further growth via its backward and 
forward linkages with other industrial sectors. 
• The creation of jobs, especially in developing countries. 
The above breakdown draws primarily on work done by Hiffebrandt (1984), Ofori (1994a), and 
Department of Public Works (DPW, 1997). Clearly, the multi-facetted role of the construction industry 
makes it a significant component of the overall economy of a country. Interesting features of the 
construction industry's contribution to a national economy are its role in initiating investment 
(infrastructure provision) and its contribution to growth-dependant investments such as housing 
(Hillebrandt, 1984; DPW, 1997). It is within the foregoing conceptual framework that the contribution 
of the South African construction industry to the national economy of South Africa is reviewed. 
2.1.3 Contribution of the South African Construction Industry to the Economy of South 
Africa 
A review of South African Reserve Bank statistics over the past decade clearly indicates a declining 
demand for construction. For the 1996197 financial year the contribution to GDP from the construction 
sector, which comprises of both the building and the civil engineering sub-sectors, was only 2,87 % 
(South African Reserve Bank). This closely correlates with an assessment done by the Industrial 
Development Corporation of sectoral prospects in South Africa for the next five years, which indicated 
that the construction industry's contribution to the total economy would be 2,89 % (IDC, 1998). These 
figures are in stark contrast to the construction industry's peak contribution to the GDP of 5,37 % in 
1975 (South African Reserve Bank). It has been argued by some civil and building industry 
representatives that the construction industry's recent and projected contributions to the GDP are, in 
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fact, higher than those presented by the South African Reserve Bank and the Industrial Development 
Corporation (I DC). There is, however, no dispute amongst construction industry stakeholders in South 
Africa that since 1975 there has seen a steady decline in the industry's contribution to South Africa's 
GDP. 
The current low contribution of the construction industry to GOP in South Africa contrasts sharply with 
figures given in a study undertaken by the World Bank in 1984 on the construction sector in 
developing countries, in which they found that the construction sectors in developing countries 
accounted for between 3 and 8 % of the countries' GDPs (WoMd Bank, 1984). These findings 
conform to those of Turin, made in 1973. It is apparent from the foregoing that, even when viewed 
within the context of a developing country's economy, the potential of the South African construction 
industry is under·developed. 
In South Africa, it is estimated that building construction makes up roughly two thirds of the 
contribution to the GDP by the construction sector, civil engineering making up most of the balance 
(IOC, 1998). An area of concern is the current low contribution of 18 % by the public sector to 
construction industry demand (IOC, 1998), compared with the average 50 % contribution by the public 
sector to construction industry demand in developing countries (World Bank, 1984). The construction 
sector in South Africa has seen a decline in formal employment opportunities within the sector from 
410000 in 1985 (South African Reserve Bank) to 370 000 in 1996 (IDC, 1998). Whilst some of the 
employment shedding could be attributed to the shift towards flexible production strategies, such as 
labour-only sub--contracting, which counteract the unevenness of construction demand, this cannot 
disguise the fact that the industry has, over the past decade, cut back signtficantly on employment 
opportunities. 
2,1.4 Future Prospects for the South African Construction Industry 
It is against this fairly uninspiring recent history that one needs to examine the future prospects for the 
construction industry in South Africa. Uttimately, prospects for the South African construction industry 
are linked to the macro economic policy of the country. The South African Govemmenfs macro 
economic policy, GEAR, commits the country to increased public sector fixed investment over the 
next five to ten years (DOF, 1996). A review of Government's current medium term expenditure 
framework , the various planned spatial development initiatives and the various infrastructura! public· 
private partnerships being planned nationally and within the South African Development Community 
(SADe) region, provides a clear indication of Governmenfs commitment to increase its capita l 
spending (IDC, 199B). It is estimated that public sector, infrastructural investment of between R170-
R232 billion over the next five to ten years should increase the public sector's proportion of GDFI 
three to five fold , and cause total construction GDFI to more than double (DPW, 1997). With this 
increased public sector investment in infrastructure, it is expected that a concomitant increase in 
private sector investment is likely to follow, jf international trends are to be taken as a precedent. 
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It can be argued that the current shortfalls in construction demand are attributable primarily to 
fundamental changes in economic policy, investor caution and the re-engineering of various public 
sector institutions to ensure an appropriate response to Government's new macro-economic strategy. 
This could be viewed as a short-term, transitory problem. A similar observation was made by 
Rwelamila et al (1997), in their review of the role of the public sector in the South African construction 
industry. The author, however, does not consider that the current decline in capital formation can be 
dismissed as a short-term transitional phenomenon that will be resolved as a matter of course. The 
author considers that careful and decisive management, especially in the public sector, will be 
required to ensure that the various institutions of State are transformed effectively to enable 
government's macro economic strategy, as enunciated in Growth , Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR), to be implemented in the short term. Having made this point, it must be noted that 
transformation of the South African economy, or any specific sector within it, is a medium to long term 
endeavour. On a positive note, the basic fundamentals encapsulated in the Government's GEAR 
strategy appear to contain the ingredients for the successful development and growth of the 
construction industry in South Africa, if purposefully managed. 
Recent studies and econometric modelling conducted by the IDC (1998) to analyse the sectoral 
prospects of 80 industries in South Africa, for the period 1997 to 2001 , resulted in the following 
prognosis on the construction industry : 
~With the fuff implementation of aff facets of GEAR the construction industry and associated 
service industries (electricity, trade and finance) are likely to take the lead as the economy 
progresses towards the high scenario. It is also anticipated that the construction sector is 
likely to expand at a faster rate than the overall GDP growth. On the basis of macro 
econometric projections, it is likely that the current negative historical growth pattern in the 
construction industry (0,5% average annual growth between 1993 and 1996) is likely to be 
replaced by a high growth path of 3 % per annum, with this increase largely dependant upon: 
• Private sector investment in productive assets 
• Increased government investment expenditure 
• Capital expenditure by Public Corporations 
• Successful formation of PubficlPrivate Partnerships in infrastructure development. ~ 
In summary, whilst the short term view of the construction industry tends to indicate a less than 
positive outlook, it is apparent, from the current macro- economic framework adopted, that the 
Government is committed to increasing expenditure in fixed investment and stimulating private sector 
fixed investment. A Significant increase in construction industry demand over the next five to ten 
years is likely to be seen. 
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2.2 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY AND THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGY 
2.2.1 Strength. and W.akn ..... of the South African Con.tructlon Industry 
Having defined the important role that the construction industry is likely to play in the economy of 
South Africa over the next five to ten years, it is im portant to develop a broad appreciation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the industry. The following analysis enables us to identify the strengths 
of the South African construction industry. which should be nurtured and developed, as well as the 
weaknesses or constraints that would inhibit the industry in meeting the increased demand that is 
likely to be placed on it in the next five to ten years. 
Whilst considerable research has been done on the construction industry in South Africa, only limited 
work has been done in analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the industry. Discussions held at 
the South African Construction Management Program (CMP) in June/July 1993 attempted to address 
this issue, based on the participants' own experiences, but with fairly limited input data. More 
recently, the Department of Publ ic Works in its Green Paper 'Creating an Enabling Environment for 
Reconstruction, Growth and Development in the Construction Industry', incorporated elements of 
such an analysis (DPW, 1997). In the latter, analysis focussed primarily on constraints and 
weaknesses confronting the South African construction industry, whi lst only fleeting reference was 
made to the strengths that exist in the industry. In spite of this limitation, the findings did highlight 
elements that could contribute significantly to an integrated analysis of the construction industry.2 
The following commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of the South African construction 
industry draws primarily on the sources referred to above, the writer's own analysis of the South 
African construction Industry, and strategic planning for the construction sector undertaken in other 
countries, in particular that for Singapore (Ofori , 1994(b». The author is of the view that the limited 
research carried out in South Africa on the strengths and weaknesses of the industry seriously inhibits 
our ability to formulate a comprehensive, strategic plan for the industry that would build on our current 
strengths and would address our limitations. It is hoped that the commentary which follows will serve 
as an impetus for other researchers and policy analysts in South Africa to research the subject more 
rigorously. International research tends to indicate that such research is a prerequisite for the 
successful formulation of any industrial development strategy for the construction industry, e.g., . 
Singapore (Olon. 1996). 
2 The author was part of the management team responSible for the compilation of the OPAl Green Paper and current comments 
of the author come with the benefit of hIndsight since the development and publishing of the Green Paper. 
2.7 
2.2.2 Strengths of the South African Construction Industry 
The strengths of the South African construction industry indicated below are viewed within the context 
of South Africa as an emerging market economy. The author considers that this clarification is 
important as any advantages that we have should be benchmarked against the situation in similar 
emerging markets, rather than against that in developed economies, where such strengths are seen 
as normal inputs for a thriving construction sector. Furthermore, the strengths will be located within 
the market in which the South African construction industry is likely to make the most significant 
gains, viz., South and Southern Africa. Having contextualised the comparative strengths, the author 
is of the view that the following are, currently, the strengths of the South African construction industry: 
• Sound macro economic policy 
The macro economic policy of the South African Government, GEAR, emphasises the need for capital 
investment as an integral part of economic growth and development, and encourages foreign 
investment (OOF, 1996). This policy represents a significant shift from the mode within which South 
Africa operated during the pre-1994 sanctions era. A significant beneficiary of this policy shift, in view 
of its contribution to Gross Domestic Fixed Investment (GDFI) (DPW, 1997), is the construction 
industry, which will benefit from increased capital investment. 
• Sovereignty over policy making 
South Africa has a significant advantage in terms of its sovereignty to develop policy. Donors and 
multi-lateral financing agencies have limited influence because of South Africa's low borrowing 
commitments. In many instances, foreign funding reinforces imported contractor and consultant 
participation to the detriment of local capacity. HiIlebrandt's analysis of countries with under-
developed construction industries highlights this issue as being one of the key inhibitors of growth of 
construction industries in the recipient countries (Hillebrandt, 1997). 
• Government empathy to the needs of the South African construction Industry 
Whilst the short term reduction of capital spending by Government is impacting negatively on the 
construction industry in South Africa, it is evident that, for the first time in the history of the South 
African construction industry, the Government is empathetic to its needs and acknowledges its 
importance to the South African economy. Therefore, it is keen to draw on the expertise of 
stakeholders from the construction industry, the business sector and labour to formulate strategies 
aimed at development of the industry in South Africa (DPW, 1997). Whilst there is considerable work 
to be done, the endorsement of this process by the key stakeholders in the construction industry 
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augers well for its success in providing an appropriate platform for the integrated development of 
strategies to improve the industry in South Africa. 
• Strong domestic financlal.ervlces s.ctor 
South Africa has a very strong financial services sector (IDC,1998). The strength of this sector is of 
critical importance to the construction industry, especially in the light of the South African 
Govemmenfs endorsement of publidprivate partnerships within the sphere of infrastructural delivery. 
The strength of the domestic financial services sector was highlighted by the inclusion of domestic 
private sector resources into the Maputo Corridor project, within an environment of stiff competition 
from offshore lending agencies.3 State-aligned institutions such as the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa and the Industrial Development Corporation also serve as important bodies to fund 
infrastructural investment. 
• Cross border construction opportunities 
Since the new political dispensation in 1994, there has been increased involvement by South African 
contractors in construction and construction-related work in Southern Africa. Whilst these 
construction-related opportunities have generally been limited to larger construction companies, it 
does indicate a significant move into markets where restricted access existed previously. Whilst the 
IDC has not highlighted the construction industry as being in the export sector, considerable export 
opportunities arising from such work are likely to arise in the spheres of construction material supplies 
and manufactured products. 
• Strong construction capability and track record 
Oespite its developing country status, South Africa has an extremely strong construction capability 
and a track record that reflects its ability to undertake fair1y large and technologically complex 
projects. This is reinforced by its proven ability to compete successfully for international contracts in 
sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia. 
• South Africa Is resource rich 
In the sphere of construction materials production and supply, South Africa is mature and places only 
limited reliance on imports. 
, Assessment provided by Financial Advisors to the Department of Transport (DOT) on the project, In COITVT\unicalion with the 
author. 
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• Firm regulatory framework and strong voluntary professional and trade ilssociations 
South Africa is fortunate to have a firm regulatory framework for the construction industry in terms of 
its built environment professional regulations, construction regulations, planning requirements , and 
occupational health, safety and labour legislation. Institutions such as the Engineering Councit of 
South Africa (ECSA), the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS), the National Home Builders 
Registration Council (NHBRC), the Agrement Board and the strong voluntary professional and trade 
associations, such as the Institution of South African Architects (ISAA), the Association of South 
African (ASAQS) Quantity Surveyors, the South African Institution of Civil Engineering (SAICE). the 
Build ing Industries Federation of South Africa (BIFSA). and the South African Federation of Civil 
Engineering Contractors (SAFCEC), bear testimony to this. This richness of institutional capability 
clearly provides a good basis for the coherent regulation of construction and construction related 
activities, based on both construction-related statutes and regulations, and on voluntary compliance. 
• Strong research and development capability 
Whilst construction enterprises in South Africa have not invested as heavily as their counterparts in 
the developed countries in research and development, South Africa does have a strong platform for 
research and development in the construction industry. notwithstanding that this may not be located 
within the construction enterprises themselves. Institutions such as the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research and various built environment faculties at South African tertiary institutions have, 
over many years, provided valuable support to the South African construction industry in respect of 
research and technical development. 
• Strong consulting capability 
South Africa has a strong built environment professional consulting capability. as reftected in the large 
number of buitt environment consulting practices registered in South Africa in the disciplines of 
engineering. architecture and quantity surveying. The strength and capability of this sector is further 
reftected in the increasing number of consulting appointments secured beyond the borders of South 
Africa from multitateral funding agencies such as the World Bank. 
2.2.3 Weaknesses of the South African Construction Industry 
The weaknesses of the South African construction industry can largely be attributed to the fluctuation 
of construction demand during the apartheid-era in South Africa. It is important to highlight the 
following prevailing weaknesses in the industry. 
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• Emerging market vulnerability 
As an emerging market, South Africa is subject to global currency speculation, which has a direct 
impact on the South African construction industry. The usual response of the South African Reserve 
Bank to this situation is to increase lending rates which puts a damper on capital investment. 
especially in the construction·related goods and services sector. 
• Fluctuating construction demand 
The decline in demand for construction-related goods and services in South Africa over the past 
decade has seen a loss of core capability within this sector. The cyclical nature of the construction 
industry, which is a global phenomenon, has accentuated this process. As a result, the South Africa 
construction industry currently operates primarily in a survivalist mode, to the detriment of long term 
planning and development. 
• Public sector capacity constraints 
Whilst it can be argued that Government policy has demonstrated a serious intent to address issues 
that confront the construction industry, capacity constraints at an operational level inhibit the 
translation of Government policy and intent into action. This is especially so at the second and third 
tiers of government and requires serious attention, since the main instruments of delivery are located 
at these levels. A further area of concern that requires attention, is the lack of synergy between public 
sector policy and the policies adopted by public corporations, such as Eskom, Transnet, etc., towards 
the construction industry. 
• Diminishing supervi80ry and managerial capacity In the construction Industry 
As a result of the declining demand for construction goods and services in South Africa over the past 
decade, and the volatility of demand within the construction industry, South Africa has suffered a loss 
of core managerial and supervisory skills. Whilst it can be argued that adequate supervisory and 
management capability does exist in this current period of depressed demand, it is unlikely that 
resources will be able to meet projected demand in the construction industry if planning is not 
commenced as a matter of urgency (Gounden and Merrifield, 1994). 
• Flexible labour practices In the construction Industry 
As a result of the volatility of demand and the survivalist mode in which the construction industry has 
been operating in South Africa over the past decade, most construction enterprises in South Africa 
have gravitated towards the adoption of flexible labour practices, in particular, labour-only sui>-
contracting. Whilst labour-only sutrcontracting is not necessarily a problem in itself, it has been 
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poorly managed and controlled within the South African context. This has resulted in a reduction in 
artisan skills development, with an associated loss of productivity and the development of poor 
practices such as auctioning for sub-contracting services and unstructured relationships between 
prime contractors and sub-contractors (MOF and MPW, 1997). It must also be noted that the larger 
construction enterprises historically comprised a management echelon, which was primarily White, 
and a labour force which was primarily Black. With the shift towards flexible labour practices and 
labour-only sub-contracting, there has been a shedding of primarily Black labour from an environment 
where it was partially protected, into a totally unprotected environment. 
• Ownership patterns within the construction industry 
The current ownership pattern of construction enterprises in South Africa, is highly skewed along 
racial lines. This is a result of the nature of entrepreneurial opportunities and limited access to tertiary 
education provided during the apartheid era and the associated legislation that promoted Whites to 
the detriment of other race groups. Ownership of the large and medium sized construction enterprises 
in South Africa, including the well-established firms, vests with the White population group. The other 
population groups participate in the construction industry primarily as domestic SUb-contractors, and 
as labour-only sub-contractors to the large prime contractors. The construction industry today remains 
polarised with the established, mainly White, construction sector represented by institutions such as 
BIFSA and SAFCEC, whilst organisations such as Black Construction CounCil (BCC) continue to 
press for greater participation of Black contractors in the main-stream of South African construction 
industry activities. Several attempts have been made to bring both groups under a common umbrella, 
e.g., the formation of the Council for Construction of South Africa (COCOSA) in 1995 and the 
establishment of Construction Industry Confederation (Cl C) in 1998. Notwithstanding the attempts at 
unification, the author is of the view that the two groups remain highly polarised and that the stark 
inequalities that originated during the apartheid-era still exist within the construction industry today. 
The greatest constraint, or weakness, that needs to be addressed, in attempting to develop a vibrant 
and thriving construction industry in South Africa, is the remedying of the racial inequilities that still 
prevail in the industry. 
• Barriers to entry for the emerging construction enterprises 
Significant steps have been taken, since 1994, to promote small, medium and micro enterprises 
within the construction sector in South Africa, as part of the small business development initiative, as 
articulated in the White Paper on Small Business (DTI, 1995), and various institutions have been 
established to address supply side constraints. Nevertheless, small and medium size enterprises in 
the construction industry still have serious problems in access to finance, managerial training and 
development and work opportunities in the public and private sectors. New entrants to this sector are, 
primarily, from South Africa's historically disadvantaged population groups, which further contributes 
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to the polarisation of the construction industry along racial lines. This issue will be addressed in 
greater detail in Chapter 4. 
Finally, several researchers and policy formulators, including Rwelamila et a/ (1997), Ofori et al 
(1996), Gounden and Merrifield (1994) and Hodgson (1997), wIlen commenting on the South African 
construction industry, have indicated a need for an integrated development plan for the industry. For 
as long as such a plan, or strategy, remains not fully developed, the various initiatives undertaken to 
address problems in the construction industry will be 'ad-hoc' in nature and will not contribute 
optimally to the development of the construction industry in South Africa. 
The Green Paper on the Enabling Environment for the Construction Industry (DPW, 1997) goes a 
long way towards addressing these concerns, especially the proposal for the establishment of the 
Construction Industry Development Board. The author is of the view that a far greater emphasis 
should have been placed on the need for the fonnulation of an integrated industrial development 
strategy. rather than on the institutional mechanism to manage such a strategy.4 The author is 
confident that the processes of interaction that have followed the launch of the Green Paper and the 
establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Task Team. auger well for the refinement and finalisation of an 
integrated industrial development strategy. 
2.2.4 Towards the Development of a Framework for an Industrial Development Strategy for 
the South African Construction Industry 
The Green Paper on the Enabling Environment for the Construction Industry (DPW, 1997) serves as 
a valuable entry point for the development of an integrated industrial development strategy for the 
construction industry in South Africa. 
There are various debates on what constitutes an industrial development strategy. The World Bank 
defines industrial strategy as 'govemment"s e"orts to alter industrial structure to promote 
productivity based growth' (World Bank, 1993). This approach limits consideration of the impact of 
different policies across economic sectors and restricts the co-ordination of economic policies across 
different sectors of government. The author subscribes to the broader approach advocated by Fine 
and Rustomjee (1996) wherein they argued that industrial policy is not ideologically neutral, and may 
include any policies which impact on the industry, as well as policies directed at the industry. 
Noting the mutti-facetted composition of the construction industry in South Africa, the extent of the 
impact that other aspects of the economy have on the construction industry, and its backward and 
forward linkages with other sectors of the economy, the author is of the view that the approach 
advocated by Fine and Rustomjee provides a more useful conceptual framework for the analysis and 
4 On the basis of interventiona by the author, the White Paper on the 'Enabling Environment for the construction Industry, 
makes SpecifIC reference to the need for the finalisation of an industrial development strategy for the construdion industry. 
2.13 
development of an industrial development strategy for the South African construction industry. It is 
not the author's intention to propose a comprehensive industrial development strategy for the 
construction industry in this dissertation. However, the cluster composition proposed in Figure 2.1 
below, provides an extremely useful framework for the formulation of an integrated industrial 
development strategy for the construction industry in South Africa . Figure 2.1 establishes the 
construction industry's basic core activities and related secondary and non-core activities and 
identifies, on the one hand, the factors which can be the catalysts of industry development (industry 
drivers) and on the other, the factors which will affect the rate and pace of development (core 
capabilities). Any development strategy will accordingly need to take cogniscance of the nature of the 
industry and be developed around the strengths and drivers of change and growth within the industry. 
The cluster analysis draws on work done by Ofori in analysing the development of a construction 
industry strategy for Singapore (Ofori , 1994), and on the preliminary analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the construction industry, highlighted in section 2.2 above. It also adopts the vision of 
the construction industry, as contained in the Department of Public Works document on the Enabling 
Environment for the Construction Industry. This is 'our vision is of a construction industry policy 
and strategy that promotes stability, consistent economic growth and international 
competitiveness, creates sustainable employment and to address this historical Imbalances as 
it generates new Industry capacity', (DPW, 1997). 
The author is of the view that the initial development of an industrial development strategy for the 
construction industry would be best co-ordinated by the Inter Ministerial Task Team for Construction 
Industry Development, and subsequently managed and further developed and refined by the yet to be 
established Construction Industry Development Board (DPW, 1997), comprised the stakeholders in 
the construction industry. Figure 2.2 on page 2.17 suggests a process for the formulation of an 
integrated industrial development strategy which commences with the identification of the elements of 
such a process and concludes with the implementation of such an intervention. The activities 
associated with the appraisal aspects and choices pertaining to such a strategy are also presented. 
This strategy draws on work done by Ofori (1994) in analysing the development of a strategic plan for 
the construction industry in Singapore. 
The compilation of a preliminary industrial development strategy for the construction industry is 
urgently required . It would provide a common rallying point for all stakeholders within the South 
African construction industry, and would enable them to analyse and locate the various enabling and 
intervening strategies that are currently being proposed, within a broader framework, which has not 
yet been clearly defined. In the formulation and finalisation of such an industrial development strategy 
it is envisaged that the role of the State would be comprehensively analysed and assessed by those 
participatin9· 
The author is of the view that the State must play both intervening and enabling roles to address 
structural problems inherent within the construction industry at present. A similar view is held by 
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Merrifield (1997) and is argued in the Green Paper on the Enabling Environment for the Construction 
Industry (DPW, 1997). 
The Affirmative Procurement Policy is an intervening policy aimed at addressing some of the 
structural problems in the South African construction industry. It requires enablement on 
govemment's behalf to ensure that the policy intent is met. It as such, can form one of the building 
blocks in the broader process of industry development and illustrates how the state can play both 
intervening and enabling roles to address specific structural problems in an integrated industrial 
development strategy for the construction industry. 
It is with in this context, that this discourse will proceed to examine, in slightly greater detail, the role of 
the State in developing the construction industry and the rationale for selective State interventions in 
the construction industry in South Africa. 
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FIGURE 2.2 : Process for formulating a strategy for the Construction Industry in South Africa 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN DEVELOPING 
THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, 
WITH A FOCUS ON PUBLIC SECTOR PROCUREMENT 
AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR EFFECTIVE STATE INTERVENTION 
3.1 
3.1 THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN DEVELOPMENT 
No formulation, or analysis, of a sectoral industrial development strategy as outlined in Chapter 2 for 
the South African construction industry, would be complete without defining and analysing the various 
roles that the State should and is likely to play in giving effect to such a strategy. Traditionally, such 
analysis has departed from analysing the role of the State and looks also at markets in the unfolding 
of the strategy, and the extent to which State intervention through enabling strategies is required . The 
debate on the role of the State in markets is an ongoing one, especially within the context of a 
developing country such as South Africa . Unfortunately. most of the commentary and analysis on th is 
subject has created a false dichotomy between the State and the markets, as it relates to 
development. Such analysis conceptualises the role of the State as replacing the market, and places 
significant limitations on the range of intervening and enabling strategies that Government is likely to 
offer. This 'either-or' approach assumes that either Government directly controls resource allocations, 
or that such allocations be left completely to market forces. This over-simplification does not take 
account of the various forces at play within a country's economy and, interestingly, excludes the 
impact of labour. Clearly, the State does not only have to spend money, or direct resources, to 
influence the functioning of markets, which is influenced by many Government policy choices , 
whether implicit or explicit. Rather than considering the State and markets as being distinctly 
separate, a better appreciation is obtained by acknowledging that they are interdependent but 
fragmented, and that both are heterogeneous entities comprising a wide range of institutions through 
which individual groups pursue their own interests (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). 
Having acknowledged the complex interplay between the State and the market in the economy of a 
country, the extent and the nature of State involvement and the specific role that it is likely to play is 
very much country and industry specific. South Africa's Reconstruction and Development Program 
(RDP) (ANC, 1994) clearly sees and acknowledges the link between growth and development, 
particularly in so far as the construction sector is concerned, and the need for the State to intervene 
strategically in the economy of the country. The subsequent development of GEAR, whilst placing a 
greater emphasis on the market, still acknowledges the need for both enabling and intervening 
strategies by the State to ensure a growing economy (OOF, 1996). It is apparent from the analysis of 
both the ROP, and GEAR, that there is an acknowledgement that a capitalist economy is subject to 
structural weaknesses which cannot be overcome without some degree of State intervention. The 
State can, via appropriate interventions and policy choices, contribute to better functioning and 
enabling of markets, whilst acknowledging the primary role that the private sector has to play in 
providing goods and services required by the citizenry (Coetzee, 1989). 
This ;s the perspective adopted by the current South African Government in defining the State's role 
in the economy. Adam et af (1997) in their analysis of business in a post-apartheid South Africa , 
found that the vast inequities in South African society, which is structured along racial lines, arose 




policy. They indicated that there is a need for a fine balance between government, labour and 
business in unlocking the development of the South African economy and acknowledged the need for 
strategic interventions by government to ensure redisbibution and social equity. Reference is also 
made to the fact that this approach is necessary to maintain the fragile balance of the forces at play in 
the unfolding development of South Africa in the post-apartheid era. Eberhard and van Horen (1996), t 
in analysing the minerals and energy sector in South Africa make a similar observation, namely, the 
need for strategic interventions by the State, primarily on the basis of promoting social equity, framed 
as an economic necessity, rather than a social responsibility. It is within this framework that the role 
of the State in developing the construction industry in South Africa needs to be located. 
3.2 THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Several commentators and analysts have commented on the critical role that the State has to play in 
the construction sector. Whilst the 1970's saw a significant deregulation of the world economy, recent 
trends in the United Kingdom, Singapore and Malaysia, amongst others, support the argument for 
greater State involvement in the construction industries of those countries (Merrifield, 1997). The 
Green Paper on the Enabling Environment for the Construction Industry in South Africa (DPW, 1997) 
also argues for State intervention in the construction industry to promote equity and to locate it within 
the framewor1<. of the broader project of nation building and reconciliation currently taking place in 
South Africa. 
It is useful, at this juncture, to define the various roles that the State may play in the construction 
industry of a country. Ofori, (1990) in analysing aspects of the construction Industry's economics and 
management, presents three principal roles through which a government is likely to impact on the 
construction industry. These include an investor role , a regulatory role and a developmental role. The 
Green Paper on the Enabling Environment (DPW, 1997) sees the envisaged role of the State in the 
construction industry slightly differently. It suggests that the key roles of Government are those of a 
regulator, a facilitator and a client. An analysis of these proposals indicates that the difference in 
terminology is largely one of semantics, and does not indicate any fundamental differences at a 
conceptual leve\. For the purposes of further discussion, the author has chosen to adopt the 
terminology proposed by Ofori (1990). A brief commentary on the different roles that the State is 
likely to play in the construction industry of South Africa is as follows : 
• The State •• Investor 
In South Africa, the public sector and public corporations initiate between 40 and 50 % of construction 
related GDFI, and this is likely to increase if the current macro economic strategies are maintained 
(DPW, 1997). The State, therefore, has a responsibility to its citizenry to ensure a thriving and 
efficient construction industry and to promote productivity, quality and value for money, thereby 
ensuring a greater return on its investment. The State, with its significant share in the construction 
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market is also in a position to influence certain industry-related outcomes. Th is ability , is heightened 
within the South African environment, where established, private sector construction role players want 
to be seen to be responsive and receptive to the needs of the current government. in view of their 
chequered roles during the apartheid-era. Hodgson's (1997) historical perspective on the 
development of the construction industry in South Africa clearly demonstrates the impact apartheid 
and its associated policies have had on the construction industry, and their contribution to the skewed 
ownership patterns that currently prevail in the industry. 
• The State as regulator in the construction industry 
Regulatory intervention in South Africa is primarily aimed at public protection. To this end, the 
regulatory framework is largely in the form of statutes addressing issues such as standards for 
occupational health and safety, adherence to environmental requirements, specification of 
construction procedures and materials, compliance with planning requirements , and the like. A 
regulatory framework also exists in respect of the delivery of professional design services within the 
built environment. 
• Developmental role of the State 
The State has identified the construction industry as a sector of the economy where significant socio-
economic objectives, such as job creation, skills transfer and entrepreneur promotion, can be realised 
via the delivery of construction related goods and services. This position is based on an appreciation 
of the multi-facetted nature of the construction industry and its potential to create employment and 
stimulate entrepreneurial opportunities within the sector and in other sections of the economy. Both 
the Green Paper for the Enabling Environment for the Construction Industry (DPW, 1997) and the 
Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform (MOF and MPW, 1997) make specific reference 
to the role of the State in utilising its leveraging capability within the construction industry to realise 
specific socio-economic objectives. South Africa is in an advantageous position to ensure the 
realisation of such socio-economic objectives through the high investment envisaged by the public 
sector and public corporations in construction projects. The developmental role of the State in the 
construction industry is not only located within the context of the maximising of socio-economic 
outcomes on a project specific basis. It is also aimed at the promotion of public sector delivery 
programmes which target and support weaker sections of SOCiety, such as DPW's Community Based 
Public Works Programme. 
3.3 ENABLING POLICY INSTRUMENTS WITHIN THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR 
The State's ability and effectiveness in influencing outcomes within the construction industry in South 
Africa is largely dependent on the choice of policy instruments that it uses to address specific areas of 
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concern. The Green Paper on the Enabling Environment (DPW, 1997) highlights the following policy 
instruments that are at the disposal of the State in its interaction with the construction industry : 
• Regulation; 
• Procurement policy; 
• Government human resource strategy; 
• Direct support including financial support; and 
• Institutional support. 
The policy instrument of regulation is used primarily for public protection and to ensure compliance 
with minimum standards, an example being standard building regulations. Procurement policy could 
be used either to promote efficiencies within the construction industry, or to promote socio-economic 
objectives. State utilisation of procurement policy to promote efficiencies and to realise specific socio-
econom ic objectives within the construction industry has potential, especially in developing countries 
This view is confirmed by Aziz and Ofori , 1996; Masiyiwa, 1994; Watermeyer, 1997; Abeysekera and 
Oezylva, 1997; Watermeyer et ai, 1998. Policy instruments aimed at human resource development 
within government are primarily intended to minimise delivery bottlenecks in the public sector, and, 
thereby, to promote overall efficiencies within the construction industry. Policy instruments of financial 
and institutional support by the State are primarily aimed at addressing supply side constraints, such 
as access to finance, managerial and technical skills and information. 
The author will now focus more specifICally on public sector procurement as a policy instrument for 
effective State intervention in the construction industry. 
3.4 PUBLIC SECTOR PROCUREMENT AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR EFFECTIVE STATE 
INTERVENTION WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO PREFERENCING 
3.4.1 Public Procurement 8S an Instrument of Policy 
Governments, in general, have utilised their public sector procurement capability to realise a range of 
objectives not necessarily connected with the immediate purpose of procuring specific goods and 
services. Arrowsmith, (1995) in her analysis of public procurement and its relationship with market 
<' liberalisation in the United Kingdom, refers to these objectives as secondary policies. Such 
secondary policies focus on a range of outcomes, from efficiency related issues, to objectives which 
could be broadly defined as socio-economic. 
The utilisation of public sector procurement to realise socio-economic objectives can be traced back 
to public procurement preference schemes introduced in the 1930's to assist areas hit by the Great 
\ Depression. Following the Second World War, further schemes were adopted, some of which 
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survived in Europe until 1991 . The South African government, prior to 1994, used procurement to 
promote South African goods and to provide incentives to produce goods within demarcated areas. 
The tendency of governments to use public sector procurement as a policy instrument is 
understandable, particularly when noting that the size of government markets means that they provide 
significant opportunities to impact on the country's economy. The Green Paper on Public Sector 
Procurement in South Africa estimates that total , consolidated, general Government procurement 
expenditure was approximately R56 billion for the 1995/96 financial year. This amount constituted 
approximately 13% of GDP and represented approximately 30% of all Government expenditure (MOF 
and MPW, 1997). Similar observations were made in the United Kingdom in 1984, where it was 
estimated that procurement by public bodies and associated public corporations accounted for 21 ,8% 
of GDP in the United Kingdom (Arrowsmith, 1995). Governments are seen, therefore, to have the 
ability to utilise their large purchasing power to influence industrial, economic and social outcomes, 
and to create behaviour responses in the market. McCrudden (1995) in his analysis of public 
procurement and equal opportunities in the European Union, highlighted five principal domestic, socio 
economic, or political, functions which public procurement may be used to achieve: 
• To stimulate economic activity 
• To protect national industries against foreign competition 
• To improve the competitiveness of certain industrial sectors 
• To remedy regional disparities; and 
• To achieve certain social policy functions, such as utilisation of local labour and increased 
employment of the disabled. 
Arrowsmith (1995) makes a similar observation and identifies public procurement policy as having 
industrial, economic and social policy objectives. Both Arrowsmith (1995) and McCrudden (1995) 
make a clear distinction between the industrial, economic and social policy objectives of public 
procurement. This distinction is reinforced by McCrudden's (1995) definition of ~contract compliance-
as : 
'the use of public procurement as an instrument of social policy, particularly for the 
purpose of achieving equality of opportunity between different groups' 
The author stresses the importance of placing these observations within the context of developed 
economies, and considers that, within the South African context. the delineations are inappropriate. 
In South Africa, social policy is intimately linked to the economic and industrial well being of the 
country, especially taking into account the legacy of inequality based on race. 
The Malaysian experience provides us with an interesting example of how public sector procurement 
was utilised to promote the economic development of its indigenous Bumiputra community, thereby 
enabling its integration into the overall Malaysian economy and contributing to its greater 
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competitiveness in the South East Asian market (Ministry of Finance, Malaysia, 1997). Whilst the 
recent collapse of the South East Asian economy indicates certain limitations in the manner in which 
countries like Malaysia have managed their economies, it is accepted that public procurement has 
contributed significantly to the economic integration of all sectors of the Malaysian population. This 
has contributed to Malaysia's competitiveness in the South East Asian market, especially in respect of 
design, build, finance and operate type projects in Southern and South East Asia (Aziz and Ofori , 
1996). 
Within the South African context, it is apparent that the current Government intends using public 
procurement as one of the instruments to realise broader developmental goals. This is clearly spelt 
out in the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement where the twin objectives of public sector 
procurement reform and socto economic objectives are highlighted (MOF and MPW, 1997).1 
3.".2 Models for PubliC Sector Procurement Intervention 
Various models for public sector procurement intervention have evolved internationally, based largely 
on country specific requirements. With the rapid rate of globalisation of the world economy, several 
countries have had to review public sector procurement strategies to ensure compliance with multi-
lateral agreements emanating from organisations such as the World Trade Organisation. It is not 
intended in this dissertation to comment on the impact that trade liberalisation is likely to have on a 
country's ability to use publ~ sector procurement as an instrument of policy. However, it would be a 
serious omission if this factor were not raised as an issue that needs to be constantly monitored, as it 
does have a bearing on the nature and the form of procurement interventions that countries are likely 
to adopt. 
The procurement interventions or models that exist at present are as follows: 
• Price pr.f.renclng policy 
Under such a policy, targeted groups are given a price preference and, in general, there is no 
exclusion of non-targeted groups from the bidding process. An example of the implementation of this 
model is the case of Greece, where a price preference of up to 8% on public sector procurement was 
accorded to business enterprises located outside the prefecture of Attica, which encompasses the 
area of Athens (McCrudden, 1995). This was introduced to avoid an over concentration of economic 
activity in the Athens area. The Affirmative Procurement Policy currently utilised by the national 
Department of Public Works in South Africa also utilises a price preferencing mechanism to target 
woman-owned enterprises and Affirmable Business Enterprises for contracts of less than R2 million 
I The author was a member of the management team responsible for the fOnTIulation of this Green Paper, and in the 
formulation of such policy, the nature and the extent of state intervention was primarily located within the context of the role of 
the State, as defined In the Reconstruction and Development Program. 
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• Set asides 
Set asides refer to a procurement strategy whereby a percentage of the total value of transactions in 
a specified market segment, or sub·segment, is set aside for a particular targeted group. In such 
cases, businesses from non-targeted groups cannot participate in the bidding process. A good 
example of a set aside program occurs in the United States, where Federal contracts for the supply of 
goods and services that have estimated values of between US$ 2 500 and US$ 100 000 are reserved 
exclusively for small business (McCrudden, 1995). 
• Step·in mechanisms 
This phrase "step.in mechanism" has been coined by the author within the context of public sector 
procurement, as this cannot be viewed as a direct preference. Using this approach, targeted 
enterprises are granted the opportunity to step in once the cheapest bid has been established. A 
targeted enterprise is offered the contract, provided that it can match the terms and conditions offered 
by the cheapest bidder. Examples of this model of intervention are the step-in options for small and 
medium enterprises developed in Germany in 1976, and a modified version thereof entitled the 
Special Preference Scheme, which was used in the United Kingdom (Arrowsmith, 1995). 
• Contract participation goal..setting 
Using this model, the procurement agency specifies a minimum contract participation goal, be ing a 
percentage of the value of the contract which must to be undertaken by the targeted group. Achieving 
this contract participation goal could be either at a prime contract level by means of a joint venture 
relationship, or at a sub-contract level by the procurement of materials, supplies and services, 
including professional services, from the targeted group. Under this model, the responsibility of 
attain ing the contract participation goal rests with the contractor and bonus points contributing 
towards the award of the contract are awarded to tenderers who offer to exceed the minimum contract 
participation goal. Examples of this model are the City of Atlanta's Equal Business Opportunity 
Program (City of Atlanta, 1994), and the South African Department of Public Works Affirmative 
Procurement Policy (APP) for construction projects in excess of R2 million (Watermeyer et ai, 1998). 
The foregoing illustrates that the various models of public sector procurement interventions, which 
have evolved internationally and locally, have done so on the basis of country-specific requirements. 
It is important to note that the use of procurement as an instrument of policy is not without 
controversy, with differing viewpoints as to its legitimacy and effectiveness. Resolution of points of 
view is hampered by limited research and the lack of data on most international programs and 
schemes. It is within this global context, that the South African Government has adopted a fairly 
controversial stance, from an international perspective, with the utilisation of government procurement 
as an instrument of policy. The author is of the view that, prior to presenting an overview on the 
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South African situation relating to public sector procurement as an instrument of policy, it will be 
useful to sketch a brief ouUine of the approach adopted in the United States in regard to contract 
compliance. Many of the issues raised in this connection are of relevance in South Africa, as the 
operational systems currenUy utilised in South Africa have drawn upon USA experience.2 
3.4.3 An Overview of the USA Experience In regard to Contract Compliance 
The utilisation of public procurement for socio-economic purposes relating to equal opportunities has 
been in operation for a substantial time in the United States (McCrudden, 1995). The basis of the 
current program can be traced back to Executive Order No 11246, promulgated by President Lyndon 
Johnson in 1965, which obliged government contractors to take affirmative action measures to ensure 
equality of opportunity. This order emanated primarily from observations as to the limited 
employment opportunities being made available to minority groups. It is important to note that the 
USA program was, initially, linked only to the issue of labour equity, and it was only in 1978 that the 
program was formally expanded to provide preferences to business enterprises owned by socially, or 
economically, disadvantaged persons. Interestingly, the construction industry has always been at the 
forefront in the utilisation of public sector procurement as an instrument of policy in USA, with the 
linkage between public procurement and employment equity in the construction industry being 
traceable to area programs such as the St Louis plan in 1965 and the Philadelphia ptan in 1967 
(McCrudden, 1995). In his analysis of contract compliance in America, McCrudden acknowledges that 
the construction industry was the first sector in the USA in which an explicit approach to affirmative 
action was developed by the US Federal Government. He attributes this to the construction industry's 
status as a major sector in the economy, which could generate employment opportunities for large 
numbers of unemployed and under-employed Black workers. It is important to note that, from a 
political perspective, employment opportunities generated within the construction industry are highly 
visible and much of the new work that was being undertaken at the time was within the context of 
urban renewal in, or in close proximity to, large Black neighbourhoods. A further factor that influenced 
the focus on the construction industry was that it was highly dependant on public funds, the Federal 
Government of the time being responsible for at least one third of expenditure on construction in the 
country, and consequently enjoying high leverage capability. Since the issuing of the Executive Order 
in 1965, the policy relating to contract compliance in the United States has evolved to embrace a 
wider range of target groups, such as woman-owned businesses, and has also been implemented at 
various levels of government. 
Leonard's (1990) study of the effects of affirmative action regulation on employment equity in the 
United States indicates that significant gains were made in the sphere of both male and female Black 
2 As one of the co-authors of the Government's Affirmative Procurement Policy specifications, the author wishes to 
acknowledge that whilst the policy and the specifications respond to a need that is truly South African, the operational systems 
largely draw from the USA experience, and more specifically that of the US Department of Transport. The American system is 
localed within the conditions of contract; the South African is in the resource (management) specifications. The Disadvantaged 
Business Enterprise Participants' Manual provided a useful basis from which the South African specifications and operational 
systems were developed. 
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employment via contract compliance. There was no evidence that affirmative action has resulted in a 
productivity decline (Leonard, 1990). Similar observations were made by Johnson (1990) in her 
analysis of affirmative action policy in the United States, and its impact on woman. The introduction 
and implementation of contract compliance policy have been unsuccessfully contested on the 
grounds of constitutionality of the USA. Various programs utilising the set aside model, or the 
preferencing model, or a combination of both, aimed at employment equity of minorities and the 
targeting of minority·owned and woman~owned businesses are applicable in all tiers of government in 
the United States today. 
Some interesting observations which emanate from the author's review of the USA policy on contract 
compliance (Brimmer and Marshall , 1990: McCrudden, 1995: Office of Civil Rights and Office of 
Highways Operation, 1990; City of Atlanta, 1994) and which are of Significance to South Africa are : 
• The challenges to the policy were made, primarily, on the basis of consututionality; 
• The requirements for contract compliance are, currently, located within bid documents, as 
opposed to revolving around pre·award negotiations, as was previously the case: 
• Stricter enforcement resulted in enhanced effectiveness of the program; 
• The program is being applied at aUlevels of government. namely, federal, state, and city levels; 
and 
• The program primarily targets minorities and is located within a social policy paradigm. 
3.4.4 The current South African approach to Public Procurement aimed at realising SocIo-
Economic Objectives 
3.4.4.1 The South African government's approach 
It is quite apparent from the preceding sections that the current South African government has 
recogn ised the need for strategic interventions in the economy. These interventions are primarily 
aimed at ensuring a thriving, growing and competitive economy in global terms. The concept of social 
equity in the South African context cannot be viewed merely within the human rights perspective. 
Whilst this is of great importance, it is also necessary that interventions should increase the number of 
partiCipants in the South African economy, thereby contributing to greater efficiencies and growth 
within the economy in the medium to long term. In the preceding sections it was demonstrated that 
public sector procurement is an important instrument that can facilitate state intervention in specific 
economic sectors. In the following sections, the author reviews South Africa's approach to public 
sector procurement as an instrument to rea lise socio-economic policy objectives. 
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3.4.4.2 Public .actor procuroment In South Africa the pre-1994 era 
Prior to 1994, public sector procurement in South Africa was regulated in terms of the State Tender 
Board Act of 1968 (Act No 86 of 1968). The general conditions for procuring goods and services 
were contained in the State Tender Board's General Conditions and Procedures (ST 36). A review of 
the abovementioned legislation, including the regulations and amendments, indicates that the 
regulatory framewoi'X for public sector procurement in South Africa before 1994 was based on 
systems and procedures that are prevalent in developed countries. The emphasis of the regulatory 
framework was primarily, on financial rules and regulations, as opposed to the broader economic 
implications of public sector procurement. A Similar observation was made in the Green Paper on 
Public Sector Procurement in South Africa (MOF and MPW, 1997). The only reference to targeting, 
or preferencing. is in Section 25 of ST 36, where consideration was given to tender preferences for 
products with local content, or worK where local processes were involved; preferences for the 
utilisation of the South African Bureau of Standards standardisation mark; preferences related to the 
regional industrial development incentives in force at that time; and, in terms of clause 25.1.4, 
preferences as may be determined by the Minister of State Expenditure from time to time. The author 
has been unable to identify any instance where this latter option was exercised by the Minister of 
State Expenditure.3 
The foregoing observations may be interpreted as indicating that a free and fair procurement system 
prevailed at the time. The author argues that the review of public sector procurement legislation in 
force in South Africa during that period was consistent with that prevalent elsewhere in the world. 
However, it is important to locate such legislation within the scope of the various statutes promulgated 
to promote apartheid, such as the Group Areas Act. and legislation relating to job reservation on racial 
grounds, since such legislation effectively restricted participation in public sector procurement. The 
disproportionate allocation of resources at the time, on the basis of racial classification, exacerbated 
biased participation. A review by the Procurement Task Team, in 1995, of contracts awarded during 
the five years preceding 1994 indk;ated that approximately 95 % of State contracts were awarded to 
White-owned and controlled enterprises.} The author postulates that. whilst the regulatory framework 
relating to public sector procurement appears to have been fair and reasonable, the underpinning 
legislation of the apartheid paradigm ensured that the prime participants and beneficiaries of public 
sector procurement were from the White race group. It was, therefore, not necessary to effect 
targeting via public sector procurement, as this was largely achieved through decades of apartheid~ 
related legislation. The author is of the view that this is important, because a superficial analysis of 
past public sector procurement policies and guidelines may result in a downplaying of the significant 
role that public sector procurement has played in the growth and development of White-owned 
J This observation was based on an interview conducted with the Chief Director of the State Tender Board by the author, a 
review of State Tender Board directives from 1985 to 1994 and Is also inferred in Van der Unden's commentary on new 
developments in state tendering systems (Van der Linden , 1992). 
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enterprises. The author contends that several of the larger civil engineering construction companies 
owe a significant proportion of their growth and development and, hence, their current status, to public 
sector procurement opportunities in the apartheid era.4 
3,4.4,3 The Post -1994 Era 
Following the first democratic elections in the Republic of South Africa, after decades of unequal 
development based on racial lines, the Government of National Unity, led by the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Public Works embarked upon initiatives to reform public sector procurement. This 
initiative was driven, primarily, by the need to ensure a more equitable distribution of public sector 
procurement opportunities, but, also, to ensure the promotion of efficiency in public sector 
procurement. Arising from a request from the Minister of Public Works in South Africa, the World 
Bank, via its institutional development grant facility, agreed to fund the first phase of this initiative. 
The primary objective was to define a policy framework that would be receptive to South Africa's 
current developmental needs, which, in turn, were driven by the twin reform objectives of realising 
socio-economic goals and promoting good governance through public sector procurement reform 
(MOF and MPW, 1997). 
Processes were instituted to ensure that the views of a wide range of key stakeholders involved in 
public sector procurement in South Africa were obtained. The author, who was then special advisor 
to the Minister of Public Works, was privileged to be appointed as co-chairperson of the Public Sector 
Procurement Forum which was tasked with the development of a new policy framework for 
procurement in South Africa. The Forum was supported by the appointment of a Public Sector 
Procurement Task Team, whose members were drawn from both the public and private sectors. 
During the development of the policy framework for public sector procurement, it became apparent 
that there was a need for an overhaul of the regulatory framework and legislation relating to public -
sector procurement in South Africa, in order to operationalise a range of policy reform proposals 
required to achieve both socio-economic and good governance objectives. Accordingly, the following 
concurrent strategies were adopted by the Procurement Task Team. 
• Development of a policy framework 
A new policy framework for public sector procurement was developed and is encapsulated in the 
Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa. This will ultimately lead to new 
legislation being enacted . 
• The author wishes to clarify that this observation is not intended to downplay or to derogate from the signifICant role that these 
construdion enterprises have and will play in the development of South Africa, but rather to record that they did derive 
business benefits from the apartheid State. 
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• Development of Interim procurement str.tegies 
The Ten Point Plan on Public Sector Procurement (MOF and MPWs, 1995) was developed to create 
a range of interim procurement strategies aimed primarily at increasing the participation of previously 
disadvantaged enterprises in public sector procurement. This strategy was introduced in order to 
prevent the perpetuation of the inequitable award of State contracts after 1994, whilst new policy was 
being developed,5 It is important to note that the Procurement Task Team was given a clear mandate 
to ensure that there was synergy between the policy framework that was being developed and the 
interim strategies, This was to ensure that the interim strategies would serve to pilot initiatives that 
were likely to be encapsulated in new legislation , 
The Ten Point Plan on Public Sector Procurement was adopted by the National Government Cabinet 
as its interim procurement policy in November 1995, The Ten Point Plan remains government's 
interim procurement policy. The State Tender Board adopted the Ten Point Plan for implementation 
in the procurement of goods and services during August 1996. 
The Green Paper on PubliC Sector Procurement in South Africa was released with the full 
endorsement of the Cabinet of the Govemment of National Unity in April 1997. All policy perspectives 
contained in the Ten Point Plan have been incorporated into the Green Paper. The Department of 
State Expenditure has since been tasked with the responsibility of preparing the White Paper on 
Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa and associated legislation.e 
On the basis of the proposals contained in the Green Paper, it is clear that the South African 
Govemment has embraced the policy of utilising public sector procurement as an instrument to 
realise socio-economic policy. It is also apparent that targeted procurement is intended to be a key 
instrument in addressing inequities in various sectors of the South African economy, and that a policy 
of affirmative procurement is likely to be included in forthcoming legislation (MOF and MPW, 1996). 
Any review of the implementation of affirmative procurement by the Department of Public Works 
should, therefore, not only be seen as a review of an interim strategy, but also of overall government 
policy that is likely to be implemented over the medium term in South Africa. Prior to an overview of 
the Ten Point Plan and its development into the Affirmative Procurement Policy specifications, the 
author presents the constitutional framework within which public sector procurement is currently 
located in South Africa. 
J Based on public statements made by the Minister of Public Works, and the Deputy Minister of Finance in 1995, and directives 
~iven to the Procurement Task Team by these political office bearers. 
From discussions between the author and the Chief Director of the State Tender Board who Is responsible for the formulation 
of the White Paper, it is apparent that such legislation is likely to be tabled in Parliament In the year 2000. 
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3.4.5 South African Constitutional Provisions for Public Sector Procurement 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa makes specific constitutional provisions pertaining to 
public sector procurement in South Africa. Section 217 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) contains specific provisions relating to procurement (refer to 1.1 of 
chapter 1). 
The Constitution provides the framework for targeted procurement via preferencing and specifies that 
national legislation should clearly prescribe the framework within which such preferencing should be 
effected by organs of State. The inclusion of public sector procurement in the constitution of a 
country is not common, and indicates the seriousness with which South Africa views public sector 
procurement as a socio-economic instrument. Interestingly, the in itial clauses pertaining to public 
sector procurement that were included in the Interim Constitution did not make any specific provision 
for such preferences. Section 187 of the Interim Constitution for the Republic of South Africa, 1993 
(Act no 200 of 1993), was framed as follows : 
(1) The procurement of goods and seNices, for any level of government shall be regulated by an 
act of parliament and provincial laws which shall make provision for the appointment of 
independent and impartial Tender Boards to deal with such procurements. 
(2) The tenden·ng system referred to in sub section 1 shall be fair public and competitive, and the 
Tender Board shall on request give reasons for their deCisions to interest parties. 
(3) No organ of State and no member of any organ of State or any other person shall improperly 
interfere with the decisions and operations of the Tender Board. 
(4) All decisions of the Tender Board shall be recorded' 
The significant departure in South Africa's approach to procurement between the Interim Constitution 
of 1993 and the Final Constitution of 1996 can be largely ascribed to the work done by the 
Procurement Task Team during the intervening period. During this period the Procurement Task 
Team reviewed the various legal challenges to the USA preferencing/set-aside policy, and arrived at 
the following approach : 
• The favouring of preferences which are non-exclusionary, rather than set asides, as the preferred 
modus operandi to give effect to targeted procurement in South Africa. 
• The need for a national legislative framework to define such preferencing and targeting, especially 
noting the various strategies adopted by different tiers of government during the intervening 
period; these were well intended but many had undesirable outcomes, e.g., the preferencing 
policy adopted by the Free State Tender Board for Free State based business enterprises. 
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It was, primarily, on the basis of this work that changes were proposed for inclusion in the final version 
of the Constitution,7 which is explicit in its approach to targeted procurement and the use of public 
procurement as an instrument to realise socio-economic policy objectives. 
Having identified the importance attributed to the targeting of specific groups in public sector 
procurement in South Africa, the author is of the view that it is likely to play a significant role in the 
development of the South African economy in the medium term. An analysis and assessment of the 
Affirmative Procurement Policy (APP) currently being implemented by the Department of Public 
Works, therefore, needs to be undertaken with this in mind, as it can provide useful route m·arkers for 
the refinement of the policy. 
3.4.6 The Ten Point Plan on Public Sector Procurement in South Africa and the development 
of the Afflnnatlve Procurement Policy Specifications 
The Ten Point Plan on public sector procurement in South Africa represents a cluster of policy and 
strategies that are aimed at increasing the participation of small and medium enterprises, especially 
those owned by historically disadvantaged individuals, in Government procurement opportunities. 
Notwithstanding the limitations present in the regulatory and legislatory framework, it was the view of 
the drafters that these strategies could contribute significantly to increased participation by small and 
medium enterprises, especially those owned by historically disadvantaged individuals. In summary, 
the Ten Point Plan incorporated the following ten strategies : 
1) The improvement of access to tendering information. 
2) The development of tender advisory centres. 
3) Broadening the participation base for small contracts. 
4) The waiving of security I sureties on construction contracts having values of less than R100 000. 
5) The unbundling of large projects into smaller projects. 
6) Promotion of early payment cycles by government. 
¥ 7) The development of a preference system for small and medium enterprises owned by historically 
disadvantaged individuals. 
8) The simplification of tender submissions. 
7 The author, as co-chairperson of the Public Sector Procurement Forum and as part of the management team responsible for 
the development of the revised public sector procurement policy, was privileged to be part of the team that contributed 10 this 
constitutional change, in the sphere of public sector procurement. 
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9) The appointment of a procurement ombudsperson. 
10) The classification of building and engineering contracts. 
In developing the Ten Point Plan for public sector procurement, cognisance was taken of the work 
done by the Department of Trade and Industry on small business development, especially with regard 
to access to finance, training, and the development of entrepreneurial and managerial skills (OTI, 
1995). ' The Department of Trade and Industry had the responsibility for addressing supply side 
constraints facing Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs), whilst the procurement reform 
initiative was required to create increased procurement opportunities for SMMEs, especially those 
owned by historically disadvantaged individuals. These two approaches were intended to create an 
enabling environment for growth and development of SMMEs. 
Although the Ten Point Plan was adopted by the Cabinet in November 1995, it was only approved for 
implementation by the State Tender Board in August 1996. The preferencing scheme for Affirmable 
Business Enterprises (ABEs) was approved by the Minister of Finance, utilising the regulatory 
framework contained in Clause 25.1.4 of ST 36 (State Tender Board, 1991). It is suggested that the 
delay in implementation of the Ten Point Plan by the State Tender Board may, largely, be attributed to 
a lack of understanding by members of the Board regarding the location of responsibility within State 
institutions for the formulation of public sector procurement policy. 
From a review of the current State Tender Board Act and ST 36, it is quite clear that the State Tender 
Board's responsibility relates, primarily, to ensuring that contracts are awarded in a free, fair and 
transparent manner and within the context of applicable government policy. The Act does not 
empower the Board to formulate public sector procurement policy and failure to appreciate this 
resulted in some tension within the Board. Similar tensions were noted at the time by the author in 
other government institutions and public corporations, such as the Gauteng Provincial Tender Board 
and the Transnet Tender Board. Whilst several reasons can be put forward for these transient 
difficulties, they can, broadly, be attributed to the public sector transformation taking place in South 
Africa. 
A review of the Ten Point Plan indicates a bias towards influencing the construction industry as 
evidenced by the fact that two of the points dealt solely with construction issues and the degree of 
detail provided in point 10 of the plan. It could be argued that a similar bias is also present in the 
Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa. The author, having been involved 
in both processes, proposes two reasons for this. The first is that it is 'by design' whilst the second is 
the nature of the procurement reform process and the role players involved. 
The focus on construction procurement 'by design' was based on acknowledgement that the 









procurement in the public sector, and that any strategy addressing public sector procurement 
limitations in the construction sector could be utilised, quite easily, in other sectors of government 
procurement. The complexity of public sector construction procurement and its need for focussed 
attention was acknowledged in a procurement efficiency study conducted by the United Kingdom 
Government (HMSO, 1995). A further factor that influenced the focus on this specific sector was that 
most of the local and international operational strategies for using public sector procurement as a 
socio- economic policy instrument are well developed within the construction sector. Examples 
include the Bumiputra Contractor Development Programme in Malaysia8 , the CONQUAS Programme 
in Singapore and its preceding programmes,9 Soweto's Contractor Development Programme, various 
programmes aimed at employment creation and small contractor development in South Africa 
(Watermeyer and Band, 1994), and the various programmes aimed at developing minority and 
women-owned businesses in the United States (McCrudden, 1995). The wealth of international 
documentation available to policy formulators in South Africa served as a useful departure point, 
notwithstanding that the policies mentioned above relate to country-specific needs. A factor that 
contributed to the focus on construction was the acknowledgement of the critical role that the 
construction industry is playing in the unfolding development of South Africa and the consequent need 
for the full enablement of this sector. 
Reasons for the focus on construction procurement that can be attributed to the nature of the 
procurement reform process and the role players involved, are as follows : 
• The Department of Public Works10 has been one of the main drivers of public sector procurement 
reform in South Africa. Noting that its primary business in government relates to the construction 
sector, it is understandable that emphasis has been placed on a range of strategies relating to the 
construction industry. 
• The key policy formulators of public sector procurement reform, including all members of the 
procurement task team and the co chairpersons of the Public Sector Procurement Forum, were 
from the built environment professions. 11 
With hindsight, it could be argued that a better balance of formulators of public sector procurement 
reform in South Africa should have been achieved by assembling a more diverse team of specialists. 
This argument can be countered by reference to the wide ranging public participation process that 
ensured that all stakeholders from different sectors of the economy were given adequate opportunity -to make inputs during the policy formulation process. The author asserts, therefore, that the 
emphasis on construction within the public sector procurement reform process in South Africa is, 
largely, a reflection of the extent of work that has been done, both internationally and locally, in this 
I Based on an interview with representatives of the Economic Policy Unit in Malaysia, 1995. 
D Based on an interview with Singapore CIBO representatives in Singapore, December 1997. 
10 The Procurement Forum was co-ehaired by a senior official nominated from the Department of Stale Expenditure (J 
Breytenbach) and a senior official from the Department of Public Works ($ Gounden). 
11 The task team comprised 0 Letchmiah (team leader-quantity surveyor), R Watenneyer (engineer), J Breytenbach (engineer). 
J Nkosi (town planner) and L Gouws. 
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sphere. Issues that are likely to be encountered in other economic sectors in South Africa are 
addressed, and should be used as a basis for formulating other sector-specific procurement 
strategies within the framework outlined in the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement. 
The development of the Affirmative Procurement Policy specifications largely originated out of a need 
to define a cost effective procurement system which could incorporate socio economic objectives in 
accordance with the objectives described by Watermeyer, et al (1998) as set out in the preview 
presented in 1.5 of chapter 1. 
The procurement of the Malmesbury prison and housing project in the Western Cape, in 1995, 
prompted the Department of Public Works to initiate the development of targeted procurement 
specifications that encapsulate the objectives highlighted in the Ten Point Plan (Letchmiah, 1997). 
Whilst the Ten Point Plan captured broad principles and goals, it did not provide well defined 
mechanisms whereby such a policy could be operationalised. The Affirmative Procurement Policy 
specifications therefore represented a logical progression of the development of the Ten Point Plan, 
and aimed to provide definable, quantifiable, measurable, verifiable and auditable procurement 
mechanisms, initially aimed at addressing the needs of the construction sector. These specifications 
were subsequently broadened to ensure applicability to a wide range of goods and services to be 
procured by the public sector (Watermeyer et aI, 1998). 
The Affirmative Procurement Policy being implemented by the National Department of Public Works 
targets ABEs via the procurement by the public sector of construction and construction related goods 
and services. In South Africa, contractors, suppliers and service providers are normally required to 
construct. supply or provide a service in accordance with a technical specification. The development 
and inclusion of the Affirmative Procurement Policy specifications now also requires contractors to 
execute their contracts in accordance with a human resource specification. These specifications 
define and sets out goals for targeted small, medium and micro enterprise participation in the 
performance of the contract in such a manner that it can be quantified, measured, verified and 
audited. These specifications also define the various permutations by which contractors can attain 
these goals in order to comply with the requ irements of the contract. Furthermore, they set out the 
measures which a client-body has at its disposal to remedy and penalise non-compliance. 
The specifications allow for direct preferences to be accorded to ABEs in respect of low value 
contracts. For projects of value less than R2 million, ABEs are encouraged to participate as prime 
contractors by way of a direct price preference of 8,3 % (maximum). For projects of value in excess 
of R2 million, participation goals are set. A participation goal is a percentage of the monetary value of 
the contract which is used to represent ABE participation and is defined as the value of goods and 
services for which a firm undertakes to engage ABEs in the performance of the contract. Prime 
Contractors can secure ABE participation in these contracts in one, or more, of the following ways : 
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• by sub-contracting parts of the contract to ABEs; 
• through the purchase of supplies and materials from ABE suppliers; 
• by obtaining manufactured articles from ABE manufacturers; 
• by engaging ABE professional, technical, or management, service provtders; or 
• by entering into joint venture agreements with one or more ABEs. 
In this changed environment, contracts are awarded on a point scoring system based on a 
development objective/price mechanism. Tenders are awarded points, in the first instance, for the 
financial offer and, in the second instance, for the extent to which the offer exceeds the minimum 
specified contract participation goal. Non-compliance with the minimum specified contract 
participation goal would render a tender submission non-responsive and lead to its automatiC 
recjection. On average, the Department of Public Works sets its contract participation goal for ABE 
participation at 15%. Tenders are awarded up to 90 points for price and up to 10 points for the 
degree to which they offer to exceed the minimum participation goal. In the development of these 
specifications, which were designed for inclUSion with standard contract documentation, careful 
attention was paid to the formulation of tender evaluation criteria, which are clearly spelt out to enable 
tenders to compete on a equitable basis. 
A full definition of an ABE is provided in Chapter 4. It is, in summary, either a small, medium or micro 
enterprise owned and managed by previously disadvantaged individuals. The rationale for defining 
the targeted group in this manner and for the application of the Affirmative Procurement Policy within 
the Department of Public Works is also provided in Chapter 4. At this juncture it is, however, 
important to note that the enterprises earmarked for this preference is defined in terms of: 
• being a legal registered business enterprise; 
• having clearly defined ownership management and control characteristics; and 
• having clearly defined turnover limits. 
Utilising the experience gained on the Malmesbury Prison Project, the Department of Public Works, in 
conjunction with the Public Sector Procurement Task Team (1996), developed a range of 
standardised resource specifteations relating to the Affirmative Procurement Policy. These 
specifICations were : 






targeting of Affirmable BUSiness Enterprises; 
Structured Joint Ventures (Affirmable Partners); 
Targeted Joint Ventures; 
Targeting of Local Resources; 
the engagement of Targeted Labour; and 
targeting of Affirmable Professional Service Providers 
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Whilst specifications APP1 to APP5'2 were approved for application on a pilot basis on the 
Department of Public Works' construction projects by the State Tender Board in August 1996, the 
Department concentrated its efforts primarily on the utilisation of the APP1 and APP2 specifications. 
This was in recognition of the fact that the APP1 and APP2 specifications, in the main, address the 
needs of ABEs and that the remaining specifications were designed to meet project-specific 
applications such as the stimulation of local economic development, employment creation and poverty 
alleviation (Watermeyer, 1998). The focused use of APP1 and APP2 was, also, motivated by the 
realisation within the Department of Public Works that the application of a new policy needs to be 
unfolded in an incremental manner, with the concurrent development of appropriate capacity and 
understanding by staff who are primarily responsible for its successful application. 
The next chapter focuses on the rationale for the development of affirmable business enterprises 
within the construction sector in South Africa. Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this dissertation review the 
application of the Affirmative Procurement Policy specifications and, more specifically , the 
specification on construction projects procured by the National Department of Public Works during the 
period August 1996 to June 1998. 
12 The international community has expressed considerable interest in Targeted Procurement and suggested a name change 
from Affirmative Procurment which has South Africa undertones to Targeted Procurement. The Department of Public Wol1l.s 
when it received and finalised the APP series of specifICations renamed the South African edition as follows: 
.. TP1 (APPt ): Targeting of Affirmable Business Enterprises 
.. TP2(APP2): Structured Joint Ventures (Affirmable Partners) 
.. TP3(APP3): Structured Joint Ventures (Targeted Partners) 
.. TP4(APP4): Targeting of l ocal Resources 
.. TP5(APP5): Engagement of Targeted labour 
.. TP6(APPS): Targeting of Affirmable Professional Sevice Providers 
The international version don1 have the bracketed reference. The international series of TP specifications in contrast to the 
South African editions have user defined definitions for the target groups. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
AFFIRMABLE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 




In this chapter, the author will consider SMMEs in general, and then focus more specifically on (ABEs) 
in the South African construction industry. their relevance and the constraints that confront them. It is 
acknowledged that small construction companies face similar problems to their counterparts in other 
industrial sectors and that most sectoral strategies aimed at developing small and medium size 
businesses have been based on an initial macro assessment of the impact that these businesses 
have on the growth and development of a country, across a spectrum of that country's economic 
activities. 
4.2 DEFINITIONS OF SMALL, MEDIUM AND MICRO ENTERPRISES (SMMEs) AND 
AFFIRMABLE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
Internationally, according to Ofori (1995), the definition of a SMME is, normally, linked to one or more 
of the following criteria : 
• the total number of employees; 
• value of fixed assets; 
• paid up capital; 
• annual turn-over; and 
• annual volume of physical production. 
It is apparent from a review of international literature that, whilst common trends are evident in the 
definition of SMMEs, these definitions are very much country and sector specific. Noting the 
heterogeneous nature of enterprises that are likely to be classified within the broad definition of small, 
medium and micro enterprises, Ofori (1995), in attempting to identify the different development needs 
of construction enterprises at different stages of their growth, utilises a categorisation of SMMEs 
based on their level of maturity. This categorisation draws on the work done by Ang (1992), who 
proposed three categories of SMMEs. The first of these is start-up companies, characterised 
primarily as family-owned businesses where basic management has not been put in place. The 
second category includes established SMMEs with structured management systems, which need 
improvement in productivity and modernisation. The third group are the globalising SMMEs, which 
require sophisticated management and systems to compete in the world market. Whilst Ang 's 
proposal was based on an assessment of active SMME's in Asia , it demonstrates that the range of 
SMMEs' need is dependent on their level of business maturity. 
In South Africa, the Department of Trade and Industry, in its White Paper on a National Strategy for 
the Development and Promotion of Small Business in South Africa (OTI, 1995), acknowledges the 
value of SMME classifications and proposes four broad categories. The four are survivalist 
enterprises; micro enterprises; small enterprises; and medium enterprises (OTI, 1995). The latter 
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three categories correspond to Ang's classification (Ang, 1992). The survivalist enterprise category 
covers activities in the informal sector, undertaken by people who are unable to find paid jobs or to 
get formal employment in the economic sectors of their choice. The focus of this dissertation is on 
SMMEs operating in the formal sector, because the aim of public sector procurement to reinforce tax 
morality can only be achieved through formal sector SMMEs. Survivalist enterprises do, however, 
remain an important component of the South African economy and a range of strategies beyond the 
scope of this dissertation needs to be developed. Neverthe~ss, the fine interplay between survivalist 
enterprises and micro and small enterprises in the South African construction industry is noted and is 
relevant. 
It could be argued that, at present in South Africa, many of the unregistered labour-only sub-
contractors in the construction industry fall into the category of survivalist enterprises. For the 
purpose of this dissertation, however, the author's focus will be on SMMEs operating in the formal 
sector. The Department of Trade and Industry defines an SMME as 'a separate and distinct 
busine.. entity, Including cr;operatlve enterprises and non-governmentsl organisations, 
managed by one owner or more which, Including Its branches or subsidiaries, "any. is 
predominantly carried on In any sector or sub-sector of the economy mentioned In column 1 
of the schedule and which can be classified as a micro, a very small, a small or a medium 
enterprise by satisfying the criteria mentioned In columns 3, 4 or 5 of the schedule, opposite 
the smallest relevant size or class as mentioned In column 2 of the schedule', (South African 
National Small Business Act, Act No. 102 of 1996). 
An excerpt from this schedule for the construction sector Is presented in Table 4.1. 
TABLE 4.1: SMME CRITERIA FOR THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AS PROVIDED FOR IN 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL SMALL BUSINESS ACT 
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3 COLUMN 4 
SECTOR OR SUB SIZE OR ClASS TOTAL FULL-TIME TOTAl ANNUAL TOTAL GROSS 
SECTORS IN EQUIVALENT OF TURNOVER ASSET VALUE 
ACCORDANCE WITH PAID EMPLOYEES (FIXED PROPERTY 
THE STANDARD EXCLUDED) 
INDUSTRIAL 
CLASSIFICATION LESS THAN LESS THAN LESS THAN 
CONSTRUCTION MEDIUM 200 R20,OOM R4,OOM 
SMALL 50 R5,OOM R1 ,QO M 
VERY SMALL 20 R2,OOM RO,40M 
MICRO 5 RO,15M RO,10 M 
The Act classifies SMMEs in terms of the number of employees, annual turnover, and total gross 
asset value, excluding fixed property. Whilst this sectoral classification represents a significant 
milestone in the definition of SMMEs in South Africa, it has limitations because of its broadness, which 
includes non-profit organisations. Furthermore, no sub-sector refinements , which are considered to be 
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critical in the construction industry, have been attempted. In the definition of SMMEs in the 
construction sector, it appears likely that general contractors, domestic sub-contractors, labour-only 
sub-contractors and consultants will all be similarly classified. This would, obviously, be incorrect as 
the turnovers, number of full time employees and total asset values vary widely between these 
subsectors and cannot be lumped together for procurement purposes. It is hoped that, in the 
development of sector-specific strategies for SMMEs, appropriate sub-categorisation will be 
forthcoming. 
We will now examine the definition of an Affirmable Business Enterprise (ABE), which is the targeted 
beneficiary of the Affirmative Procurement Policy, and the definition for synergy in specific areas, e.g., 
with the SMME definition for the construction sector embodied in the Small Business Act of 1996. A 
comprehensive definition of an ABE as provided for in the standardised resource specification for the 
Targeting of Affirmable Business Enterprises (TP1(APP1» (OPW, 1998) is as follows : 
DEFINmON: Affirmable Business Enterprise 
A business which adheres to statutory iabour practices, is a legat entity, registered with South African Rewmue Services and a 
continuing and Independent Enterprise lor profit, providing a Commercial Useful Function and: 
a) which is at least /wo thirds Owned by one or more Previously OiS8dvantaged Individuals or, in the case of a company, at 
least two thirds of tha shares ara Owned by one or more Previously Disadvantaged Individuals; and 
b) whOse management and daily business operations are in the Control of one or more of the PraviousJy Disadvantaged 
Individuals who effectively own it provided, however, that the ennua/average tumover excluding Velue Added Tax (VA T) 
and eny tumover generated in respect o( worlc performed by other parties in a joint venture or a consortium, of the 
business during the lesser of the period for which the buSiness has been operating, or the previously three financial years. 
does not exceed: 
1) R25 million in respect of contractors who generate more than orequal to 75 % of their lumover as Prime Contractors; 
2) R10 million in mspect cleantrectors who generate less than 75" of their tumoveras Primf! Contractors; 
3) R2, 5 miltian in raspect of labour-only sub-contrectors; 
4) R10 million in respect of Manufactumrs; 
5) R15 million in respect 01 Suppliers 
6) R2,5 million, exclusive of any tumover generated in raspect of outsourced activititJs which thI'J entI'J1prise does not 
have the in-house competence and expertise to perform, in respect of professional servic$ providers; and 
7) R2,5 million in respect of other service providers, e.g. trensporters: end 
c) thal the sum of the average annual turnovers over the same period of a/l thI'J business COfIC9ms which a(9 under thI'J 
Control of Previously Disadvantaged Individuals within the business entity or Affiliated Entities does not exceed one and 
a half (1,5) times the maximum allowable annual average tumover for the particular category of enterprise as set out in b) 
above. 
Supplementary definitions: 
Affiliated Entities: A buSiness 9ntity which has control of or the power to control another business entity, albeit indirectly, e.g., 
where a third person has control of or has the power to controt both entities. Indicators of control shall, without limitation, 
include intI'Jrlocking management or ownership, id&ntiry of interests among family members, Sharad facilities and equipment, or 
common use of employees. 
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Commet'ClMly UMfuI Function: TIH# P'9rfotmance of real and BCtual wom, or the provision of S8Mcss, in the dischat'f/8 of any 
contractual obligation which shaH Jnc/ude but not be limited to the performance of a distinct element of WClf'K which the business 
has the skill and expertise to unden8ke and the fflsponsibility for man8f1$ment and SUlJ(H'Vision. 
Control: The possession and exarcise of legal authority and power to manage the assets, goodwi" and daily operations of a 
business and the 8C1ive and continuous exercise of appropriate managerial authOrity and power In determining the poIlclBs of 
and diracfjng the operations of the business. 
ExecutJv. Director.' A partner in a partnership, a sole proprietor, 8 director of a company established in t9rms of the 
Companies Ad, 1973 (Act 61 of 1973) or 8 member of 8 close corpomtion RJgistered in tenns 01 the Close Cotporation Act, 
who jointly and severally with his partners, oo-dif'8ctors or co-memb9rs, 8S the case may be, bears the risk of business and 
takes responsibility for the management and liabilities of the partnership, company, or close OOIJ)Of8tion. 
Ind."andent En,.""., .. : An ent9rplise which is free of any degree of direct or indirect Ownership, or Control, by any (inn 
which engages in 8CtivitJeS similar to thosB in mspect of which Cf8dit towards the Contract PartiCipation Goal is sought, or by 
any Ex6CUffve Dif"fJCtor 01 such a finn, who is not a Previously Disadvantaged Individual. 
NOTE: Any enterprise whosB QWneI3 include firms which engage in the majority of activities that am performed by that 
ent9rprise cannot claim Affinnable Business Enterprise status. Likewise any tmterprise whiCh hss any non·PDI 
Executive Directors who hsve intemsts in such finns cannot claim Affinnsble Business Enterprise status. 
Owned.' Having all the customary incidents of ownershIp, including tha right of disposition, and sh8ring in all the risks and 
profits commensurate with the degree of ownership intemst as d6monstrated by an examination of the substance, rather than 
the fonn of ownership arrangements. 
In making comparisons, it is important to note that the definition of an ABE in the construction industry 
preceded the definition of an SMME in the construction sector, as contained in the Small Business 
Act. It is, therefore, likely that some discrepancies will be encountered. 
The objective of the current definition of ABE is to ensure the effective targeting of small , medium and 
micro enterprises owned by previously disadvantaged individuals in the construction sector. It is 
evident from this definition that the SMME parameter of turnover, delineated on the basis of prime 
contractor, sub-contractor, manufacturer, supplier, service provider, etc. was adopted. This 
delineation draws primarily from the USA experience and, in particular, that of the Small Business 
Agency, which co-ordinates preferencing programs at Federal level. It is expected that. when the 
various policy strands of the Small Business Act are put into effect at a sectaral level, turnover 
thresholds will be individually set on a sub-sectoral basis to acknowledge the different roles and 
functions that different enterprises fulfil. The definition of an ABE could serve as a useful route 
marker for this process. The difference in the upper tumover limits of R25-million for prime 
contractors in the ABE definition and R20-million for medium sized enterprises specified in the Small 
Business Act can be attributed to the timing of the formulation of the definitions. The author is of the 
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view that the turnover thresholds for ABEs could quite satisfactorily be amended to conform with 
those contained in the Small Business Act of 1996.' 
Two concepts used in the definition of an ABE, as it relates to its SMME status, are "independent 
enterprise- and "to render a commercially useful function-. These were included to ensure that correct 
targeting takes place, and that targeted SMMEs are bona-fide business enterprises and not 'front' 
companies for larger, non-qualifying enterprises wishing to access tender preferences. The author 
argues that a similar approach should be adopted in operationalising the Small Business Act, if 
appropriate targeting is to take place. From the foregoing , it is apparent that the section of the ABE 
definition that focuses on its SMME status is more rigorously defined than the SMME definition 
contained in the Small Business Act. Rather than viewing this as a potential source of conflict, the 
author suggests that it provides a useful starting point to refine the definitions of SMMEs in other 
sectors, in order to ensure appropriate targeting. 
Beyond the SMME categorisation contained in the Small Business Act, the White Paper on a National 
Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small Business in South Africa (DTI, 1995) is explicit 
about the need to specifically focus on SMMEs owned by previously disadvantaged individuals and 
the rationale for this is discussed in greater detail in section 3.4. At this juncture, however, it is 
important to note that, in the definition of an ABE, the need for such focus is dealt with by specific 
reference being made to a minimum of two thirds ownership by previously disadvantaged individuals. 
Also, management and control of the enterprise must vest with previously disadvantaged individuals. 
The definition of an ABE, which was initially proposed in 1995, and which preceded the SMME 
definition contained in the Small Business Act, reflected both the spirit and intent of the White Paper 
on a National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small Businesses in South Africa, both 
in terms of its adoption of tumover thresholds and specific targeting of enterprises owned by 
previously disadvantaged individuals within the small , medium and micro enterprise sectors. 
The author is of the view that this chapter would be incomplete without a brief review of the impact 
that SMMEs have on the economy of a country, and hence the attention they receive from 
governments around the world to ensure their ongoing growth and development. The next section, 
accordingly focuses on SMMEs and the economy, with an emphaSis placed on SMMEs in the 
construction sector. 
4.3 SMMEs AND THE ECONOMY 
SMMEs play an important role in the economies of all countries, both developing and developed. In 
Singapore, for example, SMMEs comprise 94 % of business enterprises and account for 71% of tota l 
employment (Ang, 1992; Ofori , 1995). South Africa has a poor statistical base for SMMEs, but it is 
estimated that they account for approximately 60% of employment in the economy and 40% of output 
, The author was part of the team that drafted the ABE definition, and notes that whilst the turnover thresholds prescribed in the 
ABE definition recognise local market conditions the preliminary nature of the assessment made at the time, does not warrant 
the strict adherence to the R25-mill ion turnover threshold. 
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(OTI, 1998). SMMEs have played an important role in some countries in facilitating their transitions 
from developing to industrialised status and such transitions have generally been accompanied by the 
rapid growth and development of small and medium enterprises (Steel and Webster, 1991 ; Ofori 
1995). The Reconstruction and Development Program (ANC, 1994) and the Growth Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, (DOF, 1996) both identify the promotion of SMMEs as a key element 
of Government's strategy for employment creation, economic growth, and the promotion of equity in 
South Africa. 
The role and the contribution of the SMME sector are wide ranging and multi-facetted and SMMEs 
offer several benefits to the economy of a country (DTI, 1995; DPW, 1997; OIori , 1995). Whilst these 
benefits relate to SMMEs across the economic spectrum, the author is of the view that they apply in 
greater measure to the construction sector. Some of the contributions by the SMME sector are the 
following : 
• They are generators of employment opportunities at relatively low capital cost. 
• SMMEs can be more competitive than larger firms on some spatially dispersed projects because 
of their relatively low overheads. Further, because SMMEs tend to be more geographically 
widespread, they have promoted economic activity beyond the traditional domain of the larger 
companies, thereby serving as important catalysts for local economic development. 
• They provide an entry point into the economy for persons with limited capital , or technical skills. 
• Their flexibility enables them to exploit niche markets both locally and internationally. 
• They provide an opportunity to ensure more equitable income distributkm and wider-ranging 
competition. This is particularly important in the South African context, noting South Africa's 
legacy of big business domination and unequal distribution of income. 
• They are able to successfully effect backward and forward linkages between other sectors of the 
economy. 
• Noting the global trends towards outsourcing, SMMEs provide a basis for sub-contracting by 
larger enterprises, thereby realising higher order efficiencies in some sectors of the economy. 
This last point is of particular relevance in the construction industry, where the current trend is for the 
larger contractors to adopt a managing contractor approach. Cawthra (1991) observes that in the 
construction industry in the United Kingdom, project management and design skills are retained by 
the larger construction companies, whilst operational and artisan skills are located in small and 
medium enterprises. Edum-Fotwe et 81 (1997), in their review of small and medium contracting 
organisations, primarily in the United Kingdom, note that approximately 80 % of the turnover of 
general contractors and about 50% of the turnover of civil contractors is sub-contracted, and that the 
ability of larger contractors to deliver within project parameters is very much dependent on the small 
and medium contractors who are sub-contracted. In South Africa, a similar approach has been 
adopted by larger construction companies, primarily as a mechanism to counteract the volatility of 
demand. 
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It is estimated that between 20% and 30% of the firms in the construction sector in South Africa 
accounted for more than 80% of the construction output in 1991 . There is no reason to believe that 
this pattern has changed significantly (DPW, 1997). There might be a temptation to conclude that this 
represents an unhealthy situation. Hindle (1997) observed, however, that the 80/20 ratio is applicable 
to construction sectors in several countries , and could largely be attributed to the structure of 
construction markets. 
Accepting Hindle's statement, it is reasonable to assume that, in most countries, the distribution 
profile of construction enterprises contains four times more medium and small firms than large firms . 
Hindle further argues that this relationship should not be interpreted as market dominance, but 
renects a response to the way the construction market operates. He proposes that larger firms are not 
necessarily in competition with smaller firms but that they are complementary within the construction 
industry. The author endorses this position, and is of the view that the dominance of larger firms 
should not be seen as a negative factor in the South African construction industry, but rather as an 
expected consequence of the structure of the construction markets.2 
The role of SMMEs in the economy of a country is significant. The nature of construction markets 
globally has resulted in a necessary inter-dependence between SMMEs and larger construction 
companies. Whilst the larger construction companies account for a significant percentage of the 
construction output, it is clear that the overall performance of the construction sector is very much 
related to a thriving and vibrant SMME sector in the construction industry. 
4.4 RATIONALE FOR THE FOCUS ON ABEs IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY 
The importance of SMMEs in the construction sector has been highlighted in previous sections. This 
section explores the rationale for the specific focus on small, medium and micro construction 
enterprises that are owned, managed and controlled by previously disadvantaged individuals in South 
Africa . Internationally, most programs that have been aimed at promoting equal opportunities within 
the construction industry for marginalised people have been located within a human rights paradigm 
(McCrudden, 1995). Merrifield (1997), in his review of several conference papers on equal 
opportunities and/or empowerment of previously disadvantaged individuals in the construction 
industry, makes a similar observation. The author, as previously argued in Chapter 3, is of the view 
that the nature of the South African environment requires a focus on individuals and enterprises from 
previously disadvantaged communities on economic grounds, beyond social or human rights 
justification, which is, however, equally important. From an economic perspective the focus on 
accelerated development of 70% of South Africa's population, who were denied access to 
2 The presence of these larger firms in the South African construction industry and Iheir contribution to the construction 
economy is not in question tl"leir ownership and management control, which could largely be attributed to the apartheid, 
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opportunities, growth and development by institutk>nalised discrimination, is a necessity. Not only is 
this necessary to promote reconciliation in a society that remains polarised along racial lines, but also 
to expand the economic base of the country and to develop resources that were previously neglected. 
It will, furthermore, ensure greater competition in the South African economy and, by extension will 
contribute to a competitive South Africa within the global economy. 
The need for specific focus on SMMEs owned and managed by previously disadvantaged individuals, 
departing from a socio economic perspective, was seen, initially, in the Reconstruction and 
Development Program (ANC, 1994) and was carried through in OTt's White Paper on Small Business 
(OTI, 1995). Both the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement (MOF and MPW, 1997) and the 
White Paper on Small Business (OT!, 1995) have identified the need for selective targeting of 
enterprises owned by previously disadvantaged individuals on both economic and social grounds. 
The Department of Trade and Industry In its Small Business White Paper (OTI, 1995) presents a 
historic rationale for the focus on black owned and controlled small enterprises. This is based, 
primarily, on the denial of equal access to opportunities to these enterprises during the apartheid-era 
which took the following form : 
• Apartheid-based education restricted the acquisition of technical and professional skills by Black 
people. 
/' • Apartheid confined Black people to dormitory type residential areas and, in the cases of many 
African people, to homelands which were not only poor, in terms of living standards and business 
opportunities, but also lacked a dynamic business environment. 
• Racially segregated residential areas created under the Group Areas Act uprooted millions of 
Black South Africans from their places of residence and business and virtually destroyed the 
fabric of small black business. 
• Forced segregation of the different race groups increased the distances between black residential 
and working areas, thereby increasing the cost and risk of conducting business. 
• The restriction of ownership rights by Blacks made it impossible for them to buy assets that could 
serve as collateral for loan financing. It also excluded Blacks from the process of capital 
accumulation and growth through rising property and share values and from the possibility of 
acquiring fixed properties in high value added areas. 
(OTl , 1995). 
In the construction sector, various pieces of labour legislation were promulgated during the apartheid 
era which prevented Blacks from attaining artisan status and prevented them from performing skilled 
work in White areas (Cattel, 1997). The current approach adopted by the South African Govemment 
on this issue is, appropriately, captured by OTl (1995) in its White Paper on Small Business which 
, states 
" 
dispensation Cs however protMematlc and contributes to the polarisation of the South African construction industry along racial 
lines. 
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'Small business support policies will for a considerable time also have to focus on the 
particular needs of black enterprises and the ways to overcome the remaining 
consequences of that legacy [apartheid}. This does not mean that the policies should 
only focus on black owned or controlled enterprises but that policy differentiation will 
have to include affirmative action elements'. 
Having presented the historical context for the targeted focus on ABEs it is important to note that a 
further justification for the accelerated development of previously disadvantaged enterprises in the 
construction sector is that it has brought to bear new value systems that are behavioural rather than 
rule orientated. These systems are likely to become inculcated into current industry culture, and will 
bring about and promote long term cultural change and transformation within the sector. This will draw 
on the strengths of the previously disadvantaged that were not formally factored into construction 
industry culture in South Africa (Merrifield , 1997). 
The perceived close affin ity between small Black contractors and Black communities provides a useful 
example of how such behavioural practices could help contribute to positive outcomes in a manner by 
which the construction industry in general addresses the needs of its clients. A further justification for 
the focus on ABEs in the South African construction industry is the current polarisation of the South 
African construction industry along racial lines, as noted in Chapter 2. 
Th is polarisation serves as one of the major constraints that needs to be addressed in order to 
promote a unified, vibrant and sustainable construction industry in South Africa . Whilst some authors 
have argued that current government interventions could serve to further polarise the industry along 
racial lines (Rwelamila et aI, 1997), the author is of the view that this polarisation has not decreased 
with the demise of apartheid in 1994. Further, there is no tangible evidence in the post-1994 era to 
indicate that private sector construction markets in South Africa have taken tangible steps to address 
this imbalance. The author is, therefore, of the view that the current focus on ABEs by Government, 
far from promoting further polarisation, has the potential to reconcile the established component of the 
construction industry with the emerging component and will serve to promote a unified construction 
industry in South Africa through the establishment of business linkages. 
4.5 KEY CONSTRAINTS FACING ABEs IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY 
The key constraints facing ABEs in the South African construction industry are no different to the 
problems encountered by emerging contractors in other developing countries. It may be argued, 
however, that when compared to other SMMEs in the South African construction sector, the problems 
confronting ABEs are more acute for the reasons outlined in the preceding section. Significant 
research has been conducted both internationally and locally on the problems facing emerging 
contractors. Ofori (1995) , in a report prepared for the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 
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(UNCHS) on policies and measures for small contractor development, identified a range of problems 
confronting SMMEs. These Included : 
• discrimination by financial institutions against SMMEs which have little collateral; 
• projects are seldom packaged and structured to enable SMMEs to undertake them; 
• weaknesses in management and a lack of entrepreneurship; 
• difficulty in accessing information and a lack of market exposure; and 
• excessive competition amongst SMMEs. 
In South Africa, several researchers have analysed problems confronting emerging contractors 
(Atkins and Milne, 1996; Hodgson and Gwagwa, 1997). The most noteworthy of these was the recent 
study commissioned by the affected sector, represented by the Black Construction Industry (BCI) and 
funded by USAID. The problems identified in this study were inadequate skills, poor access to 
finance, poor access to work and negative market forces (BCI, 1995). Similar observations were 
made by Cattel (1994) in his study of small black builders in South Africa and Watermeyer and Band 
(1994) in their study commissioned by the National Housing Forum. The Green Paper on an Enabling 
Environment (DPW, 1997) also identified similar problems, as well as the following additional 
problems : 
• conflict between community demands and SMME growth. with local communities in many 
instances wishing to reserve work for locals. thereby impacting negatively on SMMEs wishing to 
participate in the projects; and 
• the lack of cohesion amongst the various provincial and national associations representing 
emerging contractors, which has resulted in the emerging sector being unable to articulate its 
needs and requirements in a coherent manner. 
Whilst the Green Paper on the Enabling Environment identifies a tension between community 
demands and SMME growth, the author is of the view that local SMMEs tend to adopt a similar view 
towards SMMEs that do not come from the immediate enVironment, thereby tending to restrict the 
participation of SMMEs to defined geographic boundaries.3 
The observation by Of oM (1995) regarding excessive competition amongst SMMEs is particularly 
relevant to the South African construction industry. Price undercutting at sub-<:ontracting level has 
become commonplace in South Africa, with negative impacts on ABEs in the construction industry, 
who are forced to participate in this practice to ensure work continuity (MOF and MPW, 1997). 
, In the erection of the Atlantis Magistrates Court in the Western Cape, demands for exclusive lOcal business participation on 
the project were initially made by business associations from AlIantts. Following a series of protracted negotiations in which the 
author was. involVed this was subsequently changed to allow for greater participation of contractors from outside the mmediate 
environment. 
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It is quite apparent that both enabling and intervening strategies are necessary to address problems 
confronting ABEs in the South African construction industry. The need for an integrated emerging 
contractor support program was recognised by the BCI Task Group (BCI, 1995) and endorsed by 
DPWs Green Paper on the Enabling Environment (DPW, 1997) in its proposals on the Emerging 
Contractor Development Program (ECDP). Of on (1995) notes that contractor development programs 
must be linked to the prioritised needs of a nation's construction industry. In the same study, for the 
UNCHS, Ofori also notes the lessons learnt from past contractor development programs in developing 
countries. These lessons include the following (Ofori , 1995): 
• Large companies can be used to develop small ones, making for stronger intra·industry linkages. 
• Management contracting, or the development team approach can be used to transfer skills to 
emerging contractors. 
• Contractor associations can play a key role in small contractor development. 
• Skills training, focussing on technical and managerial skills has significantly improved the ability of 
small contractors to function effectively. 
• Specific measures should be adopted to wean contractors off supporting schemes. 
Some of the lessons highlighted by Ofori were evident in the Soweto Contractor Development 
Program in South Africa, one of South Africa's more successful small contractor development 
programmes (Watermeyer, 1992; Watermeyer and Band 1994; Watermeyer et aI, 1995). 
The author subscribes fully to the need for an integrated approach to the development of ABEs in the 
South African construction industry, and recognises that the full enablement of SMMEs in the 
construction industry, and ABEs in particular, requires the addressing of problems identified above in 
an integrated manner. The use of public sector procurement as a policy instrument to address some 
of the problems confronting ABEs in the South African construction industry is only one of the many 
instruments required for the enablement of this sector. The author is of the view that the fu ll 
enablement of the ABE sector is dependent on strategies aimed at overcoming supply side 
constraints, such as access to finance, negative market forces, and access to technical and 
managerial skills development, as well as addressing the needs to improve access to markets, both in 
the public and private sectors. 
Public sector procurement, as a policy instrument to address problems confronting ABEs, primarily 
targets the improvement of ABEs access to markets in the public sector. A review of the Department 
of Public Works' Affirmative Procurement Policy specifications, which, whilst primarily aimed at 
improving access to public sector markets, appear to have drawn on international lessons learnt in 
SMME development. These include, in particular, the encouragement of joint ventures between 
emerging and established construction enterprises, the utilisation of sub--contracting as a mechanism 
to promote SMMEs, the recognition of the need to wean SMMEs from support programs by setting 
upper turnover threshold limits, and the un bundling of larger contracts through the setting of contract 
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participation goals to ensure increased participation by ABEs, Table 4,2 (Watermeyer, 1998) provides 
a comprehensive outline of the various targeting mechanisms that are proposed in the Affirmative 
Procurement Policy specifications, Interestingly, a similar approach was proposed by the BCI task 
group, who argued for affirmative action principles to be incorporated into a public sector work access 
program for emerging contractors (BCI. 1996). 
TABLE 4.2: TARGETING MECHANISM FOR ABEo AND AJVPo IN TERMS OF AFFIRMATIVE 
PROCUREMENT POLICY (Watenneyer. 1998) 
CONTRACT TARGET GROUP MEANS OF SECURING REMARKS 
TARGET 
TYPE ClASS 
PRIME MICRO .... (ama. ,,'" • _od ......,., • The ac:c:elel'1lted I'tltation through the quotation 
(W .... (Quotations, ., micro) pefforming as tIvough ,- rool" enables ABEs to have ..... 
contracta. Tenders, If val\HI is prime oontraetors rosters. opportunlUes for the preparation 01 quotations 
only) above a pf'e$Cribed • 7,5 adJudicaUon points and hence a greater chance of success.. 
~"""oId .. , ,. are awa!tled to ABEs • SureUes are waived in respect 01 prime (micro) ... - R100 '" le"'" or • ""''''''''. 000). <teYeiopment objective • 7.' adjlJdication po;nto .... ... ,..to " I - mechanism e1I'edIYe price preference of 8,3 %. ..... adjudicating ~- OM - . 
PRIME MINOR ABEa (smaU ",' • 7,5 adjudication points • Sureijes are 2,5 % on worl<s contracts where (Goods, (Low risk wo~. medium) pefformlng are awarded to ABEs eSijmated tender value isle .. than R1 ,0 m. 
services -- ., as prima contractors '" te~. 01 • • Sureties are 5,0 % on WO!1\s contracts wnefe and works ""''''''' ... "" development objective estimated tender value Is greater Ihan or equal ""''"'''') are below R2,O m), I - mechlnlsm toR1 ,Om. ..... ad;..cllcating • 7,5 ~=':re~nts translate into '" ten_. etrectIve rence of 8 3 %. 
PRIME MAJOR ABEa perfomling " • Prime contractors are • An ABE can act as a prime conlr8ctor only if (Good. (Relatively high the capacities of : awarded "' to 10 the contract value is not disproportionate to lis .. -. m' wo~. adjudication points In annual turnover limits. and worl(s contracta. a. • Prime I~ of • • An ABE contracting to act al • prime contractor 
contracts) contracta having a ""'- development objective can be awardecl a ptIc:e preference of up to """""" value ,. • Joint venture I - mechanism 11 ,1 % depending upon the amount of wonc eXQ8SS of R2,O m), """" -- they ...... subcontracted 10 othenl. • su_ ABe. • the • 10,0 adjudication ..... ttanllate inlO '" • Suppliers performance of thK el'feclive price prefefeooe of 11 ,1 %. 
• Manuracturenl contract, • ABEI which outgrow their !Status by virtue of 
• Se ..... • The engagement 01 high tumovenl can receiVII affirmative action 
providllnl ABEs ,. defined, milestone credits, equivalent 10 the attainment 
mealured, quanUfted of 11 Contract ParUcipaUon Goal, of up to 12 ".,. 
and audited In terms Thl. provides ~om ,.;th • competitive or • .."'"~ advantage over non-tatpeted gfOlJp enterprises . 
specificallon. • SUreties In an a::nt of 10 % are required 
'MXb contracts on . 
STRUCTUR . Alfirmable .IoIm • PI1me conlrKtorl are • 10,0 adjudication ,."," translate into '" EO JOINT (Relatively high Venture Par1nenl or awardecl ",Io 10 effective price prefererN:e of 11 ,1 %. 
VENTURE 'ok -. ABEs acting either as adjudication poInta in • An Alfirmable Joint Venture Partner Is an (Goods, COm_ a. joint venture partnenl _. .1 • enterprise which has outgrown lIS ABE status, serviOe. contracta having a and ABEs acting es development objeCtIve by virtlJG of Its increased turnover. 
and work_ ""'- value ;. aujl9lieB, I ,"", mechanism • This approach enables the Target Group to act "",.-) exoeas of R5,0 m), manufacturers "" ,houId they engage .. ""me """"""" irrespective 0/ the;, MIfVice providers, Am""""" - turnover limits. Venture P ....... ,. • An AlfilTTllltive Joint Venture Par1ner can be the "..."",."'" of ,- "'""" of the ""'''''' _.the their conttacl. minimum Joml Venture Pal'1iclpation 0001 • The engagement of percentage be set at 60 %. 
Al!trmable Joint • A non-Alfirmable Joint Venture Partner can 
Venture Par1ners and """,Ide the necessal)' '"''''''' ., My ABE. • defined, resources which the Alflrmable Joint Venture measured, quantifiecJ may 1adI. 
and audited In \IemIS • , It Is admlulbla for two AtIIrmable Join t VenttKe 
0/ • .".,"'" P ....... .. """ • ""I venll.we loc the spec:itleation. .......... "' ... ""'- .. • " "'" • '"'.""""" ~I ~ of the joint """ .... partners be a non-All'irmable Joint Venture 
Partner. Joint Ventures formed In this maM8f 
will be awarded an etractlve price pJefererN:e of 
11 ,1 %. I I 
• ~uretIH In an ~~~t of 10 % are required 
worill contrads o . . 
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In summary, Affirmable Business Enterprises in the construction industry in South Africa are 
confronted with problems not dissimilar to those faced by emerging construction enterprises in other 
developing countries. On the basis of lessons learnt from emerging contractor development programs 
internationally, it is apparent that integrated strategies, which address both supply side constraints 
and increased access to procurement opportunities, are necessary for the full enablement of 
Affirmable Business Enterprises in South Africa. Public sector procurement, as a policy instrument in 
this context, aims, primarily, to improve access by ABEs to public sector procurement opportunities. 
A review of the Affirmative Procurement Policy specifications indicates that the primary objective of 
these specifications is to increase public sector procurement opportunities for ABEs. The 
specifications also promote a range of 'good practice elements', such as the promotion of joint 
ventures etc. It is within this context that the primary hypothesis, and sub-hypotheses, pertaining to 
the National Department of Public Work's Affirmative Procurement Policy, are made below. 
4.6 PRESENTATION OF KEY HYPOTHESIS AND SUB-HYPOTHESES 
In the preceding sections and chapters of this dissertation, the author has argued for the wider 
participation of ABEs in the South African construction industry. More specifically, public sector 
procurement is identified as an important policy instrument to promote the growth and development of 
Affirmable Business Enterprises in the South African construction industry. 
The primary hypothesis that is tested below in this dissertation is: 
The public sector in South Africa can contribute to Increased participation of Affirmable 
Business Enterprises In the construction industry, via the implementation of the Affirmative 
Procurement Policy. 
The author wishes to record the following salient points arising out of an analysis of the above 
hypothesis: 
• 'Public sector'. refers to all institutions of government, including the first, second and third tiers of 
Government. This dissertation focuses on a first tier government institution , namely the National 
Department of Public Works, because it is presently the only institution that has been granted 
approval by the State Tender Board to utilise the Affirmative Procurement Policy specifications on 
its construction projects. 
• 'Can contribute' is indicative of the following : 
Public sector involvement is necessary, but not in itself, a sufficient condition for the full 
enablement of Affirmable Business Enterprises. 
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The elements that impact on the extent to which the contribution can be successfully made, 
are the following : 
coherent and cohesive policy adoption and implementation wrthin all sectors of 
government; 
poltcy framework should be routed within a sustainable development paradigm 
and should have measurable outputs; 
overall government capability and institutionalisation; 
effective monitoring and evaluation of policy; 
the needs of the construction industry and absorptive capacity of the targeted 
beneficiaries; and 
other enabling programs. 
• 'Affinnable Business Enterprises' refers to small, medium and micro enterprises, owned, 
controlled and managed by previously disadvantaged individuals as stated in this chapter. 
• 'The Affinnatlve Procurement Policy' refers to the policy that was developed by the 
Procurement Task Team in South Africa as one of the outcomes of the Public Sector 
Procurement Reform process currently taking place. The policy was approved by the Cabinet in 
November 1995 and approved by the State Tender Board in August 1996 for implementation on 
construction projects procured by the national Department of Public Works. 
• 'Increased participation ..•.. •..•.....• In the construction industry' infers some measurable 
outputs. These outputs would include: 
increased participation of ABEs in public sector construction projects; 
acceleration in the growth of ABEs; 
increase in the successful completion of public sector construction projects by ABEs; 
promotion of successful joint venture relationships between established contractors and 
ABEs; and 
increased participation by ABEs in private sector projects. 
The primary hypothesis outlined above will be tested by analysing the application of the Affirmative 
Procurement Policy on the Department of Publk: Works construction projects for the period Aug ust 
1996 to July 1998. The primary hypothesis has been dis-agg,egated into the following sub-
hypotheses. 
1. The National Department of Public Works can promote increased participation by ABEs in the 
construction economy, via its Affinnative Procurement Policy (APP). 
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2. The adoption of the Affirmative Procurement Policy has resulted in the State bearing a nominal 
financial premium, when compared to the initial projected outcomes and overall benefits, 
3. Increased procurement opportunities to Affirmable Business Enterprises via government's 
Affirmative Procurement Policy is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the full enablement 
of ABEs in the construction sector. 
4. Affirmable Business Enterprise participation varies according to sub-sector entry level thresholds. 
5. The Affirmative Procurement Policy promotes joint venture relationships between established 
contractors and Affirmable Business Enterprises. 
6. The application of the Affirmative Procurement Policy has resulted in better regulated 
relationships between prime contractors and sub-contractors. 
These six sub-hypotheses derived from the primary hypothesis have been clustered as fOllows: 
Cluster 1 - Sub-hypotheses 1 and 2 focus on analysing the primary policy outcomes of the 
application of the Affirmative Procurement Policy on the National Department of Public Works 
construction projects. These two sub-hypotheses will be tested and analysed in Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation. 
Cluster 2 - Sub-hypotheses 3 and 4 focus on the Affirmative Procurement Policy being a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for ABE empowerment. These sub-hypotheses are tested 
and analysed in Chapters 6 and 70f this dissertation. 
Cluster 3 • Sub-hypotheses 5 and 6, focus on the impact that the Affirmative Procurement Policy 
has had on the construction market in South Africa. These sub-hypotheses will be tested and 
analysed in Chapter 8 of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 5 




The author, in this chapter, analyses the primary policy outcomes of construction contracts 
administered by the National Oepartment of Public Works for the period August 1996 to July 199B. 
The primary policy outcomes viz. the increase in ABE participation via the application of Affirmative 
Procurement Policy and the extent of the direct financial premium borne by the Department in the 
application of the Affirmative Procurement Policy, will be assessed by testing the following two sub~ 
hypotheses. 
1) The National Department of Public Works can promote Increased participation of ABEs 
in the construction economy, via its Affirmative Procurement Policy. 
2) The adoption of the Affirmative Procurement Policy ha. resulted in the State bearing a 
nominal financial premium, when compared to the Initial projected outcomes and 
overall benefits. 
A review of the mechanisms whereby the Department of Public Works procures construction works 
contracts indicates that this is done either by soliciting quotations from a limited number of suppliers I 
service provides I contractors or by inviting tenders. Quotations are normally obtained from not less 
than three sources. Th is procedure is currently confined to contracts which have a value of R45 000 
or less and usually involves work mainly of a building maintenance or minor renovation nature. 
During the period August 1996 to October 1997, the Department awarded some 3423 works 
contracts, amounting to R914,5 million. Quotations accounted for approximately 80% of the number 
of contracts awarded, but less than 3% of the total financial value of contracts awarded; the average 
value of a quotation being R9491 (Watermeyer et aI, 1998). 
Quotations have been excluded from this study as their award is largely dependent upon who is 
invited to submit quotations. Their consideration in the testing of the above-mentioned hypothesis 
would introduce an inherent bias in the analysis , and would in any event have a nominal impact on 
the outcomes. 
5.2 DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
Affirmable Business Enterprises are defined in Chapter 4. It is necessary, however, to define the 
following additional tenns to which reference will be made, later in this Chapter. 
i) Participation : 
Participation is the amount of money paid to an enterprise for work performed, goods 
supplied, services rendered or a combination thereof in the performance of a contract. 
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Participation is used to measure and represent the Commercially Useful Function performed 
byABEs. 
11) Commercially Useful Function: 
The performance of real and actual work, or the provision of services, in the discharge of any 
contractual obligation which shall include but not be limited to the performance of a distinct 
element of work which the business has the skill and expertise to undertake and the 
responsibility for management and supervision (TP1(APP1), 1998). 
Ill) Financial Premium Index (FPI) : 
The Financial Premium Index in the context of the Affirmative Procurement Policy , is the 
difference in price between the awarded tender price i.e. the tender receiving the highest 
, 
number of points, and the lowest tender price used for the awarding of adjudication points for 
price, divided by the lowest tender price used for the awarding of adjudication points for price 
Financial premium is used to measure the financial premium associated with meeting 
development objectives. 
Iv) Afflnnable Bu.in... Enlerprl.e Index (ABEI) : The estimated tolal value of work 
undertaken by ABEs expressed as a percentage of the total value of contracts awarded, 
where ABEs are targeted. 
5.3 REVIEW OF POLICY PROVISIONS OF THE POLICY FOR THE TARGETING OF 
AFFIRMABLE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 
5.3.1 General 
In assessing the policy outcomes, it is important to understand the background to the policy and the 
precise manner in which the Department implemented this policy. Certain refinements made in the 
policy between the time that the policy was adopted and the time that it was implemented need to be 
understood, as these have a direct bearing on the manner in which the two hypotheses will be tested. 
5.3.2 Provision. ofthe 10 POint Plan 
5.3.2.1 General 
The Affirmative Procurement Policy specifications draw its preferencing mechanisms for contracts 
less than R2 million and its classification of building contracts, from points 7 and 10 of the 10 Point 
Plan respectively (MOF and MPW, 1995). Points 7 and 10 will be discussed below as they provide 
useful background information, in assessing the impact of the Affirmative Procurement Policy. 
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5.3.2.2 Point 7 : Preferences I Targeting 
Point 7 of the 10 Point Plan addressed the question of preferences and targeting. The interim 
strategy which was proposed was that a : 
·price preference system be effected to target a specific group, i.B. ~Persons disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination - within the emerging SMME sector. This policy wifl be based on a 
percentage preference and shall apply to all contracts which are usually less than R2 mil/ion. 
(This limit is to control the possibility of any undue expenditure resulting from this preference 
policy during the untested period of implementing these interim strategies. In addition, this 
limit targets the emerging SMME sector rather than the'better established businesses)." 
"This preference system will be operated via tender adjudication criteria. The following 
criteria is proposed : 
(a) Cost of the works 
The calculation of these points will be based on the formula: 
88(1-T-T ,,;,J 
T"", 
where T min = 
and T = 
the lowest tender (offer) 
the tender submitted in each case. 
(b) Equity owned by disadvantaged persons 
1) Maximum 100 % equity 10 
2) Minimum 0 % 0 
3) Prrrrata allocation within the maximum and minimum limits 
(c) Equity owned by women 
1) Maximum 100 % equity 2 
2) Minimum 0 % equity 0 
3) P~rata allocation within the maximum and minimum limits 






This policy proposal was conceptualised in the absence of clear and scientific definitions of small , 
medium and micro enterprises and was developed to initiate : 
"a system that starts to deracialise business ownership and control through this focused 
policy of black economic empowerment". 
It also preceded the definition of small medium and micro enterprises as defined in the South African 
National Small Business Act of 1996 (Act No. 102 of 1996). As the application was restricted to 
contracts below R2,O million in value, and the benefits targeted at a prime contractor level, it may be 
argued that in practical terms. black owned. SMMEs were the primary targets of Point 7. One of the 
limitations of Point 7 was that it made no reference to management and control of the enterprise and 
that it focused only on equity-ownership. 
The policy proposal set out in this point of the 10 Point Plan also contained the following definitions : 
• "Disadvantaged person" refers to a South African citizen disadvantaged by unfair racial 
discrimination in the previous political dispensation. 
• "Equity" refers to the value of the shareholding held in the tenderer's business entity as 
reflected in its financial statements and/or contractual agreement as at the closing date of 
tenders. 
5.3.2.3 Point 10 : Classfflcatlon of building and engineering contracts 
The interim strategy set out in point 10 (MOF and MPW, 1995) sought : 
"to provide interventions that will assist towards establishing, regulating and promoting an 
enabling environment and thereby ensuring the meaningful and effective involvement of 
small, medium and micro enterprises". 
A framework for the following was provided to enable interim strategies to be effected viz. : 
• Contract classification 
• Performance bonds (security I sureties) 
• Tender adjudication criteria 
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A minor contract was defined as a contract in which : 
• -the potential risks involved in the works for both contracting parties are adjudged to be 
small; 
• the period for completion of the contract does not normally exceed 6 months but cerlainly 
not more than 12 months; 
• the contract value is usually (ess than R1 milfion and generally not more than R2 million; 
• the works are of a straightforward nature in terms of complexity, quality and tolerances 
and the possibility of significant variations from the work envisaged is adjudged to be 
relatively low; 
• the site establishment requirements are adjudged not to be onerous; 
• the contractor has no responsibility for the design of the permanent works other than 
possible design of a specialist nature; 
• the design of the works, save for design work for which the contractor is made 
responsible, is complete in all essentials before tenders are invited; 
• the contractor's responsibility for nominated / selected sub-contractors is limited; 
• the contractor is not required to underlake work of a specialist nature. ~ 
It was suggested that : 
"major contracts are contracts which have more onerous requirements than that descn'bed in 
respect of minor contracts. International contracts are major contracts where the necessary 
resources required are adjudged to be beyond the capacity / capabilities of most large South 
African companies, At the other end of the scale, micro contracts are contracts which are 
adjudged to have less onerous demands than is the case for minor contracts and where the 
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contract period is normally less than 3 months and certainly not more than 6 months; and the 
value of the works ;s usually less than R100 000". 
In essence the above-mentioned classifK:ation is based on risk and the demands placed on those 
who have resources to execute such contracts. 
A further means of classifying contracts was put forward to facilitate the integration of emerging I 
historically disadvantaged contractors into the main stream of the economy. This classification was 
based on who the contracting parties are, viz. : 
• prime 
• community I development 
• structured joint ventures 
Community IDevelopment Contracts have not been included in the scope of this dissertation, as they 
have no material bearing on the analysis of Public Works contracts as this model was nct utilised on 
any contracts awarded by the Department of Public Works. 
It was suggested that : 
·Prime contracts are contracts in which the contractor is unassisted by other contracting 
parties, separately appOinted by the client. Community contracts are ones in terms of which 
the client has appOinted a development and/or materials procurement contractor to provide 
ceriain rasourcas which community / emerging contractors may lack. Typically, a 
development contractor would be required to establish the site, to advise, assist and train-on-
the-job, administer payments made to community / emerging contractors to provide certain 
items of equipment, to report to the Client on project expenditure, construction and progress 
and co-ordinate site actMties. In some circumstances a development contractor may be 
required to engage specialist contractors to perform certain aspects of the works and/or to 
construct portions of the work. In structured joint venture contracts, established and emerging 
contractors are selected through independent processes and enter into a final jOint venture 
agreement to execute the worlcs" 
The aforementioned classification of contracts was used to frame the interim strategies in respect of 
tender adjudication criteria and the levels of performance bonds required to reasonably share the risk 
of a contractor's failure to perform between the state and the contractor. The interim strategy for 
perfonnance bonds was based on the premise that the Employer's risks associated with performance 
',-~nds (Le. the additional cost of compfeting the worKs where the works are interrupted prior to their 
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completion, due to the termination of the contract for reasons which may include contractor insolvency 
or failure to perform) could be addressed by the management strategies which are adopted and the 
classification of contracts. It was accordingly proposed that performance bond requ irements be as 
follows : 
7ype of Contract 
International 
Major 
% Performance Bond 
Minor estimated contract price.:: R1.0 m 






The strategy proposed that contracts be awarded on a points basis in a similar manner to point 7 with 
a maximum of 85 points being allocated to price and a maximum of 15 points being allocated to 
project specific RDP objectives! . 
5.3.2 Awarding of tenders in terms of the Affirmative Procurement Policy 
Tenders, in support of an Affirmative Procurement Policy, are awarded in terms of a development 
objective I price mechanism as described in the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform 
in South Africa (MOF and DPW, 1997) i.e. a slightly modified version of that put forward in the 10 
Point Ptan (MOF and DPW, 1995). 
It was envisaged in the 10 Point Plan that black owned SMMEs would be targeted on contracts below 
R2,0 million. No definitions for black owned small businesses were available when the 10 Point Plan 
was conceived. As a result black equity was used as an interim measure. The final approach put 
forward by the Procurement Forum and that which is currently being used in terms of the Department 
of Public Wolits' initiative for the Delivery of Targeted Procurement in support of an Affirmative 
Procurement Policy is as follows : 
Prime (Minor) and Prime (Micro) 
Price 
Affirmable Business Enterprises status 
Women Equity Ownership (WEO) where such equity 
exceeds 25% (0,0333 x (WEO - 25)) 
TOTAL 





I The Minister of Finance in June 1996 amended the 85115 weighting to 90110 for all building and construction contracts. 
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Prime (Malor) and Structured Joint Venture Contracts 
Price 
Tendered contract participation goal in terms of one 





Paints for price are awarded in accordance with the following formula : 
Np = 90 - (1 - (P - Pm» 
Pm 
where Np = the number of tender adjudication points awarded for price. 
Pm = the price of the lowest responsive tender adjusted to a commOn 
applicable. 
base, ij 
P = the price of the responsive tender under consideration adjusted to a common 
base, if applicable. 
Development objective points are awarded as follows : 
Prim. (Mlnorl and Prim. (Mlcrol contract! : 
• 7,5 points (fixed) to those enterprises which enjoy Affirmable Business Enterprise status. 
• a maximum of 2,5 points (variable) to enterprises where the Women Equity Ownership 
(WED) exceed 2,5%, in accordance with the following formula: 
Number of points awarded = 0,0333 x (WEO - 25) 
Prime (Malor) and Structured Joint Venture contracts : 
A maximum of 10 points may be awarded for the extent to which the tendered resource goal 
measured in accordance with a resource specification exceeds the specified minimum. The basis of 












(X - Os) 
the number of tender adjudication points awarded. 
the tendered resource goal percentage. 
the specified minimum goal percentage as stated in the Tender Data. 
the maximum goal percentage above which no further adjudication points are 
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awarded, as stated in the Tender Data. 
The abovementioned approach in essence refines Point 10 of the 10 Point Plan. It permits a direct 
preference to be applied to low value contracts and also provides a preferencing mechanism linked to 
an appropriate contract resource goal above a defined financial threshold , which in the case of the 
Department of Public Works was R2 million. 
5.3.3 Awarding of tenders by the Department of Public Works 
The 10 Point Plan was developed in September 1995 and adopted as national policy during 
November 1995. In January 1996 the APP1 (Targeting of Affirmable Business Enterprises) 
specification which permitted Affirmable Business Enterprises to be engaged in contracts was 
developed. The first guideline documents on how to implement the Ten Point Plan were released by 
the Procurement Forum during April 1996. Most of the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement 
Reform in South Africa was complete by September 1996. This paper, however, was only released in 
April 1997. The State Tender Board adopted the 10 Point Plan in June 1996 and granted the 
Department of Public Works permission to implement the programme on a pilot basis during August 
1996. The Affirmative Procurement Policy speCifications were then used by the Department from 
August 1996. 
The Department, in implementing the policy defined minor contracts as being works contracts having 
an estimated tender price not exceeding R2,0 million. State Tender Board officials directed that the 
price preference set out in Point 7 of the 10 Point Plan should apply. 
As a result, the Department implemented the Affirmative Procurement Policy in the following manner: 
Contracts below R2,O million 
Price 
Equity of Previously Disadvantaged Persons 
Women Equity Ownership 
TOTAL 
Contracts above R2,O million 
Price 
Resource specifications APP series 
TOTAL 








The Department usually applied the APP1 specification (Targeting of Affirmable Business Enterprises) 
to contracts having a value in excess of R2,0 million. In some instances the APP2 (Structured Joint 
Ventures (General)); the APP4 (Targeting of local Resources) and the APP5 (Engagement of 
Targeted l abour) was used. On certain civil engineering contracts having a value below R2,0 million, 
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the APP5 specification was used2 . 
The Department also applied the proviskm of Point 10 insofar as sureties were concerned. 
5.4 DEPARTMENTAL REPORTING ON ABE PARTICIPATION UP TO MAY 1998 
The Department of Public WOrXs tasked its Documentation Development Section to gather data on 
the outcomes of the policy and to report thereon. A reporting procedure was set up in terms of which 
each regional office was required to present bask: statistics on contracts awarded within their region in 
terms of their delegated authority i.e. contracts having a value of less than R750000. Generally, 
these reports listed tender number, project name, date, name of tenderer, adjudication points 
awarded, contract amount and lowest tender amount. 
Data gathered at head office and from the regions was manually consolidated and captured on an 
electroniC spreadsheet in order to arithmetically calculate certain basic statistics. No details pertaining 
to individual contracts were electronically captured. The data gathering and processing procedure 
which was adopted can best be described as being a paper-based, manual system. 
The first progress report comprised a number of tabulations and covered the period August 1996 to 
August 1997. These reports provided statistics on POI I ABE participation and cost premiums; 
An analysis of the Departmenfs Progress Report for the period August 1996 to October 1997 (see 
Appendix 5.1) revealed the following : 
• of the 3423 contracts, totaling R914 million, reported on (head office still to award 173 tenders 
and the regional offices, 518), 321 or 9,4% were issued by the head office in ~n amount of R828 
million i.e. 90,6% of the total value of contracts awarded; 
• 118 (36,7%) of contracts awarded by head office and 1501 (48,4%) awarded by regional offices 
were awarded to firms with POI equity/ABE participation; 
• the value of awards to ABEs is reported as being R375 million or 45,3% of the expenditure at 
head office and R25 million (28,8%) at regional offices; 
• the "ABElPOI participation~ is reported as being R189 million (26,1%) at head office, R19 million 
(25.4%) at regional offices. and R208 million (26,0%) in total ; 
• the overall cost premium based on the difference between the awarded price and the lowest 
acceptably priced tender, was calculated to be 0.8 %. 
A review of the method in whk:h data was captured by the Department indicated the following 
limitations: 
' TM designation 01' resource spedncatlons was, following suggestions by International development experts, chanQed during April 1998 to TP to 
designate "Targeted Procurement'. The South African editions which are used in support or an AmmNlltive Procurement Policy are designated 
(TP1(APP1) etc.). The TP(APp) speclftcatiOl'll are essentially !he same as the APP Specification,. 
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• The parameter ~value of awards to ABEs~ which was reported on, appears to be the total value of 
contracts with ABE/PDI participation, however limited. Such a parameter is not representative of 
the Rand value of actual work performed by ABEs; nor is it representative of "commercially useful 
function-. Accordingly, the -total ABE contract value- presented by the Department is inflated and 
does not represent actual ABE participation. 
• The statistics are based on the date upon which a tender number is allocated and not on when a 
contract is awarded. Accord ingly, they will change as more tenders having numbers allocated in 
the period under consideration are awarded. It is therefore not possible to analyse changes in 
participation between different time periods. 
• The Department's analysis included quotation-type contracts, which in turn distorted the analysis 
of the number of contracts awarded to ABEs. Further, the quotation-type mechanism has an 
inherent bias, in that it allows for the potentially subjective identification of three contractors to be 
shortlisted to provide quotations, as opposed to the competitive bidding environment that prevails 
in a traditional tender situation. 
Departmental records clearly indicated serious limitations, both in the nature of data captured, the 
methodology adopted in the capture of data and the data analysis itself. It was therefor quite apparent 
to the author that both the reliability and the validity of the Department's data was problematic and did 
not provide for an appropriate platform to further analyse the different delineations within the data set, 
and that a separate data-capturing exercise would need to be embarked upon to address the 
aforementioned limitations. 
5.5 METHODOLOGY OUTLINE 
5.5.1 Defining sample size and 8ub-categories. 
The author, considering that part of the scope of this dissertation was to provide an improved 
mechanism to monitor and evaluate the Affirmative Procurement Policy and that the study was 
sponsored by the Department of Public Works, decided from the outset to analyse the full universe of 
available data for the period under review, as opposed to utilising an appropriate sample size for 
analysis. For reasons stated previously, only contracts which were awarded via an open tender 
process were included, and quotation type contracts were excluded. 
The period of review for this study is 1 August 1996 to 1 July 1998, with 1 August 1996 being the 
commencement date of the implementation of the Affirmative Procurement Policy by the Department 
of Public Works. Data in three discrete time intervals are considered and analysed, viz. 
i) The start up phase : 1 August 1996 to 30 June 1997 
ii) First six month period after start up : 1 July 1997 - 31 December 1997 
iii) Second six month period after start up : 1 January 1998 to 30 June 1998 
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The Department of Public Works according to their records awarded 659 tender numbers during the 
period 1 August 1996 to 1 July 199B. The actual tender adjudication reports on all tenders awarded 
with the exception of those set out in Appendix 5.2 were located and logged for study purposes? 
This reduced the universe analysed to 603 tenders and covered all tenders awarded by the various 
regions and head office. 
The introduction of a new policy into any organ of state inevitably occurs in a phased manner. It also 
takes time for tenders already within the system to be awarded. Table 5.1 provides a breakdown of 
the number of contracts awarded within this period where the policy was applied (i.e. where targeted 
procurement was used) and where it was not applied.'" 
In the analysis of the Oepartmenfs records, only those contracts where targeted procurement is used 
are considered. Table 5.2 summarizes the Departmental Record used in this study. It should however 
be noted that in many instances, the tender adjudication reports indicated the type of contract viz., 
general (building, renovations, etc.), civil, electrical or mechanical. Where the contract type was not 
indicated, contracts were classified on the basis of their description. In reviewing the record , certain 
anomalies in this regard were noted. For example, fencing, depending upon which section within the 
Department was responsible for the contract fell into all four types. Accordingly, the figures presented 
in Table 5.2 for the types of contracts should be considered as being indicative of contract types. 
5.5.2 CategOrisation of Departmental contracts 
The Departmental contracts as described in 5.5.1 are categorised in accordance with the appropriate 
subconstruction sectors, viz general, civil , electrical and mechanical. However, in order to assess the 
impact of the Affinnative Procurement Policy on ABE participation, it is also necessary to categorise 
contracts in accordance with the targeting strategy which was employed. This enables the outcomes 
of the different policy interventions to be probed. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 set out the summary of 
measures designed to promote ABE partiCipation in different classes of contract and the 
categorisation of contracts for the purpose of analysis, respectively. 
3 It is quite likely that some of these "missing" contracts were In fact cancelled (see Appendix 5.1). 
4 The Implementation Manual for the Use of Targeted Procurement to Implement an Affirmative Procurement Policy contains 
the following definitions: 
• Atnrmatlv. Procurement Policy: A procurement policy which uses procurement as an instrument of social policy in 
South Africa to affirm the changed environment. government's soQo.economic objectives and the principles of the 
Reconstruction and DevelOpment Programme. 
• T.rgeted Procurement: A system of procurement which provides employment and business opportunities for 
marglnallsed individuals and communities, enables procurement 10 be used as an Instrument of social policy In a fair, 
equitable, competitive, transparent and cost effective manner and permits social objectives to be quantified, measured, 
verified and audited. References by the author to the use of targeted procurement infers inplementalion of the 
Affinnative Procurement Policy. 
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TABLE 5.1: Summary of Departmental Record 1 August 1996 to 1 July 1998 
NUMBER OF CONTRACTS AWARDED 
TYPE OF CONTRACT TARGETED PROCUREMENT NOT TARGETED PROCUREMENT TOTAL 
USED USED 
NUMBER PERCENTAGE OF NUMBER PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL(%) TOTAL (%) 
General 94 63 313 69 418 
Civil 15 10 32 7 47 
Electrical 22 15 46 10 68 
Mechanical 18 12 63 14 70 
TOTAL , .. 100 ... 100 603 
TABLE 5.2: Summary of Departmental Record used In study 











63 14 ... 100 
Summary of measures designed to promote ABE participation In the different 
classes of contracts 
CLASS OF PRIME CONTRACT TENDER ADJUDICATION LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE BONO 
PROCEDURE 
Major Award adjudication points for resource 10% 
goals 
Minor Direct prefereoc:e • 2,5% if contract value S; R1 ,Om 
• 5% If contract value >' R1 ,0 m 
Micro Direct preference Nit 
TABLE 5.4: Categorisation of contracts for the purpose of analysis 
CLASS OF CONTRACT SUB-CATEGORY IOENTlFICATION CHARACTERISTICS 
Prime (Major) - Use is made of the TP 1 (APP1 ) resource specification to engage 
ABEs on contracts as : 
• Joint venture partners 




• Service providers 
Prime (Minor) >' R1 ,O m • Use is made of a direct preference to tip the scates in favour of 
ABEs 
• The levels of surety bonds, depending upon the contract value 
vary from 2,5% 10 a maximum of 5%, 
• The contract value exceeds R100 000 
s R1 ,Om 
Prime (Micro) . • Use is made of a direct preference to tip (he scales in favour of 
ABEs 
• No sureties are called for 
• The contract value is less than or equat to R1 00 000 
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It can be seen from the Table 5.4 that an examination of the tender adjudication reports would enable 
contracts to be categorized as being -Major" or -Minor". The distinction, however, between Minor (s; 
R1,O m), Minor (> R1 ,O m) and Micro, cannot be made without examining each and every contract 
document to ascertain the level of performance bond set. (Levels of performance bond are set on the 
basis of an estimated departmental value of the contract which can vary appreciably from the 
awarded tender price. In some instances departmental project managers reduced performance bond 
levels and deducted greater retention amounts to compensate for this. This information can once 
again only be obtained by reviewing the departmental files for each and every contract.) . It is 
therefore necessary to make some assumptions in order to classify these latter classes of contract. A 
reasonable approach is to classify "minor" contracts into Minor (> R1 ,O m); Minor <.:: R1,O m) and 
Micro, purely on the basis of award value. Contracts, for the purpose of analysis, will accordingly be 
classified in accordance with Tables 5.3 and 5.4 based on the contract award value. 
5.5.3 Reduction of Departmental records to focus on ABEs 
Table 5.5 summarises the Departmental record used in the study. This record indicates no Structured 
Joint Venture contracts were awarded and some contracts did not target ABEs but other objectives. 
As a result, Structured Joint Venture contracts and contracts which targeted labour in terms of the 
TP5 (APP5) Specification for the engagement of Targeted Labour and local enterprises and local 
labour in terms of the TP4 (APP4) Specification are excluded from this study. Accordingly, the total 
number of contracts considered for ABE partiCipation reduced from 454 to 443 as reflected in Table 
5.6. Tables 5.7 to 5.9 present the breakdown of the data set for the different sub time increments. 
TABLE 5.5: Summary of Departmontal Record uaed In this study (1 August 1996 - 1 July 
1998) 
CONTRACT 
(s R1.Om) 79 9 27 34 149 
I> R1,Om) 32 2 3 10 47 
Prime _jor (TP1(APP1) 97 I. • 14 131 Prime M_jor (TP5(APP5) 0 4 0 0 4 
Prime MIIjor - Other 
(Including TP4(APP4) 
• pec:lflcaItlon) • 2 0 0 7 Structured Joint Venture 
P.me Is R1.0m) R35 929820 R3 094 835 R8215151 R10612 092 898 
I> R1,Om} R53 237 230 R2 840 683 R5380 597 R16 972 503 013 
Prime (M.,Jor) (TP1IAPP1) R1 270 125 041 R124579197 R20 142 859 R96 425 748 R1511 272845 
Prime (M.jor) (TP5(APP5) 0 R12 736 818 0 0 R12736818 
P .... t_)-otho< 
(Including TP4IAPP4) 
.pec:lftcMIon) R33 260 257 R12 478 841 0 0 R45 739 098 
Structured Joint Venture 





Summary of Departmental Record where ABEs were targeted ( 1 August 1996-

























Table 5.6 represents the full universe of records of Departmental records, where ABEs were targeted 
for the period of study. The table indicates that a significant proportion of Departmental records fell 
within the general contracting category. (Approximately 82.5% of the Department's projects measured 
in financial terms fall in this category.) Further, whilst the number of contracts are relatively evenly 
spread across the Prime (Micro), Prime (Minor) and the Prime (Major) contract categories, it is 
important to note that in financial terms the Prime (Major) contracts represent approximately 91 .4% of 
the financial tota l of contracts awarded under the APP Specifications. (The full universe of the 
departmental record for this study is summarised in Table 5.2). 
TABLE 5.7: Summary of Departmental Record where ABEs were targeted (1 August 1996-











TABLE 5.8: Summary of Departmental Record where ABEs were targeted (1 July 1997-
31 December 1997) 
Prime (Minor) (s R1 ,Om) 
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TABLE 5.9: Summary of Departmental Record where ABEs were targeted (1 January 1998-
1 July 1998) 






























The participation of ABEs in the Department's contracts needs to be measured in a standard manner. 
Participation can be established by considering the value of contracts awarded to ABEs and those 
which will be offered to ABE in terms of the resource specification. Participation needs to be 
measured in relation to the total value of contracts awarded and needs to be measured over different 
time intervals to enable current participation to be compared with past participation and participation 
between sectors to be compared. An Affirmable Business Enterprise Index (ABEt) is considered to be 
a suitable instrument for such purposes; such an index being defined as follows: 
The estimated value of work undertaken by ABE. exp ...... d a. a percentage of the total value 
of contracts awarded where ABEs are targeted. 
Thus ABEI = total value of contracts and subcontracts awarded to ABEs x 100 
total value of contracts awarded where ABEs are targeted 
This being the case, it is necessary to establish from the Oepartmenfs record, the value of contracts 
contracted and subcontracted to ABEs. 
Certain simplifying assumptions need to be made, however, in order to assess ABE participation and 
as such to calculate the ABEI as: 
• ABEs were not directly targeted by the Department in the implementation of the policy in respect 
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of Prime (Minor) and Prime (Micro) contracts for the reasons set out in 5.3.3. 
• The Contract Participation Goals provided in TP1 (APP1 ) specification for the targeting of 
Affirmable Business Enterprises do not directly measure ABE participation. 
In order to overcome the problem relating to the targeting of ABEs in Prime (Minor) and Prime (Micro) 
contracts, it may be assumed that enterprises which received 6,7 or more adjudication points in 
respect of POI equity are Affirmable Business Enterprises. This simplifying assumption merely 
confirms the ownership requirements of the ABE definition, namely that not less than two thirds of the 
ownership of the enterprise is in the hands of POls. Aspects such as control and turnover limits will 
remain unconfirmed. It may, however, be argued that most businesses which have a two thirds POI 
ownership and are contracting to execute contracts having a typical value of less than R2,Q m, are 
likely to meet the ABE parameters for control and turnover. 
There is a need to link the Contract Participation Goal contained in the TP1 (APP1) specification to 
actual ABE participation. This can be addressed by initially reviewing the definition contained in the 
TP1(APP1) specification for this term. Contract Participation Goal is defined as being : 
~An amount equal to the sum of the : 
a) portion of the Award Value of goods, services and works for which the Contractor 
contracts to engage ABEs in the performance of the Contract, expressed as a percentage 
of the Award Value of the Contracts; and 
b) additional credits, if any, granted in respect of 100% Ownership by Previously 
Disadvantaged Individuals; and 
c) bonus credits, if any, granted for the attainment of Affirmative Action milestones· 
Award Value is defined as: 
·The value of the Contract at the time of the award, exclusive of VA T, provisional sums and all 
allowances for escalation and contingencies provided for by the Employer". 
The tender adjudication reports, however, provide only information on the tender value and the 
Contract Participation Goal for a particular contract. Detailed statistics from a sample of 12 tenders 
which were awarded (see Table 5.10) revealed the following: 
Tender Price (including VAT) 
Award Value (including VAT) 
Average ABE participation based on Award Value 
Average ABE participation based on Tender Price 




R58 445 090 




The sample comprised all the Prime (Major) contracts awarded and whose file complete with a copy 
of the tender document was in the records room at the time the sample was drawn. 
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TABLE 5.10: Statistics obtained from a detailed examination of 12 tende .. 
REFERENCE NO. TENDER NO. TENDER PRICE CONTRACT AWARDV,f.LUE ABEVAlUE 
I""nd, PARTICIPATION (INCl. VAn (Rand) 
GOAL I""nd, 
1 970013 3735411 27 3 382 011 913143 
2 970019 6716091 12 6716091 805930 
3 970052 3987654 12 3987654 478518 
• 970110 9436 000 12 9436 000 1 132320 
5 970125 5411887 40 5411887 2 164 754 
6 970152 9741587 40 9718787 3887515 
7 970288 1776006 10 1776000 177 600 
8 980343 1 620000 15 1620000 2-43000 
9 960344 7260 300 40 7260 300 2904120 
10 980381 1 496 325 15 1496 325 224448 
11 980388 2998957 55 2998957 1 649426 
12 960376 .. 264 872 40 4264 872 1 705949 
TOTAL R58 445 090 25 R5B 068 884 Rl. 806 723 
The relatively small difference between Tender Price and Award Value (0,6%) confirms officials 
adherence to the Department's policy of avoiding the use of provisional sums as far as is practicably 
possible. It is reasonable to assume for the purposes of this study, that the Award Value can be 
equated to the Tender Price and that no adjustment is necessary to adjust for any significant 
discrepencies between these values. It is important to note however, that in samples where there is a 
large utilisation of provisional sums in contracts, this could contribute to Significant differences 
between the Tender Price and the Award Value and adjustments would need to be effected. 
The awarding of bonus credits upto a maximum of 12% for the attainment of Affirmative Action 
milestones within an enterprise leads to a situation whereby the Contract Participation Goal tendered 
for, can be significantly higher than the actual ABE participation achieved in the performance of a 
contract. Most tenderers who have claimed these points have entered into jOint ventures with partners 
who qualify for such points in order to secure such credits e.g. on the Malmesbury Prison Contract 
goal credits amounting to 8% were granted. Credits passed towards the Contract Participation Goal 
in respect of ABEs with 100% POI ownership are increased by 10%. 100% POI ownership of ABEs is 
frequently encountered on contracts e.g. all ABEs on the Malmesbury Prison contract had 100% POI 
ownership. 
A further complication is the manner in which credits are passed in respect of joint ventures. Credits 
are awarded on the basis of a Participation Parameter.s Clear1y ABE participation does not equate to 
~ The concept of the" participation parameter" is explained in chapter 8. (See 8.3.2.1) 
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the Participation Parameter on Prime Major Contracts. 
The ABEI which by definition measures the value of work clearly cannot equate to the Contract 
Participation Goal as some adjustments need to be made to take account of the aforementioned 
distortions6. The actual value of the factors used to adjust the recorded participation to reflect a more 
realistic participation level is not critical as the AB El is used to compare participation over different 
time increments and between different subsectors. The author accordingly proposes that the ABEI for 
Prime (Major) Contracts be represented by: 
AB El (Prime( Major)) = 0,851 x sum of the products of all Prime (Major) Contracts 
awarded In the appropriate sub-sector, and their associated 
Contract Participation Goal divided by the sum of all contracts 
in the appropriate Prime (Major) sub-sector, represented as a 
percentage, 
In Prime (Minor) and Prime (Micro) contracts adjudication points, in terms of the Affirmative 
Procurement Policy, are awarded for ABE status subject to the ABE undertaking not to subcontract 
more than 25% of the value of the contract. (This provision was not initially applied by the 
Department, in applying the policy to Prime (Micro) and Prime (Minor) contracts). This requirement 
allows for an ABE to potentially sub-contract a maximum of 25% of the contract value to a non-ABE. 
Most construction related contracts in excess of R100 000 generally include some form of sub-
contracting. It is assumed that on Prime(Minor) and Prime (Micro) contracts approximately 10% of the 
contract value is likely to be sub-contracted to non-ABEs. The author accordingly proposes that the 
AB El for Prime (Minor) and Prime (Micro) contracts be represented by: 
ABEI (Prime (Micro) and Prime (Minor)) = 
5,5.5 Description of data capture, 
0,9' the sum of all contracts awarded to ABEs in 
the sub-sector divided by the sum of all 
contracts in the sub-sector, reduced to a 
percentage. 
Data was gathered from the National Department of Public Works' archives. Copies of actual tender 
reports were obtained as well as a listing of all tender numbers issued. Data regarding the status of all 
contracts was obtained from the Department's WCS system. It was possible, using the sources of 
information, to reconstruct the complete record of contracts awarded with the exception of those listed 
6 The actual value of the factors used to adjust the recorded participation to reflect a more realistic participation level is not 
critical as the ABEI is used to compare participation over different time increments and between different subsectors. 
7 The factor 0,85 effectively &djusts the recorded participation to reflect the estimated actual part icipation if factors such as 
bonus credits, additional credits, value of wort< subcontracted by ABEs to non·ABEs (upto 15% permitted) and the manner in 
which joint venture participation is calculated, all of which are provided for in the TP1 (APP1) resource specification , are 
considered . 
• The factor 0,90 effectively adjusts the recorded participation to reflect the estimated actual participation if permissable levels 
of subcontracting 10 non·ABEs Is considered. (The facto( of 0,90 in effect assumes that ABEs on average subcontract 10% of 
thier WOf1I. to non·ABEs). 
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in Appendix 5.2. 
Data pertaining to the contracts awarded where Targeted Procurement was used over the period 1 
August 1996 to 1 July 1998 was captured on an Excel spread sheet in respect of the following (see 
Appendix 5.3) : 
• Tender number 
• WCS number 
• Date of award 
• Contract description 
• Project Location 








• Resource specifications used if any: Specification number 
Minimum resource goal set by Department 
• Particulars of successful tenderer : Name 




Tendered Resource Goal, if any 
• Particulars of lowest responsive tender with a realistic price : Name of firm 
Tender Price 
Research assistants were utilised to capture data, with the format being prescribed by the author. 
Tenders with unrealistically low tender prices should be rejected before tendered judication points are 
awarded for price. Those adjudicating tenders did not follow this procedure in an instances. The 
logging of tenders with unrealistically low prices would have distorted the Financial Premium Index 
(FPI). As a result, it was not possible to log the price used as the benchmark for the calculation of 
adjudication points for price without considering whether or not it was realistic. Fortunately, it is the 
Department's policy to motivate why the lowest financial offer cannot be accepted e.g. unrealistically 
low price. not the tenderer with the highest number of points, has no experience in the type of work 
etc. The lowest financial offer of a tenderer whose price was acceptable was logged irrespective of 
whether or not such a tenderer presented a bad risk to the department for reasons other than price. 
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The FPI reported on represents the cost difference between the awarded price and the lowest 
responsive tenderer with a realistic price. The FPI accordingly measures the potential cost premium in 
respect of the system of tender adjudication and not the actual premium if risk is taken into 
consideration. 
5.5.6 Assessing ABE participation prior to the Introduction of the APP Policy 
In order to test for an increase in ABE participation it is necessary in the first instance to establish 
what the probable ABE participation levels were prior to the introduction of the policy. The 
departmental record for 1993 was chosen for this purpose as this record is considered to be 
representative of contracting practices prior to the 1994 elections and the change in department 
senior management which took place during 19959 • 
The head office record for tenders awarded in 1993 logged data under the following headings: 




• Contract amount 
• Guarantee number and date of release 
• Contract period 
• Commencement date of contract 
• Completion date 
The number of tenders awarded and the total value of tenders awarded in a number of categories is 
set out in Table 5.11 Contracts were classified upon their present day value for comparative 
purposes i.e. award values were de-escalated by 26,9%. De-escalation was calculated from July 
1993 to July 1997 in accordance with the following Contract Price Adjustment Formula'o : 
(1 - 0, 15)(C,fC, - 1) 
where Cl is the weighted average consumer price for urban areas in July 1997 and Co is the weighted 
average consumer price for urban areas in July 1993. 
~ The records for the period 1994 to August 1996 are likely to be distorted by the implementation of certain policies adopted in 
the run up to the launch of the Affirmative Procurement Policy in August 1996. 
10 Statistics South Africa have discontinued with the publication of indices for the Construction industry. Current practice in 
South Africa is to utilise this formuta to adjust construction prices. 
5.22 
TABLE 5.11: Departmental records of contracts oworded In 1993 (ex heod office) 




Major 55 289284 718 27,8 84,1 
Minor(>R1 ,Om) 18 20490 760 ' .1 6.0 
Minor (:!:: R1 ,0 m) 107 33358 810 " .0 ' .7 
M""" 18 833433 ' .1 0.2 
TOTAL 198 R343 987 721 ~ 100 100 
0 
A stratified sample of 20% was selected for follow-up on the ABE participation during the 1993 
financial year (eachran, 1997)11. Telephonic interviews with the contractors who could be contacted 
(see Appendix 5.4) were conducted to ascertain whether or not such contractors at the time when the 
contract was executed : 
• had ABE status; or 
• subcontracted portions of the work to ABEs. 
Although the total sample accounted for 20% of the total number of tenders awarded, the sample size 
(see Table 5.12) varied according to the number of tenders awarded in each category, ranging from 
10% to 72% of the number of tenders in respect of each class of contract awarded. The specific 
number of tenders awarded in each class of contracts was selected to ensure that the sample is 
representative of the universe. 
TABLE 5.12: Statistics parlalnlng to contracts sampled to obtain ABE participation In 1993 
CLASS OF CONTRACT SAMPLE NUMBER SAMPLE VALUE 
NUMBER PERCENTAGE OF RAND PERCENTAGE OF 
OF TOTAL TOTAL PER CLASS 
OF CONTRACT 
Major 9 ,. 111 329182 38 
MinOr(>R1,Om) 7 J9 11134 572 54 
Minor (s R1 ,0 m) 11 10 3925057 12 
M""" 13 72 669262 80 
TOTAl .. 20 1270151073 37 
11 The sample was obtained by attempting to contact every fifth contractor entered into the departmental record. Where the 
contractor could not be contacted, the contractor above or below the uncontactable contract or in the record was contacted. 
Thereafter, contractors awarded contracts having a certain contract value were contacted, starting from the top of the record to 
improve the sample number within a particular class of contract. 
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5.6 THE AFFIRMABLE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE INDEX: AN INSTRUMENT TO MEASURE 
ABE PARTICIPATION OPTIMISATION 
5.6.1 Definitions and formulae 
The Affirmable Business Enterprise Index (AB El) is by definition the estimated total value of work 
undertaken by ABEs expressed as a percentage of the total value of contracts awarded, where ABEs 
are targeted. This index provides a useful mechanism to access ABE participation in financial terms 
for the different construction subsections viz general, civil , mechanical and electrical and for the 
different contract classifications viz, Major, Minor and Micro. 
Based on arguments made in section 5,5.4, ABE participation is not synonymous with the contract 
participation goals tendered for on Prime (Major) contracts. Further, for Micro and Minor contracts 
where direct preference to ABEs are applicable, the extent of ABE participation is assessed on the 
value of contracts awarded to ABEs, with no relationship to contract participation goals. For this and 
other reasons outlined in Section 5.5.4, the ABEI for the different contract classifications are 
calculated, in accordance with the following formulae: 
Where: 
AB El (Prime (Micro)) = 0,9 X AlB X 100 
A = sum of all prime contracts awarded to ABEs in the micro sector. 
B = sum of all prime contracts awarded in the micro sector under the APP 
programme. 
The formula could be further delineated per subsector, e.g. Mechanical , Civil, etc. 
Where: 
ABEI (Prime (Minor)) = 0,9 X CID X 100 
C = sum of all prime contracts awarded to ABEs in the minor sector. 
o = sum of all prime contracts awarded in the minor sector under the APP 
programme. 
The formula could be further delineated for minor contracts greater than R1 ,0 m and for minor 
contracts less than or equal to R1 ,0 m to account for the impact of varying performance bonds. 
Where: 
ABEI (Prime (Major)) = 0,85 X ElF X 100 
E = sum of the product of all prime major contracts and their associated contract 
participation goals divided by 100. 
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F = sum of all prime major contracts awarded under the programme. 
ABEI (Composite) = (0,9xA + 0,9xC + 0,85xE) I (B + 0 + F) x 100 
For practical purposes the ABEI (Prime (Minor)) and ABEI (Prime (Micro)) are calculated as a 
combined index viz. ABEI (Prime (MinorlMicro)). 
5.6.2 Time Incrementa 
The indices referred to in 5.6.1 are calculated in respect of the following time increments: 
• 1 August 1996 - 30 June 1997 
• 1 July 1997 - 30 Dec 1997 
• 1Jan1998-1July1998 
Start up phase 
First six month period after start up phase 
Second six month after start up phase 
ABEIS applicable to the entire time period are also calculated and statistically analysed for variances 
in key parameters associated with each time increment. 
5.6.3 Estab"shment of potential polIcy outcomes 
In order to establish the degree to which the ABE participation meets with potential policy outcomes, 
appropriate targets or limits must be set for appropriate time increments 12. 
A review of the tender adjudication parameters contained in the tender conditions aSSOCiated with the 
awarding of Prime (Major) contracts, indicates that the only reference to an upper target for 
participation is made in Prime (Major) Contracts where reference is made to no further allocation of 
development objective tender adjudication points, in instances where tile contract participation goal 
exceeds 40 %. (Refer to 5.3.2 for method of calculation) . This tends to indicate that the policy 
writers were satisfied with a contract participation goal of 40 % being realised for the period under 
review. For the purposes of this dissertation and in the absence of any other information, the upper 
threshold to ensure full compliance of the APP for the current time frame for Prime (Micro), Prime 
(Minor) and Prime (Major) contracts is assumed to be: 
ABEI (upper threshold) = 0,857 x 40 % 
= 34,3 % 
The factor of 0,857 is applied to compensate for the difference between the ABEI and the overall ABE 
participation and is the weighted average of 0,85 and 0,90 calculated on the basis of a proportional 
split between Prime (Micro) and Prime (Minor) contracts on one hand, and Prime (Major) contracts, on 
the other. (Refer to Table 5.6) 
12 Targets tor ABE participation were flOt set by the Department as there were no previous statistics against which appropriate 
benchmarks could be formulated. 
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Applying a 4 point incremental linear scale to the measurement of the ABEI with the upper threshold 
set at 34,3 % for the period under review, the author arrived at the descriptors for different ABEI 
outcomes wh ich are tabulated in Table 5.13. 
Table 5.13: Description for different AB El outcomes 
ABEI DESCRIPTOR ABEI VALUE RANGE (%) 
l ow (l ) 0 -8,58 
Below Average (BA) 8,59-17,15 
Above Average (AA) 17,16 -25,73 
High (H) 25,74 - 34,30 
The descriptors set out in Table 5.13 provide a simple means to assess different ABEls against the 
envisaged initial outcomes. These descriptors are applied to all the ABEls which are calculated. 
5.6.4 Resource Goal Ratios as a diagnostic instrument 
The introduction of minimum resource goals by the employer at tender stage on prime major 
contracts, requ ires tenderers to embrace the policy and guarantees some participation by ABEs. It is 
therefore important to log the minimum resource goals set for every Prime (Major) tender and to 
determine the ratio for the number of contracts under consideration of the weighted average of the 
contract participation goals and of the contracted minimum resource goals specified in the tender. A 
resource goal ratio close to unity would indicate that the minimum resource goal ratio is too high for 
one or more of the following reasons: 
• The absorptive capacity of ABEs in the specific sector has been reached. 
• The prices received from the targeted enterprises are not competitive when compared to those 
received from non-targeted enterprises. 
• The scope for participation by ABEs is less than predicted. 
• The cost to embrace the policy objective generally exceeds the reward which is provided in the 
development objective/price mechanism to do so. 
The resource goal ratio serves as a useful diagnostic instrument to test the appropriateness of the 
minimum goals set, and allows for the establishment of appropriate threshold goals on subsequent 
tenders. Resource goal ratios are calculated for all 5ubsectors in the Prime (Major) category to test 
the appropriateness of the minimum thresholds set. 
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5.7 QUANTIFYING THE FPI ASSOCIATED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE APP 
POLICY 
5.7.1 IntroducUon 
The financial premium associated with the promotion of ABEs. has direct and indirect components. 
The direct component relates to the increased tender amount to promote ABEs, and the indirect costs 
relates to the hidden cost including increased administrative requirements, intemal staff training ete, 
which are not necessarily included in the tender price. The direct financial premium associated with 
ABE promotion can be readily quantified where the development objective/price mechanism used for 
the award of a contract. provides for adjudication points for ABE status, i.e. where a direct preference 
is applied; the financial premium being the direct preference which is applied. Where adjudication 
points are awarded on the basis of achieving a contract participation goal e.g. Prime (Major) 
contracts, this may not necessarily be the case. It should be noted in this regard that: 
• The introduction of a positive minimum resource 'goal requires that all tenderers must embrace 
the policy. Accordingly, the tender prices which are submitted include for both a threshold cost of 
embracing the policy and the cost to optimise ABE participation. 
• The introduction of a zero resource goal allows tenderers to choose to embrace the policy, or not 
to do so. Accordingly the tender prices which are submitted under these circumstances include 
the total cost of embracing the policy, if th~ tenderer elects to embrace the policy. The 
Department of Public Wori<.s was reluctant to allow the principle of zero minimum goals to be 
applied on an appropriately sized sample, as they were of the view, that this approach might 
contribute to some perceptions of policy reversals during the initial implementation phase. 
The true cost premium can in theory only be determined on Prime (Major) contracts jf a zero contract 
participation goal is set and tenderers with the lowest financial offer always tender contract 
participation goals having a zero value. If a tenderer tenders the lowest financial offer and a positive 
resource goal, where a zero minimum goal is set, a benefit as opposed to a financial premium results. 
Accordingly, the calculation of true financial premiums within the context of the current APP 
framework, are possible only for Prime (Micro) and (Minor) contracts, whilst on Prime (Major) 
contracts, for the aforementioned reasons, the calculated financial premiums generally relate to the 
cost of optimising the policy, i.e. awarding of tenders in terms of the development objective/price 
mechanism. 
5.7.2 OefinitJons and fonnula. 
The Financial Premium Index (FPI) is defined as the difference in price between the awarded tender 
price, i.e. the tender receiving the highest number of points, and the lowest tender price used for the 
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awarding of adjudication point for price, divided by the lowest tender price used for the awarding of 
adjudication points for price, namely: 
FPI =A -BX100 
B 
Where A = sum of the tender prices of awarded contracts in a particular sector 
B = sum of the tender prices of the lowest responsive tender used as the 
base value for the awarding of tender adjudication points for price. 
The theoretical maximum FPI for any prime contract where a 10/90 formulation is used for the 
development objective/price mechanism is 11 ,1 %. 
FPls for all construction subsectors and for the full range of prime contracts are calculated for both 
discrete time increments and the overall period of study. 
5.7.3 Establishment of different FPlscenarios 
Applying a 4 point linear scale to the measurement of FPls with the upper threshold set at 11 ,1 %, the 
descriptors tabulated in Table 5.16 can be used to describe different FPI scenarios. 
TABLE 5.14: Oescriptors for different FPI outcomes 
FPI OESCRIPTORS FPI VALUE RANGE (%) 
LOW (L) 0-2,77% 
BEL()VoI AVERAGE (BA) 2,76 - 5,55 % 
ABOVE AVERAGE (AA) 5,56-6,32 % 
HIGH (HI 633-11 10% 
The interpretation of the descriptors set out in Table 5.14 are as follows: 
'Low' (FPI in the range 0 - 2,77 %) indicates that either a low direct financial premium is incurred on 
Prime (Micro) or Prime (Minor) contracts or that a low financial premium is incurred to optimise ABE 
participation on Prime (Major) contracts. 
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'High' (FPI in the range 8,32 - 11,10 %) indicates that either a high direct financial premium is 
incurred on Prime (Micro) or Prime (Minor) contracts or that a high financial premium is incurred to 
optimise ABE participation on Prime (Major) contracts. 
The aforementioned descriptors provide a simplified measure to interpret the different FPI outcomes 
against the potential maximum FPI. These descriptors are applied to all FPls which are calculated . 
5.8 LINKING FPls AND ABEI. VIA A QUADRANT COMPARATOR 
Descriptors for ABEls and FPls which were developed in 5.6 and 5.7, respectively, cannot be 
interpreted in isolation from each other. A mechanism is required to provide a collective interpretation 
of these parameters. 
Unique ABEls and FPls can be readily calculated for each construction subsector within a particular 
contract classification e.g. Prime (Major-General), and can be plotted as ordinates on a graph. This 
graph can be divided into four equal quadrants if lines parallel to the x and y axis are drawn along the 
mid and maximum value ranges of the descriptors for ABEls and FPls as tabulated in Table 5.13 and 
5.14. respectively. (See Figure 5.1) 
The quadrant comparator can best be explained by considering four ordinates located on the 
extremities of the quadrants shown in Figure 5.1 . 
Ordinate (a): low FPI and very high ABEI. 
Ordinate (a) indicates that a very high ABE participation is being achieved at a very low finanCial 
premium, i.e. the most desirable condition from a policy position. The outcome is indicative of 
appropriate absorptive capacity amongst the ABEs and efficiently operating ABEs. 
Ordinate (b): high FPI and high ABEI. 
Ordinate (b) indicates that a very high ABE participation is being achieved, but at a high financial 
premium. This outcome is indicative of ABE availability in the sector but which is not necessarily 
operating as efficiently as non-ABEs. 
Ordinale (c): high FPland low ABEI. 
Ordinate (c) indicates that very small gains in ABE participation occur at 'very high financial premiums. 
This outcome is indicative of limited ABE availability in this sector, or possibly a very small group of 
ABEs controlling the market niche. resulting in high financial premiums. It could also indicate entry 
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threshold difficulties for ABEs entering into a sector, such as requirements for specialised skills or 
specialised work processes. Corrective measures which would need to be taken to improve policy 
outcomes include focussed interventions of a supply side nature to increase ABE participation. 
r 
FIGURE 5.1: The FPII ABEI Quadrant Comparator 
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Ordinate (d): very low FPI and very low ABEI. 
Ordinate (d) indicates that there are no or a negligible number of ABE participants in this sector. As a 
consequence, the tenders received are predominantly from non-ABEs. As such the Affirmative 
Procurement Policy is having little or no impact. 


















Ideal outcome; policy intent being met in a cost effective manner. 
There is appropriate absorptive capacity amongst ABEs; ABEs are operating 
effectively. 
Maintain policy with continuous monitoring. 
Satisfactory outcome; the policy is yielding satisfactory outcomes but not at 
optimum effICiency. 
ABE availability with the sector. ABEs not necessarily operating as 
effectively as non-ABEs. 
Focus on supply side measures to improve effICiency. 
Worst outcome; the policy is yielding disappointing participation level for the 
financial premium incurred. 
Limited ABE capacity in the sector, arising from a small group of ABEs 
controlling the market. which accounts for the high premiums. 
Focus on supply side interventions to develop new ABE capacity in sector. 
Neutral outcome; the policy is yielding disappointing participation levels, but 
is not attracting significant financial investments to do so. 
Limited or negligible ABE capacity in this sector, probably relating to entry 
thresholds, e.g. specialised skills, plant requirements, etc, which mitigate 
against ABE participation. 
Focus on supply side interventions to develop new capacity. Increased ABE 
participation levels only likely in the medium term. 
The impact of the Affirmative Procurement Policy, both in terms of ABE participation and potential 
financial premiums can be readily assessed should FPls and ABEls be calculated for all four 
construction sectors in respect of Prime (MinorlMicro) contracts and Prime (Major) contracts and the 
resulting 8 sets of ordinates are plotted on the FPIIABEI Quadrant comparator. 
5.9 PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
5.9.1 ABE participation levels 
The projected AB El of the representative sample of 40 contracts awarded by the Department of 
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Public Works Head Office in 1993 are presented in Table 5.15. The combined ABEI for Prime 
(Micro/Minor) Contracts was found to be 1,93% with the projected AB El for Prime (Major) Contracts 
being 0,32%. In the Prime (Minor/Micro) Category, only one out of the thirty one contracts sampled, 
was awarded to an ABE, whilst in the Prime (Major) category no contracts out of the nine contracts 
sampled were awarded to ABEs. In the Prime (Major) category ABE participation was confined solely 
to ABEs participating as sub-contractors with the AB El being limited to 0,32%. The composite ABEI 
for all prime contracts was a mere 0,52%. The author anticipated a relatively low ABE index. 13 
However, the exceptionally low ABEI for Prime (Major) contracts warrants further comment. 
Historically ABEs have participated primarily as sub-contractors to established prime contractors, and 
one would therefore have expected a higher ABEI in this category . Upon further investigation the 
author concludes that this exceptionally low index reflected in Table 5.15 above can be attributed to, 
inter alia : 
• ABE sub-contractors not being registered as formal business enterprises 
• The lack of formal sub-contracting agreements between the ABEs and the Prime Contractors 
being in place. 
TABLE 5. 15: Projected ABE Indices based on .. mple of 1993 head office contracts 
DESCRIPTION PRIME PRIME TOTAL 
(MINOR! MICRO) (MAJOR) 
ABEI 1,93 0,32 0 ,52 
Number of Contracts awarded to ABEs 1 0 1 
Percentage of Contracts awarded to ABEs 3,23% 0% 2,50% 
Value of ABE participation R337 000 R424500 R761 500 
Percentage value of Contracts awarded to ABEs 2,14% 0% 0,27% 
Total number of contracts in sample 31 9 40 
Total value of contracts in sample R15 728 891 R1l1329182 R127 058 073 
The aforementioned two factors were made known to the respondents during the telephonic 
intelViews when clarifying the recording of ABE status. The exceptionally low ABE percentage for 
Prime (Major) contracts during this period therefore does not necessarily infer that there were no 
black sub-contractors participating on these projects, but rather that these business enterprises 
operated in the informal sector with limited structured relationship with the prime contractor. Clearly 
from the definition of an Affirmable Business Enterprise provided in Chapter 4, informal enterprises 
are excluded from this defin ition and therefor the results in Table 5.15 are not unexpected. 
The ABEls for the different classes and categories of contracts, for the period under review (August 
1996 - July 1998) are tabulated in Table 5.16. Contracts totaling R1 ,65 billion were awarded under 
the APP programme during this period, with the overall AB El being 26,84%. In terms of the different 
construction sub-sectors, the General sub-sector has the highest ABEI of 29,35%, with the C ivil , 
Mechanical and Electrical sub-sectors having lower ABEls of 19,93%, 11 ,33% and 9,88%, 
respectively. 
IS Watemeyer et al (1998) had postulated that ABE participation levels in 1995 were around 3%. Watermeyer and Band (1 994) 
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The ABEI for all Prime (Micro/Minor) contracts is 16,25%, which is substantially lower than the ABEI 
of 27,84% for all Prime (Major) contracts. It is immediately apparent from Table 5.16 that a significant 
contribution to the overall ABEt of 26,84% has been the contribution of Prime (Major) contracts where 
use is made of the TP1(APP1) specification to secure ABE participation. 
The number and the value of contracts awarded to ABEs operating as Prime contractors, either in the 
Prime (MicrolMinor) or Prime (Major) class, is relatively low (10,84% in number; and 6,5% in financial 
terms), when assessed against the overall ABE index of 26,64% which was achieved. 
Of the total of 312 contracts in the Prime (Micro/Minor) category, only 34 contracts (10,9%), were 
awarded to ABEs as prime contractors. In Prime (Major) contracts, 14 of the 131 contracts awarded 
or 10,69% were awarded to ABEs. 
Tables 5.17 to 5.19 set out comparative statistics for the time increments identified in 5.6.2. 
Tables 5.17 to 5.19 show an increase in ABE participation as measured in terms of the ABEI index for 
all construction sub-sectors from 22,29% during the start~up period to 25,67% in the first six month 
period after start~up, and thereafter to 28,39% in the second six month period after start-up. These 
figures suggest an increase in ABE participation over the study period. The ABEI is, however, made 
up of a number of statistics. As such increases in value may not necessarily reflect increases in ABE 
participation but rather changes in the distribution of work within construction sub-sectors and prime 
contract claSSifications. 
Table 5.20 sets out the composition of the AB El in respect of each time increment under 
consideration. Table 5.20 shows that the percentage value of contracts awarded in each construction 
sub-sector and prime contract classification varies considerably over the study period, If the ratio of 
percentage contribution to ABEI to the percentage value of contracts is consKiered, only in the Prime 
(Major- General) category is this value consistently above 0,8 i.e contracts in this category of 
contracts are conSistently efficient in securing high levels of ABE participation. As this category 
contributes between 78,4 and 92,2% to the overall ABEI for the time increment under consideration, 
an Increase in ABE partiCipation in this category would imply increased ABE participation over the 
study period. 
reported that SAFCEC, despite being founded in the 1930'$ had no black members in 1994, 
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TABLE 5.16: ABE Indices (August 1996 - July 1998) 
, 
,. PR'M~ PR'ME P~~~E SUB-SECTOR 
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, 0' "" '" 9f :roB 
I C',II 
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:::BE: ' '0 U.""% b .bf" 3 •• ' " 
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% of T~'de~ _,!'oa of 0.00% 1.23% 1.17% 
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TABLE 5.17: ABE Indlc .. (August 1996 - June 1997) 
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~5,18: ABE July 1997 _ n r 1997) 
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The contract participation goal as determined in accordance with the TP1 (APP1) specification 
determines the value of the ABEI for Prime (Major) Contracts, The mean and standard deviation for 
Prime (Major-General) contracts in respect of each time increment is set out in Table 5,21 , 
TABLE 5,20: Composition of ABEI for different time increments 
CONSTRUCTION CONTRIBUTION VALUE 
SUB-$ECTOR TO OVERALL ABEI FOR OF CONTRACTS 
AND TIME INCREMENT 1%)" AWARED DURING TIME INCREMENTS 
PRIME EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE 
CONTRACT TOTAL VALUE OF CONTRACTS AWARDED (%) 
CLASSIFICATION August July January STUDY August July January STUDY ,,,. 1997 1998 PERIOD "96 1997 1998 PERIOD 
to to to to to to 
June December July June December July 
1997 1997 1998 1997 1997 1998 
General 15,6 3,8 2,8 4,6 16,9 7,5 2,2 5,7 
(Minor' MicrO) 
! (Ma'or) 
78,4 92,2 83,6 85,4 67,3 82,0 77,2 76,8 
Civil 0 0 0 0 1,1 0,2 0,2 0,4 
(Minor' Micro) 
, (Ma'or) 
0 0,2 8,' 6,1 0,4 0,4 12,0 7,5 
Mechanical 0,5 0 0,5 0,4 2,' 3,8 0,6 1,7 
i :~i~~~ Micro) 3,7 2,5 3,' 2,7 4,3 3,2 7,2 5,8 
Ma or 
Electrical 0 0 0,3 0,2 3,3 0,' 0,3 0,' 
I ~~i~~~~ Micro) 1,8 t ,3 0 0,6 3,8 2,0 0,3 1,2 
Ma or 
All (Composite) 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
" Bolded values indicate that the ratio of percentage contribution to ABEI to the percentage value of contracts for corresponding 
lime incremenls exceeds 0,8, 
TABLE 5.21 : Contract participation goal statistics In respect of Prime (Major-General) 
Contracts 
TIME INCREMENT MEAN VALUE OF CONTRACT PARTICIPATION GOAL STANDARD DEVIATION 
AU9U511996· June 1997 26,47 12,40 
July 1997 - December 1997 29,37 12,86 
January 1998 - July 1998 33,40 9,71 
Table 5.22 sets out the results of the application of an analysis of variance technique on the data 
used to generate Table 5,21 . The F value at the 5% level of significance confirms the null hypothesis 
meaning that there are no significant differences for the means for the different time increments at the 
5% level of significance, This result is not unexpected given the relatively high standard deviations 
recorded in respect of each time increment. If, however, significance tests are conducted on the first 
and the last time increments and it is assumed that the variances are not equal, a two-tailed test 
rejects the null hypothesis with a probability of less than 0,05; meaning that there are significant 
differences between the two mean contract participation goals, Accordingly, the primary reasons for 
an increase in the overall ABEI from the first time increment to the last time increment are two fold; 
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viz., an increase in value of Prime (Major-General) contracts and an increase in participation within 
Prime (Major-General) contracts14. 
TABLE 5.22: Analysis of variance on contract participation goals In raapeet of Prime (Major-
General) Contracts 
SOURCES OF SUM OF SQUARES DEGREES OF MEAN SQUARE F 
VARIATION FREEDOM 
Treatments 712,318 2 356,159 2,711 
Em" 12351 ,187 94 131 ,396 -
(Total) 13063,505 96 . -
Table 5.23 presents the results of Prime (Major) contracts for the overall period under review. This 
table highlights the decreasing contract participation goal as one moves from the general construction 
sub-sector through to the Civil, Mechanical and Electrical sub-sectors. This table also highlights the 
limited number of contracts awarded to ABEs as prime contractors, 13,4% of the Prime (Major-
General) contracts awarded to ABEs, 6 ,7% of Prime (Major-Civil) contracts awarded to ABE Prime 
contractors, whilst no Prime (Major-Electrical) or Prime (Major-Mechanical) contracts were awarded to 
ABE prime contractors. It should, however, be borne in mind that the ABE tumover limits for a prime 
contractor are R25,O million. If, however, only contracts having a value of say R20,0 million and less 
are considered, the number of Prime (Major-composite) contracts awarded to ABEs would increase 
from 10,7 to 11 ,1% whilst the value of contracts awarded would increase from 5,4% to 7,5%. 
Accordingly, the value of a Prime (Major) contract has some influence over the results, but does not 
account for the relatively low levels of performance. 
The Goal ratios (i.e. average contract participation goal for a series of awarded contracts to the 
minimum contract participation goal above which no further adjudication points are awarded) 
tabulated in Table 5.23, range from 1,46 to 2,70. These goal ratios indicate that the thresholds 
(minimum) goals which were set are attainable and there was some scope for tendering goals above 
the minimum. The minimum contract participation goals set for the Mechanical constructor subsector, 
however, appear to be set at too high a threshold when compared to the other sub-sectors. 
'4 There is insufficient data to perform similar analysis for other construction sub-sectors. 
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TABLE 5,23: Prime Major (TP1 ) Contracts for the period 1 August 1996 to 1 July 1998 
General Civil MechanIcal Elect rical All Sub-sectors 
Number of contracts 97 15 14 5 131 
Value of contracts R1 ,270,125,041 R124,579,197 R96,42S,748 R20,142,859 Rl ,511 ,272,845 
Avera e contract artici ation 0., 35,02% 24,6% 15,0% 15,0% 32,7% 
Minimum contract participat ion 13,0% 12,5% 10,3% 7,6% 12,8% 
aoal 
Goal Ratio· 2,70 1,96 1,46 1,96 2,57 
Number of contracts awarded to 13 I 0 0 I. 
ABEs 
% number of contracts awarded to 13,4% 6,7% 0% 0% 10,7% 
ABEs 
Value of contracts awarded 10 RSO 305 004 RI 529831 0 0 R8 t 834 835 
ABEs 
% \/alue of contracts awarded to 6,63 1,23 0% 0% 5,41 % 
ABEs 
· ABE Index fOl' all pnme contracts. 
5.9,2 Financ ial Premium Indices 
Financial Premium Indices for the study period and for each of the time increments set out in 5.6.2 are 
tabulated for each construction subsector in Tables 5.24 to 5,27 respectively, The values for OFI 
presented in these tables should be interpreted against a theoretical maximum possible OFt of 11 ,1% 
It may be observed from these tables that : 
• The overall financial premium index is 0,32% which is significantly lower than the maximum 
potential index 11 ,1% 
• The FOI for Prime (Micro/Minor) contracts is 0,25%, which is slightly lower than the FPI for Prime 
(Major) contracts which is 0,33% 
• In Prime (MicrolMinor) contracts. the General construction sub-sector had the highest FPI of 
0,32%, whilst in Prime (Major) contracts, the Civils construction sub-sector had the highest FPI of 
0,87%, which was also the highest FPI measured for the overall period under review. 
Although there are variances in FPI between periods and construction subsectors, all FPls may be 
described in terms of Table 5.14 as being "Iow·. 
The relatively insignificant FPI incurred in Prime (Minor/Micro) contracts where a direct financial 
preference is accorded to ABEs suggests that the extent to which ABEs can access work 
opportunities through such preferences is moderated by the level of competition that exists. 
The financial premium index for the Prime (Micro/Minor) class of contract, calculates the actual direct 
financial premium, which in this case is 0,25%. The financial premium index for the Prime (Major) 
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contracts. on the other hand. calculates the cost of optimising the Affinnative Procurement Policy. 
Table 5.26 shows the FPI for Prime (MinorlMicro) contracts to be lower than that for Prime (Major) 
contracts. This trend is unexpected. 
Tables 5.25 to 5.27 do not indicate any clear trends with the FPI for the Initial start up period, being 
0,4% reducing to 0,12% in the first six month period after start up, and subsequently increasing to 
0,3% in the second six month period after start up. FPls for the Prime (MicrolMinor) contracts in the 
General and Mechanical sub sectors record comparatively high FPls of 0,89 and 0,91% respectively, 
in the last time increment under review. The significance of this observation for the General 
construction sub sector could be linked to the increase in ABE participation in Prime (MicrolMinor) 
contracts for the second six month period after start up, which was measured at 39,7%. Limited 
significance is given by the author to the FPI index for the Mechanical sub sector in this time 
increment, as this was influenced by one contract awarded to an ABE. 
TABLE 5.24: Financial Premium Indices (August 1996 - July 1998) 
FINANCIAL PREMIUM INDICES MINOR' MICRO MAJOR TOTAL 
COMBINED 1%) (%1 (%1 
General 0 ,32 0,31 0,31 
Civil 0.00 0,87 0,83 
Mechanical 0,20 0 ,00 0,04 
Electrical 0.00 0.00 0,00 
TOTAL 0,25 0,33 0,32 
TABLE 5.25: Flnanclat Premium Indices (August 1996 - June 1997) 
FINANCIAL PREMIUM INDICES MINOR' MICRO MAJOR TOTAL 
COMBINED 1%) 1%) (%) 
General 0,23 0 ,54 0.48 
Civil 0.00 0.00 0,00 
Mechanical 0,00 0.00 0,00 
Electrical 0,00 0.00 0,00 
TOTAL 0 ,16 0,48 0,40 
TABLE 5.26: Financial Premium Indices (July 1997 - December 1997) 
FINANCIAL PREMIUM IN[)tCES MINOR I MICRO MAJOR TOTAL 
COMBINED 
General om 0,71 0 ,57 
Civil 0 ,00 0,00 0.00 
Mechanical 0.00 0,00 0.00 
Electrical 0.00 0,00 0.00 
TOTAL 0.00 0,70 0,12 
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TABLE 5.27 : Financial Premium Indices (January 1998-July 1998) 
FINANCIAL PREMIUM INDICES MINOR I MICRO MAJOR TOTAL 
COMBINED 
General 0,89 0,21 0,23 
Civil 0,00 0,89 0,88 
Mechanical 0.91 0,00 0,07 
Electrical 0,00 0,00 0,00 
TOTAL 0.76 0,28 0,30 
It is clear from the quadrant comparator in Figure 5.2 that the ordinate for all prime contracts for all 
subsectors plots in quadrant 1 indicating that the policy intent is being met in a cost effective manner. 
This outcome has been influenced by the nature of the sample with its large component of major 
contracts and general contracts. 
The ordinate for Prime (Major) contracts for all subsectors also plots in quadrant 1, indicating an ideal 
outcome, whilst the ordinate for all Prime (micro/minor) contracts plots in quadrant 4, close to the 
average line. This difference is attributed to the large contract participation goal contribution of ABE 
subcontractors on Prime (Major) contracts. The close proximity of the Prime (micro/minor) contracts 
for all subsectors ordinate to the average line infers that the conclusions for quadrant 4, namely a 
neutral outcome, is not applicable as clearly there has been an increase in ABE participation in this 
sector. The difference, however, between the Prime (Major-combined) and the Prime (Micro/Minor· 
combined) do indicate a slower rate of participation of ABEs as prime contractors. 
5.9.3 Linking FPls and ABEt. via a quadrant comparator 
The paired values for FPI and ABEI in respect of each construction subsector and class of contract as 
tabu lated in Table 5.28 are plotted on the quadrant comparator in Figure 5.2. The results of the 
quadrant comparator are summarised in Table 5.29. 
It should be noted that the upper threshold in the quadrant comparator has been set at 34,3%, based 
on a maximum participation of 40% (Refer to 5.6.3). Figure 5.2 shows that supply side measures 
need to focus on the development of prime contractors in the civil , mechanical and electrical 
construction subsectors and on electrical and mechanical subcontractors, suppliers and service 
providers. 
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TABLE 5.28 : FPUABE Index (Aug 96 - July 98) 
CONSTRucnON INDICE Prime {MlcrolMlnor, PltfM (M_Jor) 
SU&.SeCTOR Contracts Conb"Kts 
General ABEI 21 ,81 29.90 
FPI 0,32 0,31 
Civil ABEI 0.0 20." 
FPI 0,0 0,87 
Mechanical ABEI 6,41 12,76 
FPI 0,20 0,00 
Electrical ABEI '," 12,74 
FPI 0 ,00 0,00 
All ABEI 16,25 27,84 
FPI 0 ,25 0,33 
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It can be seen from Table 5.29 and Figure 5.2 that each policy outcome falls into one of two 
categories viz. : 
Ide.1 outcome (Quadrant 1) : 
Policy intent is being met in a cost effective manner. There is appropriate absorptive capacity 
amongst ABEs; ABEs are operating effectively. No actHJn is required. 
Neutral outcome 'Quadrant 4) 
The policy is yielding disappointing participation levels but is not attracting significant financial 
investments to do so. limited or negligible ABE capacity in this sector, probably relating to entry 
thresholds e.g. specialised skills, plant requirements, etc. which mitigate against ABE participation. 
The actions necessary include a focus on supply side interventions to develop new capacity. 
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FIGURE 5_2 : The FPI/ ABEI Quadrant Comparator for outcomes between August 1996 and 
July 1998 
5.10 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The policy has resulted in an increase in ABE participation as measured in terms of the ABEl from 0,5 
in 1993 to 26,8% during the period 1 August 1996 to 1 July 1998. The General construction sub-
sector yielded the highest participation levels with an AB El value of 29,4% followed by the Civil sub-
sector (19,9%); the Mechanical subsector (11 ,3%) and the Electrical sub-sector (9,9%). ABE 
participation as measured by the ABEI was consistently and signifICantly higher in every subsector in 
Prime (Major) contracts than in Prime (Minor/Micro) Contracts. 
The number and value of contracts awarded to ABEs operating as Prime Contractors is relatively low 
(Refer to Table 5.16). The number of contracts awarded to ABEs at prime contract level in all 
subsectors accounted for a mere 6,5% of the total value of contracts awarded and 18,1% in respect of 
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Prime (Minor/Micro) contracts. Accordingly, the bulk of the ABE participation reflected in the ABEI 
was achieved through the engagement of ABE subcontractors, suppliers, manufacturers and service 
providers in terms of the resource specification, TP1 (APP1). 
The participation level of ABE prime contractors in Prime (Minor I Micro) contracts in the General sub-
sector of 24,2% is significantly higher than in the Civil (0%), electrical (6,5%) and mechanical (7,2%) 
subsectors. This is not unexpected as Watenneyer and Band (1994) reported that the South African 
Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors (SAFCEC), despite being founded in the 1930's to serve 
civil engineering contractors, still had no black members by the end of 1992. The overall Prime 
(Minor/Micro) contract value of 18,1% is, however, higher than the figure of 11% reported by 
Watermeyer et al (1998) for the period August 1996 to October 1997, This suggests that there is 
either an increase in ABE participation in this category of contract or less ABEs have failed to claim 
the direct preference provided for in the policy. 
An analysis of the ABEI (Composite) in respect of each subsector indicates that the AB El (Prime 
(Major» is the dominant contributor to this index. An examination of the average contract 
participation goals associated with the TP1(APP1) specification, i.e. Prime (Major) Contracts , is 
signiflCantly higher in the General construction 5ubsector than for any other subsector. A statistical 
analysis of the contract participation goals achieved in respect of Prime (Major) contracts for each 
time increment showed that there is a significant increase (p s 0,05) between the average goal for the 
period August 1996 to June 1997 and the period January 1998 to July 1998, Although the 
percentage by value of General construction work increased between these two periods, the increase 
in ABEI from 22,3% to 28,4% for these periods can in part be attributed to an increase in ABE 
participation. This increase could be attributed to the popularisation of the APP policy and the 
familiarisation by the industry with the policy and not necessarily to the formation of new ABEs or the 
growth of existing ones, as the incubation period for construction enterprises exceeds the period 
under review. 
Watenneyer et sI (1998) have undertaken research into ABE participation levels prior to the 
introduction of the Affirmative Procurement Policy. They postulated a participation level of around 
3% in 1995 based on information obtained from three large contracting firms in South Africa who 
analysed their subcontracting arrangements. This level of participation would approximate to an 
ABEI of around 2,5% and is probably representative of participation levels after the changes in Senior 
Management within the Department took place, but immediately prior to the introduction of the 
Affirmative Procurement Policy. It may accordingly be argued that the order of magnitude increase in 
ABE participation between 1995 and the study period is directly attributable to the introduction by the 
Department of the Affirmative Procurement Policy_ 
The minimum contract participation goals set by the Department appear to be reasonable. 
Consideration should, however, be given to the lowering of the minimum contract participation goal 
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set by the Department in respect of the mechanical construction subsector. 
The Direct Financial Premiums are on average below 0,35% for the study period. This result is lower 
than the figu re of 0,8% quoted by Watermeyer et al (1998). This is probably due to the correction of 
errors made in the tender reports. (The Department frequently used unrealistic tender prices to 
calculate development objective I price mechanism points and then discarded the lowest tender on 
the basis of an unrealistically low tender price, thus distorting the statistics). 
Commentators at the time when the policy was first implemented on a pilot basis on the Malmesbury 
Prison Complex during the tender period (February 1996 to April 1996) stated that the cost to 
implement the policy would be between 10 and 15%. However, when a team co-ordinated by 
Soderlund & Schutte (1998) interviewed the unsuccessful tenderers, they found that some of the 
tenderers interviewed considered there to be no cost premium to implement the policy whilst others 
considered this not to be the case. Bruce (1999), the leader of the interministerial task team on 
construction industry development and the managing director of one of the largest construction 
companies in South Africa, is of the view that the cost to implement the policy is the cost to manage 
the process. He cites a potential cost premium of 1,2% which his company arrived at in a study 
prepared for the Industrial Development Corporation. He points out, however, that in his experience 
that where more management is provided, the cost savings associated with improved performance 
usually out weighs the cost of such management. His conclusion is that there is no effective cost 
premium. The relatively high participation levels, high goal ratios and relatively low OFls support 
Bruce's obsevations. 
The low FPI supports the notion that the cost premium is associated with the Department's choice of 
contractor rather than costs incurred by a contractor to structure his resources to satisfy the 
requirements of the policy. An analysis of policy outcomes in terms of the quadrant comparator 
suggests that in the main, the policy intent is being met viz., high levels of participation which attract 
relatively insignificant direct financial premiums. The analysis also suggests that policy intent in 
Prime (Major) contracts is being met at a faster rate than is the case for Prime (Minor/Micro) 
contracts. Supply side measures are, however, necessary to develop prime contractors in the civil, 
mechanical and electrical construction subsectors and subcontractors, suppliers and service providers 
in the electrical and mechanical subsectors. 
5.11 CONCLUSIONS 
The Research supports both the sub-hypotheses which were tested viz. : 
1) 
2) 
The National Department of Public Works can promote increased participation of 
ABEs in the construction economy via its Affirmative Procurement Policy. 
The adoption of the Affirmative Procurement Policy has resulted in the State bearing 
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• 
a limited financial premium, when compared to the initial projected outcomes and 
overall benefits . 
5.47 
CHAPTER 6 




The author has in the preceding chapters indicated that the State is required to take specific pol icy 
positions in order to effect real and sustainable changes to the structure of the construction industry. 
The Affirmative Procurement Policy (APP) was introduced by the state to faci litate an increase in 
participation of small scale enterprises, owned, managed and controlled by previously disadvantaged 
persons in public sector procurement. In this chapter the author examines the impact of the 
application of the policy on the Affirrnable Business Enterprise sector of the construction industry. The 
following sub~hypothesis is tested: 
Increased procurement opportunities to Affirmable Business Enterprises via government's 
Affirmative Procurement Policy is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the full 
enablement of Affirmable Business Enterprises in the construction sector. 
The process of effecting a fundamental change in the structure of enterprise participation in the 
construction sector is not a simple one. Change at a scale that will have an impact may result from: 
1) The empowerment processes presently operating in the South African economy in terms of 
which changes are occurring in the structure of equity ownership of large firms. 
2) The establishment and nurturing of significant numbers of SMMEs with ownership by 
previously disadvantaged individuals through wh ich overall levels of participation will rise on a 
sustainable basis. (MOF and MPWs, 1995, 1997). 
The first option is shaped more by high level financial mechanisms that are structured by operating 
factors in the construction industry. The result of such changes in ownership tend to manifest at 
company board level and are rarely felt in the company operating structures at the lowest levels. Such 
deals tend to be concentrated in high technology and high value sectors because they are generally 
underwritten by substantial borrowings. The construction sector is not generally considered to have 
these characteristics and such deals are not common in it Moreover the numerical majority of 
companies which participate in public sector construction contracts are privately owned, as opposed 
to being publicly listed. Significant changes in the structure of participation would thus be slow and 
limited if the government placed passive reliance on changes that are driven primarily by exogenous 
financial factors. The potential to manage change would be severely limited under this option. 
The second option, that of supporting growth in participation by ABEs, provides for management and 
adjustment of some of the factors which have a direct bearing on the participation and performance of 
companies in public sector construction activities. In particular, opportun ities exist for government to 
encourage participation through smaller value contracts and thereby provide for growth of competent, 
profitable and sustainable enterprises. The potential contribution of the public sector procurement 
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system as an incubator of enterprises with these characteristics has been both recognised and 
explored by the drafters of the Affirmative Procurement Policy. (MOF and MPWs, 1997; Watermeyer 
et ai, 1998). 
The Affirmative Procurement Policy makes provision for the targeting of ABEs whose principal 
business activities relate to physical construction as prime contractors, subcontractors and joint 
venture partners as set out in Table 4.2 of Chapter 4. It should be noted, however, that ABEs are 
targeted directly as prime contractors in only the Prime (Minor) and Prime (Micro) targeting strategies. 
An analysis of the Departmental record of contracts awarded during the period 1 August to 1 July 
1998, as tabulated in Table 5.6 of Chapter 5, reveals that a total of 196 Prime (Minor) contracts were 
awarded. These accounted for 43% of the 454 contracts awarded in the period, and 8% by value. 
Prime (Minor) contracts accordingly represent an incubation price range through which ABEs 
contracting as prime contractors ought to progress, subject to both the acquisition of suitable 
management skills and a desire to grow their business. 
As indicated below, a number of substantial supply side initiatives have commenced following the 
introduction of the affirmative Procurement Policy. They will provide broad support to structure and 
manage increased levels of enterprise creation and growth. Government procurement provides one of 
several spheres of business activity in which emerging enterprises may operate. All of the policies and 
mechanisms are predicated on the ability of sufficient numbers of ABE owners to create, manage and 
maintain value in their businesses. It will only be through these capacities that growth and expansion 
of activities into other sectors will occur. 
The author in this chapter tests the sub-hypothesis by considering only those enterprises which 
completed Prime (Minor) contracts Le. where A8Es were directly targeted as Prime Contractors on 
contracts having a value in the range R100 000 to R2 000 000 and which were completed during the 
period May 1996 to 31 August 1998. 
6.2 REVIEW OF FACTORS WHICH SHAPE AND GUIDE POLICY FOR AN AFFIRMATIVE 
SMALL, MEDIUM AND MICRO ENTERPRISE PROGRAMME IN SOUTH AFRICA 
6.2.1 Background 
The ANC, in developing its Reconstruction and Development Programme (ANC, 1994), identified the 
following four constraints facing small businesses: 
1. Credit. 
2. Access to markets. 
3. Skills. 
4. Supportive institutional arrangements. 
'-. 
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The ANC -lead government has since 1994 embarked upon a number of initiatives which have sought 
to address facets of these constraints. Procurement reform can open up markets by providing access 
to work opportunities and promoting business linkages between large and small business and as such 
can only address some aspects of the four constraints. Supplying side measures are, however, 
necessary to ensure that targeted enterprises can access and realise the opportunities presented by 
the reformed procurement regime. 
6.2.2 The refonned procurement regime 
The Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa was published in April 1997 
(MOF and MPW, 1997). This paper proposes certain procurement reforms to achieve both economic 
and social ideals. Institutional and economic reforms are set out to support good governance of 
procurement and the achievement of socio-economic objectives through procurement. 
The reform proposals were based on four key principles, which are identified in the introduction to the 
paper. These are the use of procurement to make public tendering accessible for new and emerging 
businesses and eliminate the injustices of the past: to attain and maintain good governance in 
procurement, including achievement of sound financial control : to eliminate and counter all forms of 
corruption: and to ensure good standing of tenderers in terms of service charges and tax obligations. 
The first of these principles is central to the concerns of this study. The Green Paper proposes reform 
objectives for the socio-economic and good governance thrusts of procurements reform. Of the fifteen 
objectives listed in the paper, the following six objectives indicate that the reform frameWOrk is of 
relevance to the subject of this study (MOF and MPW, 1997): 
• "to make the public procurement process accessible to all by simplifying the process, and 
by encouraging fairness and transparency; 
• to encourage greater competition in the public procurement process through the creation 
of an enabling environment for small, medium and micro enterprises while retaining 
quality and standards; 
• to support participation of a broadened range of enterprises with appropriate inland 
revenue registration and acceptable labour practices in order to ensure suitability; 
• to set out targeting poliCies in order to create opportunities for the broadest possible 
participation in the public procurement process; 
• to achieve a uniform procurement system with standardised tendering procedures, 
policies and contracts documentation for implementation at national and regional level; 
and 
• to ensure that public sector procurement complies with the provisions of the constitution. " 
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The Green Paper puts forward the primary purpose of an affirmative procurement policy as being: 
"To provide equal access in contracting and procurement opportunities for targeted 
businesses and, in so doing, eradicate the effects of past and present discrimination in public 
and private sector procurement practices and assist in creating and developing business 
enterprises which are reflective of population demographics. The adoption of such 8 policy 
should not imply "reverse discrimination" but should be regarded as an endeavor to ensure 
that al/ sectors of the population have access to opportunities on a competitive basis and are 
advanced according to their relative abilities. " 
The following vision for an affirmative SMME participation programme is proposed in this paper: 
"To promote and advance small, medium and micro enterprises, particularly those owned and 
operated by previously disadvantaged individuals, in public sector procurement without 
attracting undue costs and overloading procurement agencies' administrative capacities. It 
It is in this context that the Department of Public Works has proceeded with structured efforts aimed at 
broadening participation in public sector construction contracts. The Department has followed the 
principles proposed in the Green Paper, namely: 
• "making the tender process accessible to the target group without, however, guaranteeing 
work; and 
• linking the flow of money into target business enterprises with a concomitant flow of 
responsibility. " 
6.3 GENERAL APPROACH TO TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS 
The sub-hypothesis tested through this portion of research is: 
Increased procurement opportunltl .. to Afflrmabl. Busin .. s EnterpriSes via government's 
Affirmative Procurement Policy ia a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the full 
enablement of AffJnnable Business Enterprises In the construction sector. 
The author chose to explore through structured questionnaires whether there are in fact measurable 
differences in performance of contracts by ABEs and non-ABEs. The author contends that structured 
knowledge of any differences, which may exist, will improve the focus of management responses by 
the Department. The following .sub-hypothesis is therefore tested: 
Performance differences exist between Afflrmable Business Enterprises and non-Afflnnable 
Business Enterprises In building contracts in the price range R100 000 to R2 000 000. 
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6.3.1 Methodology outline 
In Chapter 5 it was established that: 
1) ABE participation in Prime (Minor) contracts which were categorised as being General is 
greater than those categorised as being Electrical, Civil or Mechanical. 
2) General contracts accounted for 111 or 57% of all Prime (Minor) contracts. 
The author accordingly confined the investigation to Prime (Minor) contracts to the "General" 
construction sub-sector. 
Two areas of performance were selected for review under the sub-hypothesis, viz: 
1) Mobilisation of sureties by contractors. 
2) Contractor compliance with general contractual requirements. 
Interviews for each contract in the sample were conducted with the project managers from the 
Department of Public Works and the responsible principal agent. The interviews were conducted in 
person with project ma nagers based in the head office of the Department of Public Works in Pretoria. 
Due to logistical factors personal interviews could not be conducted with respondents based 
elsewhere in the country. Questionnaires were faxed to project managers in regional offices of the 
Department and to principal agents in their own offices. These questionnaires were subsequently 
completed through telephonic interviews. 
Structured interviews with each contractor in the sample were considered but not persued for two 
reasons. Firstly, sample testing of the contact particulars pertaining to contracts in the sample 
revealed a lack of current contact details for some contractors. Secondly, Department officials 
reported a known lack of access to telephones and faxes by some contractors. Thus the potential for 
obtaining a full interview with each contractor across the whole sample was considered unlikely. The 
author's experience in obtaining interviews with contractors for the research reported in Chapter 7 
confirmed the logistical and time delay problems with direct interviews. The author therefore chooses 
to maximize sample size by conducting interviews with readily accessible officials. 
6.3.2 The research sample 
Early investigations to establish the research sample indicated that the recording and archiving 
practices of the Department of Public Works were not structured to facilitate the extraction of pertinent 
data on APP contracts from the regional offices. At the time of this research reliable access to all 
relevant data in all regional offices for sample selection was not possible. As a result, the contracts in 
the samples were drawn from the records of the Department's head office in Pretoria. 
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A sample of 44 contracts was achieved, representing 88% of the universe of contracts meeting the 
research sample criteria which were let by the Department in Pretoria. The sample comprised 19 
ABE contracts and 25 non-ABE contracts. The ABE contract sample constitutes 86,36% of the ABE 
contract universe. The non-ABE sample comprises 25 contracts and constitutes 89,29% of the non-
ABE contact universe. The derivation of the sample from the universe is set out in Table 6.1. 
TABLE 6.1: Derivation of the sample of contracts for research Into mobilization of sureties 
and contract compiiance. 
PROVINCE CONTRACTOR STATUS 
ABE non·ABE 
Number % Number % 
All contracts awarded by Department Head Office (Pretoria) 22 100,00 2. 100,00 
No response received from project manager 3 13,64 1 3,,27 
Project manager could not be traced 0 0 2 7,14 
Respondents contacted ,. ",38 2' 89,29 
The Department awarded a total of 115 general contracts priced between R100 000 and R2 000 000 
nationally in the research sample time period. The research sample of 44 records constitutes a sample 
of 38,26% and is seen as being representative of the national universe. 
The greatest proportion of contracts in the sample were located in Kwa Zulu-Natal where 12 contracts 
(27,27%) were awarded. The second highest provincial concentration of contracts was 9 (20,45%) 
which were awarded in the Northern Province. The highest number of ABE contracts (7) was awarded 
in the Northern Province, with the second highest (5) being awarded in Kwa Zulu-Natal. The highest 
number of non-ABE contracts (7) was awarded in Kwa Zulu-Natal, with the second highest number (5) 
being awarded in the Northern Province. The provincial distribution of contracts in the sample is 
shown in Table 6.2. 
TABLE 6.2: Provincial distribution of contracts for research into mobilisation of sureties and 
contract compliance. 
PROVINCE CONTRACTOR STATUS FULL-SAMPLE 
ABE non-ABE 
Number % Number % Number % 
1 Eastem Cape 2 10,53 4 16,00 6 13,64 
2 Free State 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 Gauteng Province 0 0 4 16,00 4 ',09 
4 KwaZulu -Natal 5 26,31 7 28.00 12 27,24 
5 Mpurnalanga 2 10,53 2 .,00 4 ',09 
6 Northern Cape 1 5,26 • 20,00 6 13,64 
7 Northem Province 7 36," 2 . ,00 • 20,45 
8 North West 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 Western Cape 2 10,53 1 4,00 3 6,82 




The Department is obliged to award the contract to the tenders that score the highest number of 
adjudication points (Refer 5,3,3), Of the research sample 31 (70,45%) of the contracts were awarded 
to the lowest price tender, The distribution of lowest-price awards is presented in Table 6,3, 
TABLE 6.3: 
DESCRIPTION 
l owest tender 
Not lowest lender 
No dala 
Total 
Distribution of lowest-price tender awards in the sample for mobilisation of 
sureties and contract compliance research, 
CONTRACTOR STATUS FULL-SAMPLE 
ABE Non-ABE 
Number % Number % Number % , 47,37 22 88,00 31 70,45 
'0 52,63 , 4,00 " 25,00 0 0 2 . ,00 2 4,55 
" 100,00 25 100,00 44 100,00 
There are observed differences between ABE and non-ABE tenders from the data in Table 6,3, Over 
half (53%) of the ABE tenders were awarded to companies because they scored the highest number of 
adjudication points and not because their tender price was the lowest. At least 88% of non-ABE 
tenders were awarded to the lowest tenderer, 
Date of tender award 
The research sample time period runs from May 1996 to August 1998. The distribution of tender award 
dates of the sample is shown in Table 6.4. The sample is not evenly spread over the research period. 
No tenders were awarded after October 1997. 
TABLE 6.4: 
PERIOD 
May 96-Oct 96 
Nov 96-April 97 
May 97-Oct 97 
NOli 97-Apri198 
May 98-Au9 98 
Total 
Distribution of tender award dates for the research sample for mobilisation of 
sureties and contract compliance, 
CONTRACTOR STATUS FULL-SAMPlE 
ABE Non-ABE 
Number % Number % Number % 
" 57,89 6 24,00 " 38,64 3 15,79 6 24 ,00 , 20,45 
5 26,32 '3 52,00 ,. 40,91 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
" 100,00 25 100,00 44 100,00 
There is a cluster of tenders awarded to ABEs in the first six months of the research period i.e. from 
May 1996 to October 1996. There is a cluster of tenders awarded to non-ABEs in the period from May 
1997 to October 1997, The full sample, however, shows a reduction in the number of tenders awarded 
from November 1997 to April 1998. 
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The author suggests that two factors bear on the observed distribution of tender award dates. Firstly, 
the sample contains only tenders which were completed before August 1998. Tenders awarded and 
administered by the Department in Pretoria between November 1997 and August 1998, but which were 
not completed by August 1998 were not included in the sample. Secondly, the administration of 
qualifying tenders was increasingly performed by regional offices of the Department from mid-1997 
onwards whereas the sample was drawn only from records of the Oepartment's Head Office in 
Pretoria. 
The nature of general contracts awarded by the Department was the same throughout the country 
during the research period, and the author is confident that the sample is representative of the national 
universe of qualifying contracts. 
Tender award price. 
The distribution of tender award prices for the sample is shown in Table 6.5. 
TABLE 6.5: Distribution of contract prices for research Into mobilisation of sureties and 
contract compliance. 
TENDER AWARD VALUE (R) CONTRACTOR STATUS FULL-8AMPLE 
ABE Non-ABE 
Number % Number % Number % 
100 000-500 000 11 57,89 10 40,00 21 47,73 
500 001-1 000 000 2 10,53 10 40,00 12 27,27 
1 000 001-1 500 000 3 15,79 5 20,00 8 18,18 
1 500 001-2 000 000 3 15,79 0 0 3 6 ,82 
Total ,. 100,00 25 100,00 44 100,00 
The contact prices for tenders awarded to both ABEs and non-ABEs are concentrated between 
R100 000 and R500 000. The contract price distribution of the research sample is not dissimilar to the 
contract price distribution of all contracts let by the Department. 
6.3.3 Survey Instrument 
A structured survey method was used which employed questionnaires as a survey instrument. The 
questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix 6.1. 
The questionnaire was structured in seven sections as follows: 
• Contracts details; 
• Time frames; 




• Safety: and 
• Product quality. 
During September 1998 a pilot survey was conducted. This work suggested that there might be certain 
factors external to the completion of contracts by contractors for which control data may provide useful 
cross tabulations. The following factors were incorporated into the research. 
1. Contract value. 
2. Execution of the contracts in an 'urban' or 'rural ' location. 
3. Age of the contracting company. 
4. Number of permanent employees in the enterprise at the time of the contract 
5. Level of management effort applied to the contract by the principal agent 
These factors were incorporated into the research from the sources indicated in Table 6.6. 
TABLE 6.6: Incorporation of externa l factors into research . 
FACTOR METHOD OF INCORPORATION 
Contract value Contract documentation 
location of contract Contrad documentation 
Age of company Registrar of Companies 
Number of pennanent employees Principal agent 
Extemal management Questionnaire 
The primary data obtained from the questionnaire was nominal , with the majority of questions requiring 
a yes/no answer. Respondents were offered an opportunity to provide comments for all questions. 
Data related to time was collected on an arithmetic five-point scale of 1.2 ,4,8,or 'other' units. Units of 
weeks or months were used. Questionnaire questions were nested. Primary questions for each of the 
sections of the questionnaire were supported by secondary questions. The data was captured and 
analysed in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, which is commonly known by the acronym 
SPSS. 
Two levels of analysis are carried out on the data. Firstly, the percentage distributions of the responses 
to the performance indicators used in the survey are analysed. For these ABE and non-ABE response 
are compared. The second level of analysis involved statistical tests of the significant of the 
differences that result in the bivariate cross-tabulations. For th is analysis simple >f test and T -test were 
used. (SPSS 1997) 
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The>f non-parametric test produced statistically acceptable results on the data. One weakness of the 
data lies in the size of the sample, which is not large enough to meet the minimum cell requirements in 
all cases. As a result. some of the observed differences mayor may not have been captured by the >f 
as statistically significant. The >f results are therefore examined with the percentage differences 
shown in the tables of bivariate analysis in section 6.3. 
The T -test was used to assess the significance of the differences in ABE and non-ABE performances. 
For this test, seven performance scores were calculated, one for overall performance and one for each 
group of factors for which information was collected. The use of these scores for groups of 
performance indicators and for overall assessment minimizes the effects of small samples encountered 
by the :i' test. 
As with the research into re-directed and cancelled contracts, this is the first structured research effort 
to review contractor performance under the APP. Once the purpose of the research had been clearly 
explained to the respondents they participated willingly and with interest. Because the APP had not 
been formally reviewed prior to this research, respondents freely engaged the questions in the 
questionnaire, and introduced discussion of matters of interest that were not covered by questions. 
The partiCipation in the research by both Departmental project managers and appointed principal 
agents provided a wider range of data than could have been obtained from interviews with only one of 
these. Project managers have knowledge of contractual and performance matters. Principal agents 
have knowledge of management and on-site performance due to their frequency of visits to the sites. 
All respondents received the questionnaire prior to the interview taking place. No difference was found 
in the quality of data between the personal interviews and the telephone interviews. 
All of the respondents answered all the primary questions in the questionnaire. The level of response 
to the secondary questions was variable. The author proposes that the secondary question opened 
lines of enquiry that had not previously been considered by the respondents because they were 
outside their 'normal' sphere of oversight. The variable response to the secondary questions has not 
reduced the author's confidence in representing the main findings of the research. The author 
proposes that this experience does, however, illustrate that project management and principal agent 
functions should be reviewed by the Department to bring them in line with the broad oversight 
requirements of the APP. 
In the light of the above the data are presented with confidence that they accurately represent the 
experience of the execution of the contracts in the sample. 
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The author intended to develop control data through cross-tabulated analysis of the five external 
factors identified in Table 6.6 (contract va lue, contract location, company age, number of permanent 
employees, and external management contribution) . This was not successful in all cases. Generally, 
the data obtained appears too small for further cross-tabulations or elaborate parametric tests on four 
of the five proposed factors. The first four of these yielded insufficient data for analysis as indicated 
below: 
1. Contract value: Accurate data was obtained for all contracts in the sample. The size of the 
sample did not, however allow for analysis using this variable as a control. 
2. Location of the contract: The contract documentation did not provide sufficiently specific 
descriptions to determine 'urban' or 'rural' locations. The reference definitions were obtained 
from the standard place name classification of the Department of Constitutional Development. 
Classified locations could not be determined from Department records for all contracts in the 
sample, and control variable analysis was consequently not performed. 
3. Age of the company: A list of company names was compiled from Departmental records and 
submitted for analysis to the Registrar of Companies in Pretoria. The Registrar was not able to 
identify all companies from records held. As a result this data could not be used for control 
variable analysis. The authors inability to obtain data on some companies from the Register 
identifies a matter of procedural concern for the implementation of the APP 1. 
4. Number of permanent employees in companies: Neither the project managers nor the 
principal agents were able to confidently provide data. Their knowledge of company sizes was 
restricted to their observations of companies on site. They could not accurately indicate the full 
complement of permanent employees for companies. In the absence of accurate data this 
factor was not analysed as a control variable. 
Data on external management contribution was obtained for all contracts through questions in the 
questionnaire. Discussion of this analysis is given below, but the size of the sample precluded cross 
tabulation analysis. 
The author contends that collection of reliable data on these factors will allow the Department to refine 
the analysis and understanding of the impact of the APP. It is recommended that these factors are 
included in future real-time data collection by The Department. 
l One of the four key principles underpinning the reform proposals in the Green paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in 
South Africa is to ensure good standing of tenderers in terms of service charge and tax obligations. The in-ability to obtain data 
in all of the companies in the sample from the Register suggests that compliance with this key principle is not always adhered 
to. The author recommends that this aspect of contract management be reviewed by the Department. 
6.12 
6.4 PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
6.4.1 General 
The sub-hypothesis is tested below under the following headings, using data collected in the structured 
survey: 
• Time frames; 
• Management; 
• Mobilization of contract securities; 
• Labour; 
• Safely: and 
• Product quality. 
The reporting presents results and observations of ABE and non-ABE performance derived from 
bivariate analysis of each factor. The statistical strength of the observations are assessed through the 
reporting of the results of the >f test and T -test for each factor. The level of significance selected for 
the >f and T tests is 5%. Relationships of data at p<O,05 and p<O,01 are discussed. 
In the presentation of results the bivariate analysis of all questions in the questionnaire is presented, 
with some indicative analysis. Secondly. the statistical significance of the observed differences in 
performance between ABEs and non-ABEs is reported for selected primary questions of the 
questionnaire. The results are derived from the application of the >f test. Results are also reported 
for the application of the T -test in order to test the significance of the observed differences between 
ABEs and non-ABEs for all the selected variables. 
The author is confident that this structure of analysis provides indicative and statistical evidence for 
testing the hypothesis. The analysis also provides differing levels of data interpretation, which can be 
used to consider the relationships, which are revealed for a range of management purposes by the 
Department. 
8 .... 2 Time Frames 
Tables 6 .7, 6.B and 6.9 presents the comparative bivariate analysis of the primary questions from the 
structured survey relating to time factors, the results of the >f tests to assess the difference in 
perfonnance between ABEs and non-ABEs and the results of the T -test respectively. 
6.13 
Commencement of contracts 
The data show that 30% of all contracts in the sample did not start on time. Table 6.7 indicates that 
ABEs appear to be twice as likely to start late (42%) as non-ABEs (20%). The data suggest that where 
there is slippage in the start of a contract, it is likely to start between four and eight weeks late. ABEs 
have a greater tendency to longer extensions of start dates that non-ABEs. The latter appear more 
likely to start within fours weeks of due start date if they are late. 
The dominant cause for late start by ABEs is recorded as delay in providing sureties, which is the 
recorded reason for half of the late start ABEs. The dominant cause for late start by non-ABEs is delay 
due to the Department's contract arrangements (contracts delays, site hand-over delays, and changes 
in specifications). No contract price adjustments or penalties were identified as a result of delays in 
starting. 
Site establishment 
The data in Table 6.7 indicates that over 90% of non-ABEs are judged to establish site quickly and 
efficiently once a contract has started. The data suggest that ABEs appear to be generally slower to 
establish a site, with 32% of the sample of non-ABEs not doing it so quickly and efficiently. 
Worlc" programme 
The data in Table 6.7 suggests that ABEs show a slightly greater degree of adherence to contract time 
once they have started than non-ABEs. ABEs time slippage appears generally to be less than 4 
weeks. ABEs are less likely than non-ABEs to work extra hours during the week, or to work over 
weekends. 
The data suggests that most non-ABEs whose programme shows time slippage, are between 4 and 8 
weeks behind at peak slippage on their contract. The responses to the length of any resulting over-run 
of contracts are inconclusive due to the very small number of contracts involved. 
Submission of payment certificates. 
Submission of payment certificates is a very important activity for SMMEs because it directly affects 
cash flow, and hence the sustainability and potential for growth of a company. Table 6.9 shows that 
over one third of ABEs (36,89%) failed to submit their certificates timeously. All but one of the non-
ABEs submitted on time. 
6.14 
TABLE 6.7: Structured survey blvariate analysis of questions on time factors. 
DESCRIPTlON 
contrKtor etMted on time? 
Yea .. ............ ..... .................................. ......... .... . 
No ............................................................ . 
".,.,.. ... Iafe, how""" 
Less than 4~s .................... ............ ... . 
4-8 weeks ... ........... ............. ................... .. 
More than ~ks ....... .............. ....... . 
Number of ClRU .... .... ............................ . 
c.u..ofrI'eMy 
Delayed IWrotIeS •••. . 
st." probI&ms ....... .............. . 
P\oVD deIlIys .......... ................................. . 
Other problems. 
Number of casea 
E .... bll.hed site quickly and .mc .. ntly 
yes .................. _ 
No 
Cont...ctor kept to programme 
yes .............................................................. . 
No ............................................................... . 
L~$S than .. weeks ................. . 
.. -8weeks .......... . 
Mote than 8Weeks ................... .. 
Number of casN' ..... _ .. 
compfeted c:ont:rKt wtlhln .lIoWl'd tim. 
Yes .................................................................. . 
No .......... ..... .. 
LMgth of oven-un 
Less th/Jn 4 weell's .... . 
Uweeks ............. .. 
MoAt than /J WItt'Iks 
Number of casas. 
ContJ'Ktor WCIf'Ud elltr1l hours 
Never............... .. .................... ... ........ . 
OCCasionally 
Frequently 
0001 Know ..... .. 
Never ...... ...... .. 
OCcasJonally...... . ....... ... ..................... . . 
Frequently ............. .. 
Don1 Know . ......................................................... . 
COntractor SUbmitted payment certificate on time 
Yes ..... . ........ ....................................................... . 
No .... ... ................... .. 






















































































































































































Result of the X, Test and T-test for time factors 
It can be inferred from Table 6.8 that in general ABEs tend to start contracts later that non-ABEs. Once 
they have started they appear to keep to the work programme more than non-ABEs and to work extra 
hours during the week and at weekends less frequently than non-ABEs. 
TABLE S.8: )(2 test of the difference between ABEs and non-ABEs contractors on time 
factors 
STATISTICS 
FACTORS X' value Degree of Freedom 
1. Did contractor start on time 2,53 1 
2. Established site quickly and effIcienlly.- 4,03 1 
3. Contractor kept to programs 6,116 1 
4 . Completed contract within allowed time 2,223 1 
5. Contractor worKed extra hours. 1,074 3 
6. Contractor worKed over weekends+ 3,661 3 
7 . Contractor submitted payment cert on time." 7,827 1 
• Over a quarter of all cells In these tests are empty, and therefore the statlstlC$ presented for these factors 
should be inte!preted with cautlon. 









The three factors that show statistically significant differences between ABEs and non-ABEs are as 
follows: 
• Quick and efficient establishment of site (p<O,05) which indicates that ABEs are likely to be slower 
in establishing sites than non-ABEs. 
• Keeping to work programme (p<O,05); which indicates that ABEs are more likely to keep to work 
programmes that non-ABEs. 
• Timely submission of payment certificates (p<O,01); which, at this higher level of probability 
indicates that ABEs are less likely that non-ABEs to submit payment certificates on time. 
TABLES.9: T-test resutts for performance scores of ABEs and non-ABEs on time factors. 
Score on time factors Number of cases Mean Score T-Value Degrees of Freedom Significance + 
ABE ,. 38,42 -2,80 42 0,008 •• 
Non -ABE 25 52,40 .. p< 0,01 , + two tailed 
The T-test confirms that there is a statistically significant difference between ABEs and non-ABEs for 
time factors, and that the data relating to these factors support the sub-hypothesis. 
6.16 
6.4.3 Mobilization of Contract Securnlea 
This section presents the analysis of the primary questions from the structured questionnaire regarding 
factors relating to the mobilization of contract securities by contractors. Tables 6.10, 6.11 6.12 present 
the comparative bivariate analysis, the results of the Xl test to assess the difference in performance 
between ABEs and non-ABEs and the results of the T-test, respectively. 
TABLE 6.10: Structure 8uIVey blvariate analysis of primary que.tlons on securities factors 
DESCRIPTION 
Contractor provtc»d the requlNd NCurity 
Ves .. .. ......... ... ................................ .. .. .. . 
No .. .. .... ... ... .. ................................... .. .. . 
Not required ... ..... .... ...... ... ...... ... ........... . 
Contractor dlmculti .. In proving security 
yes .. .. .... .. ... ... ................. ..... ............... .. 
No ........... . ........................................... . 
Not applicable ......................... .... ... ...... . .. 
Number of cases .............. .. 
Mobilized security on time 
yes ...... ..... .................................... . 
No ..... .. ................................................ . 
Not applicable ....................................... .. 
Number of cases ........................... .. 
Gave assist In mobilizing security 
yes ... .. . .. .. ....... .............. ..... .. .......... .. .. .. 
No ...... ... .............................................. . 
Number of cases .. ................... .. .... .. ..... .. . 






































































Table 6.10 indicates that 93% of contractors who were required to provide securities (N=43) did so. 
Non-ABEs appear more likely to provide securities (96% of qualifying contractors, N=24) than ABEs 
(90%). Those contractors who did not provide securities were assisted by the substitution of a 
progressive deduction from progress payments in lieu of securities. 
Table 6.10 suggests that 17% of applicable contractors (N=42. where "nol applicable" contracls are 
excluded) had difficulties in providing securities. A very small proportion of non-ABEs (4% where N=23) 
are reported to have experienced difficulties. In contrast 32% of ABEs are reported to have 
experienced difficulties. 
6,17 
Timely mobilisation of securities 
The data in Table 6.10 indicates that 81% of all contractors in the sample raised securities on time i.e. 
within 21days of award of the tender by the Department. Non-ABEs appear to be able to mobilise 
securities on time (78% of applicable contracts, N=23) more frequently than ABEs (79%). 
Results of the X Z Test and T-test for contract securities factors 
TABLE 6.11: XZ test of the difference between ABEs and non-ABEs contractors on contract 
securities factors 
STAnsncs 
FACTORS "JP value Degrees of Freedom p·values 
1. Contractor provided the required security+ 1,447 2 0,486 
2. Difficulties in provid ing security+ • 7,201 2 0,027 
3. Mobilized security on time+ 2,077 2 0,353 
+OVer a quarter of all cells In these tests are empty, and therefore the statlSllcs presented for these fadors should be 
interpreted with caution. 
·p <0,05 
The data was insufficient to populate all the cells for all of the factors for this test. The test indicates 
that the differences observed between ABE and non-ABE contractors in Table 6.10 in respect of 
providing security are statistically significant (p<O,05). It can be generally concluded that ABEs will 
experience more difficulties in obtaining securiUes than non-ABEs. 
TABLE 6.12: T -test results for perfonnance scores of ABEs and non-ABEs on contract 
securities factors 
Score on time factors Number of cases Mean Score T-V.lue Degrees of Freedom Significance + 
ABE ,. 25,78 -2,13 42 0,225 
Non-ABE 25 28,00 
+ two tailed 
The T -test result shows that the observed difference in performance between ABEs and non-ABEs 
with regard to contract securities factors are generally not statistically significant. 
6.4.4 Management Factors 
Tables 6.13, 6.14 and 6.15 presents the comparative bivariate analysis of the primary questions from 
the structured relating sample to management factors, the results of the )(l test for management 
factors and the results of the T -test, respectively. 
6.18 
Number of full time employees 
Table 6.13 indicates the a proportion (18%) of companies for which respondents could not provide 
accurate data. From the data which was collected some trends are evident. which should be 
considered in the light of the evaluation of the quality of this data component of the structure survey 
made above. In the full sample there is a relatively even spread of company sizes across the ranges 0-
10, 10-20 and> 20 permanent employees. 
In comparing the types of contractor, it is observed that most ABEs in the sample have fewer than 10 
permanent employees and none of the sample ABEs fall in the mid-range size. Non-ABEs are spread 
across the size range with a concentration in the range of 10-20 employees. 
cash flow. purchasing and credit 
The data from the primary questions of the structured survey data in Table 6.13 indicate with respect to 
management of spending and cash flow that the respondents identified only 14% of all companies as 
not having managed these aspects well. The high number of 'don't know' responses for the non-ABEs 
leaves the full picture of comparison between ABEs and non-ABEs in the some doubt for this factor. 
The ability to manage cash flow may be more-or-Iess the same between both types of company. 
Table 6.13 suggests, with respect to the materials supply and supplier credit data, that those ABEs 
which experienced problems with supply of material may also have experienced difficulties in obtaining 
credit with suppliers (5 contractors had problems identified for each question). This suggests that there 
is a higher risk profile attached to ABEs. 
The data in Table 6.13 also reveals different intimacy of knowledge of this aspect between 
respondents working on ABE and non-ABEs contracts. Of the respondents reporting on non-ABE 
contracts (16%) did not know management of spending and cash flow. This information was not known 
by only 1 (5%) of respondents wor1<ing with ABEs. 
Maintaining a drawing register 
The data for this factor for the ABE sample is reduced by 16% (3 records) because these jobs were too 
small to require drawings registers to be kept. A higher degree of lack of knowledge is again exhibited 
by respondents responsible for non-ABE contracts. For the full sample, there is an almost even split 
between those contractors which kept a register (39%) and those which did not (36%). The balance of 
the sample is tipped to a majority not keeping registers if the 5% held by principal agents are added. 
Clearly this specified condition of contract is not being met by a large proportion of all contractors in 




The data in Table 6.13 indicates a generally low level of negative reaction to contract variations, at 
16% of the full sample and 23% of the applicable sample of 37 records. 
A relatively high level of 35% of ABEs did not react positively to contract variations, whilst 5% of the 
applicable non-ABE sample did not react positively. With respect to agreement to final quantities, a 
lower figure of 8% of the qualifying sample did not agree. All of the finalised non-ABEs in the sample 
agreed to final quantities. Respondents recorded disagreement by 9% of the finalised ABE contracts. 
TABLE 6.13: St ructured survey bivariate analysis of primary question on management factors 
DESCRIPTION 
"'10 .. 
10.20 ............ . 
:.20 .. 
aon·,Know .......................................... . 
Ml nlged spending I nd cllh now 
yes ....................................... . 
No .................... . 
OOtf! Know .......... . 
Supplies probl.m rnultlng from non-payment 
yel ............................................................ . 
No ..... . 
Don't Know .................. . 
DIfficulty obtaining credit from lupplie" 
Yel ......................................................... . 
No ....... .. 
Don·t Know ..... 
Mllntlined a dr1lwlng regl".r 
yes ............................... .. 
No .......................................................... .. 
Don', Know .. 
Not appiicable 
Principal agent.. ........................... , ... .. 
MllntlJOflI good relltlon, with Architects ltaff 
Yel ... 
N, 
Not Applicable .................................... . 
Rel cted polltlvlly to ... arl.tlonl by Architect 
Yel .............. .. 
No ................ ........... ................................. . 
NotApplicable ........................................ .. 
Agreed to flnal quantities wlthoot dllpute 
Yes .............. .. 
No .......... .. 
Not "nallzed ..................... .. 



















































































































































Results of the X' test and T-test for management factors 
It may be surmised from Tab~ 6.13 that. in general, ABEs tend to have fewer than 10 full-time 
employees, whilst non-ABEs tend to have more than 10. ABEs have more supply problems than non-
ABEs. ABEs appear to have more problems than non-ABEs in maintaining drawings registers, and 
they tend to exhibit less positive reactions to variations and additional work required. 
TABLE 8.14: X' test of the differences between ABE and non-ABE contractors on 
management factors. 
STATISTICS 
FACTORS JP value OF p-values 
1. How many ful l-time employees+- 10.395 3 0,015 
2. Managed spending and cash tlow+ 2,451 2 0,293 
3. Supplier problem resulting from non-payment+ 5,823 2 0,054 
4 . Dtf'flculty obtaining credit from supplies+ 4,824 2 0,089 
5. Agreed to final quantities without dispute+ 4.286 3 0 ,117 
•• Maintained a drawing reglsler+ * 9,795 3 0,044 
7. Maintained good rei with Arctlitects staff+ 2,155 2 0,340 
8. Readed positively to variations by Archltect+* 6.347 2 0,041 
+Over a quarter of all cells 10 these tests are Etmpty, and therefore the statlsllcs presented for these factors should be 
Interpreted with caution. 
• p < 0,05 
The >f test results in Table 6.14 results indicate that three of the factors show statistically significant 
differences between ABEs and non-ABEs as follows: 
• In the size of full-time employees complements (p<.05) ABE enterprises are shown to be generally 
smaller than non-ABE enterprises, with over half having fewer than 10 full time employees; and 
non-ABEs tend to range in size from 10 to 20 full-time employees. 
• In the keeping of drawings registers (p<0,05) at least hatf of the non-ABEs are likely to do so, 
whilst less than a quarter of ABEs are likely to do so. 
• In reacting to variations and additional work requirements (p<O,05) ABEs are likely to react 
negatively in almost one case out of three, whilst non-ABEs are rarely likely to react negatively. 
TABLE 6.15: T·tnt results for performance acores of ABEa and non-ABEa on management 
factors 
Score on time facto,. Number of can MHnScore TNalue Deg ..... of Freedom Significance + 
ABE ,. 53. 15 -2,12 42 0,,047* 
Non-ABE 25 " ,80 
-p <0,05, + two tailed 
The T-test shows that the observed differences in performance between ABEs and non-ABEs with 
regard to management factors are statistically significant. 
6.21 
6.4.5 Labour Factors 
Table 6.16, 6.17 and 6.18 presents the comparative bivariate analysis of the questions from the 
structural survey relating to labour factors, the results of the )(2 test for labour factors and the T·test 
results , respectively. 
The data reported in this section reflect varying levels of neutral answers (i.e. Mdon 't know~) by 
respondents. The greatest level of lack of knowledge by respondents occurs in respect of contracting 
relationships between the contractors and their employees. For this factor, 44% of respondents have 
insufficient knowledge to report. The data indicates a clear trend showing that respondents in ABE 
projects have a higher degree of knowledge of all the labour questions asked in the structured survey 
than the respondents reporting on non·ABE projects. 
Mobilisation of personnel and labour 
The data in Table 6.16 indicate that at least 91% of all contractors in the sample mobilized suitable 
personnel for their contracts. The data suggest a marginally poorer performance by ABEs, but these 
results may be sensitive to the single respondent who was unable to clearly answer this question. 
More labour was hired locally than was brought in by the contractors in over two thirds of contacts in 
the sample (67%). In this practice ABEs hired the majority of labour locally in 83% of contracts while 
non-ABEs did so in 56% of contracts. 
An observed characteristic of the contracts in the sample is illustrated by the data in Table 6.16 is the 
high proportion of labour which is hired only for the contract. In 63% of the projects in the sample this is 
reported. Unfortunately, in 14% of the projects respondents did not know th is information, and the 
sample strength is therefore reduced. The proportion of contracts rises to 73%, almost three quarters, 
of the sample if the "don't knows· are excluded. 
The data indicate that ABEs appear to be more likely to hire labour for the contract only (67% of the full 
sample, 80% of known cases, N=15) than non-ABEs (60% of the full sample, 68% of known cases 
N=22). The data suggest that local temporary employment was created through the contracts 
sampled. In recording this employment only 3 respondents (7%) were able to positively report the 
existence of formal contracts between contractors and employees. There is a high level of neutral 
response to this question by respondents, with over half (56%) of the respondents reporting on non· 
ABE contracts having no knowledge of this aspect. 
In spite of these high levels of neutral responses, 72% of ABE contractors are recorded positively as 
not having formal contracts with employees. Respondents report that 32% of non·ABE contractors are 
known not to have entered into formal contracts with employees. 
6.22 
Employee training 
Table 6.16 indicates the extent to which contractors in the sample are recorded as having submitted 
employees for training. 
Over half of the contractors in the full sample (56%) did not submit employees for external training. Of 
the sample, 16% of contracts are reported by respondents as not being applicable for external training 
and 7% provided neutral answers. Thus in 73% of applicable contacts for which training submission is 
reported, and in 67% of the applicable sample of contracts, employees were not submitted for external 
training. 
Respondents reported that 80% of the applicable, known ABE contracts did not submit employees for 
external training. Reporting of this for non-ABEs indicates a level of 67%. 
Table 6.16 indicates that less than half of the contractors in the full sample (47%) provided for on-the-
job training. A high level of neutral reporting (24%) of non-ABE contracts unfortunately reduces the 
comparative value of these data. The Table suggests, however, that ABEs and non-ABEs tend to 
operate at generally the same level (44% and 48% respectively) in providing on-the-job training. 
Labour unrest 
Table 6.16 indicates labour unrest (9%) in the full sample. ABEs are reported to have had no unrest 
for 89% of contacts, whilst non-ABEs are reported to have been free of unrest for 76% of projects. 
Respondents returned neutral answers for 16% of non-ABE contracts. 
6.23 
TABLE 6.16: Structured survey bivariate analysis of questions on labour factors. 
COMPANY STATUS DESCRIPTION TOTAL 
Contractor mobilized suitable personnel 
yes ... ........ ... . ... ... ..... .... ............. . 
No ............................................ .. 
Don', Know ....... _ ............................. . 
Contractor hired the majority of labour locally 
yes ......... .. 
No ...... .. . 
Don't Know .. ........ .. .. ............... .. 
Contractor hired labour for the contract only 
yes ........ . 
No .................................................................. . 
Oon', Know ... _._ ........................................ ..... . 
Contractor submitted employ ... for external training 
yes ....... 
No 
Don't Know ... 
Not Applicable .... 
Contractor submitted employees for on·the-job Train 
yes .................................. , ..................... .. 
No ..... , ................................................ .. 
Don'1 Know ....... . .................... , ......... .. 
Not Applicable ........................... ,. ................... .. .. . 
Contractor had fonnal contracts with employees 
yes ... ..... . 
No ....... 
Don'l Know .. 
Any labour unrest 
yes ............ .. 
No ................ .. ...................... , ... , .... ",. ... ,. .. 
Don't Know .. ...... .. ... , .. , ..... , .................. . 
External effort to assist in labour unrest 
Normal 
Above normal. .. ... ..... . ................ ,,. ............ .. 
Not Applicable ............. , ........ , ..................... ...... .. 













































































































































Results of the X' test and T-test for labour factors 
From the above the following general observations are made. Neither type of enterprise is reported to 
have difficulties in mobilising suitable personnel, but ABEs appear to hire more local labour than non-
ABEs. ABEs appear less likely than non-ABEs to provide access to external or on-the-job training for 
employees. The data report extremely poor employment practices by both types of contractor, with 
none and 12% of ABEs and non-ABEs respectively having formal contractors with employees. 
TABLE 6.17: XZ test of the differences between ABE and non-ABE contractors on labour 
factors. 
STAnsncs 
FACTORS X' value Dog .... of 
F"""m 
1. Mobilized suitable personnel+ 1,489 
2. Hired the majority of labour locally+ 4,343 
3. Hired labour for the contract only+ 0,815 
4. Submitted employees for external training+ 3,867 
5. Submitted employees for on-the-:iob training+ 4 ,963 
6. Formal contracts with employees+- 7,513 
7. Any labour unrest+ 3,202 
+Over a quarter of all cells In these tests are empty, and therefore the statistiCS presented for these factors 
should be Interpreted wHh caution . 
















The >f test results presented in Table 6.17 indicate that for only one labour factor, formal contracts, 
there are statistically significant differences between ABEs and non-ABEs (p<O,05). 
TABLE 6.18: T-test mutts for performance scores of ABEs and non-ABEs on labour factors 
Score on time factors Number of cases M.an Score T-Value Degrees of Freedom Significance + 
ABE ,. 40,52 -3,20 42 0,,876 
Non-ABE 25 41,20 
+ two tailed 
The T-test shows that the differences in performance between ABEs and non-ABEs observed above 
are not significant. 
6.25 
6.4.6 Safety Factors 
Table 6.19, 6.20 and 6.21 presents the comparative bivariate analysis of the questions from the 
structured survey relating to safety factors, the results of the X 2 test for safety factors results of the T-
test, respectively. 
The data reported in this section reflect a high level of neutral answers by respondents. There is a 
relatively consistent level of lack of awareness or knowledge in about 20% of the sample. This is 
probably related to the fact that the safety aspects of the works are not the responsibility of the 
respondents. It may indicate, if the lack of awareness/knowledge occurs for the same respondents 
across all Questions, that some respondents routinely pay greater attention to this aspect than others. 
The trend reflected by the data is of lower levels of knowledge amongst respondents reporting on non-
ABE projects. 
Accidents 
The data indicates low occurrences of major and minor accidents. No major accidents are identified 
across the full sample, with one non-ABE project being reported with an unknown status. The data for 
minor accidents indicates one minor accident across the full sample, which occurred on a non-ABE 
project. 
Over half (53%) of the respondents reporting on minor accidents in ABE contracts were not aware of 
their occurrence during the contracts. Only one non-ABE contract respondent was not aware of any 
minor accidents. 
First aid fscllltles 
Table 6.19 indicates that just over (53%) of the Qualifying contractors in the sample provided first aid 
facilities on the site. One contractor is reported not to have required such facitities , due to the small 
size of the contract. 
Provisions of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (Act 85 of 1993) requires inter alia, that 
employers, who employ more than five employees at a workplace, provide a first aid box or boxes at or 
near the workplace which shall be available and accessible for the treatment of injured persons at that 
workplace. The standard conditions of contract of the Department requ ire that contractors comply with 
the provisions of the Act. Thus, a quarter of all contractors appear to be in default. 
TABLE 6.19: Structured survey bivarlate analysis of questions on safety factors. 
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DESCRIPTION 
Any major accident 
No ....... ... ......... ......... .... . ..... .. ..... ........ . ... .. .... ... ... .. 
Not aware ... ... ... ..... . 
Minor accidents 
yes ........ .............. .. ... .. ............... ........................ .. 
No ...... ......... .. ...... .... ....... .. . ... ... .. . ... ...... ... ... ... . .. 
Not aware ... ..... . ..... .......................................... .. 
Contractor provided suitable First Aid Facllltl .. 
yes ... ......... .................... .. ......... .. ... ........... . ... ...... .. 
No ... .. ......................................................... . .. . .... .. 
Don't Know ... ... ...... .. ... ...... .... ..... ....... ........ .......... .... . 
Not applicable ... ... ... ... ... .. ... ........ .... .... ...... .. .......... .. 
Contractor maintained First Aid Facilities on site 
yes ..... . ......... ...... .... .... ....... ....... ..... .. 
No .................................................................... ..... . 
Don't Know. 
Not applicable ... .. ........ .. 
Contractor published Safety Procedure 
Yes .. ... ..... .... ..... ....... . 
No 
Don't Know. .... .. ... .. ...... .. .. .. .. ... .. 
Contractor provided Nfety clothing and equipment 
yes ... ...... .. ... . ... ..... . ..... .. .. .... ... .... . 
No ....... ...... .. ... ... ... .... .... ... ....... ......... .... .... .. .... ...... . .. 
.Oon't Know ........................................................... . .. 
Not applicable ............... .......................................... . 







































































































Given these requirements, the level of respondents' lack of knowledge (recorded at 17% of applicable 
ABE contracts, and 24% of non-ABE contracts) indicates a high level of disregard for employee safety 
and low project manager and principal agent safety oversight. 
Those contractors who provided facilities generally maintained them in a locked and controlled manner. 
The data indicates that 64% of non-ABEs provided facilities and the same proportion of the sample 
maintained them in an appropriate manner. The data suggest that a smaller proportion of ABEs are 
likely to provide facilities (37%) and 71% (N=5) are likely to maintain them appropriately. 
Safety procedures and clothIng 
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The data in Table 6,19 indicate a very low level of knowledge of publishing of safety procedures by 
respondents, Of those for which an answer was given (N=32) it is recorded that only 28% of 
contractors published procedures, ABE performance, at 13% of known cases, suggests a very poor 
performance in comparison to nan-ABE performance, at 41% of known cases, The levels of lack of 
knowledge by respondents for non-ABEs is higher than for ABEs. It appears from the data that fun 
knowledge and reporting by respondents may influence the scale of difference between ABEs and 
non-ABEs, but would probably not influence the relative performance of the two contractor types. 
Table 6.19 indicates, with respect to the provision of safety clothing and equipment that respondents 
reported that 7% of projects did not require these. Once again, the respondents' lack of knowledge of 
the qualifying contracts (41 contracts) is high at 20%. The data indicate that over half (55%) of an 
contractors in qualifying contracts provided safety clothing and equipment. 
Results of the XI test and T· test for safety factors 
The data reported above indicate that there were no major accidents reported in any of the contracts in 
the sample. The data suggests that non-ABEs tend to do better than ABEs in the provision and 
maintenance of First Aid facilities, publication of safety procedures and the provision of safety clothing 
and equipment where required. 
TABLE 6.20: )(I test of the differences between ABE and non-ABE contractors on safety 
factors , 
STAnsncs 
FACTORS Jr value Degrees of Freedom 
1. Any major accident -
2. Frequent m illO( accident ... 13,929 
3. Provided suitable First Aid Facilities+ 7,108 
•• Maintained the First Aid Facilities on site+' 11 ,151 
•• Published Safety Procedure 3,754 
•• Provided safety Clothing and equipment 6,865 
+Over a quarter of all cells In these tests are empty, and therefore the stallstlCS presented for these factors 
should be Interpreted with caution. 
p < 0,05: , •• p <0,001 








• In the incidence of minor accidents (p<O,01) ABEs are more likely not to have minor accidents than 
non·ABEs. 
• In the maintenance of First Aid facilities (p<0,05) non-ABEs are more likely than ABEs to do so. 
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The X2 test result for minor accidents should, however, be disregarded as only one incident of a minor 
accident is reported on in Table 6.19. 
TABLE 6.21: T-test resutts for performance scores of ABEs and non-ABEs on safety factors 
Score on ufety facto,.. Number of c:aHII MNn$c:ore T-V.lue Degrees of Freedom Slgnlflc:amCft + 
ABE 1. 34,73 ·2,76 42 0,009-
Non-ABE 25 49,60 
.. P <0,01; + two taIled 
The T-test shows that the observed differences in peliol1l1ance with regard to safety factors are 
statistically significant. 
The results of the research into these endogenous management factors tend to support the sub-
hypothesis. There are observed differences in both the bivariate and X2 statistics, although only two 
are shown to be statistically significant by the X2 test. Overall, the T -test does not confirm the statistical 
significance of the X2 results. 
6.4.7 Product Quality Factors 
Tables 6.22, 6.23 and 6.24 presents the comparative bivariate analysis of the questions from the 
structured survey relating to product quality factors, the results of the X 2 test for the product quality 
factors and the results of the T -test, respectively. 
All contractors are reported by respondents to have understood the purpose of the contract. 
Maintenance of standaros 
Respondents reported that 84% of contractors maintained the standards specified in the contract. Over 
a quarter of ABEs (26%) and 8% of non-ABEs did not maintain standards throughout the contract. 
Respondents reported that 36% of non-ABEs and 5% of ABEs produced a higher standard of product 
than that specified in the contract. These levels of perfol1l1ance are reflected in the comparative levels 
of re-construction of sub-standard work. Respondents reported 47% of ABEs and 28% of non-ABEs 
had to remove some work due to poor quality. 
Materia' and suppliers 
ABEs are reported in Table 6.22 to have used sub-standard materials in 21% of ABE projects. No non-
ABEs are reported to have used sub standard materials. 
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TABLE 6.22: Structured survey blvariate analysis of questions on product quality factors 
DESCRIPTION 
Contractor understood the purpose of contract 
yes ........................................................ . 
Contractor maintained cOfltract standard 
yes ................................................... . 
No ........... . 
Rate effort to maintain standard 
Below normal.. 
Normal ................................................ . 
Above normal. ............................................ . 
Not applicable .......................................... . 
Contractor Produced a higher standard 
yes ................................................................. ....... . 
No ............................................................ . 
Contractor removed any portion due to poor quality 
Yes .. . 
No .... . 
Don'l Know 
Contractor used substandard malerials 
yes ...................................... . 
No ........................................................ . 
Don'l Know ...... .. .......................................... ...... .... .... . 
Rating of assistance re: use of sub-standard Material 
Below normal ....... .................... . 
Normal.. ....... .. ....................... . 
Above nonnaL ..... .................. .. . 
Not applicable .......... ............................. ... ........ . 
Contractor used the cheapest suppliers 
yes .............. . 
No ............................................................. .............. . 
Don't Know .............................................................. . 
Rating of external assistance re: use of cheapest 
malerials 
Below normal 
Normal. ....... . 
Above nonnal 
Not applicable .................................... . 
Number of cases .............................................. . 
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COMPANY STATUS TOTAL 
ABE non-ABE 
Number % Number % Number % 
19 100,0 25 100,0 44 100.0 
14 73,7 23 92,0 37 84 .1 
5 26,3 2 8.0 7 15.9 
1 5 .• 13 54.2 2,4 
5 27,8 7 29,2 18 42,9 
12 66,7 4 16.7 19 45,2 
4 9.5 
5,3 9 36.0 10 22.7 
18 94,7 1. 64 ,0 34 77,3 
9 47,4 7 28.0 1. 36,4 
9 47,4 17 68,0 2. 59.1 
5,3 4,0 2 4.5 
4 21 ,1 4 9,1 
14 73,7 25 100,0 39 88,8 
5,3 2,3 
2 10,5 4 16,0 • 13,6 
5 26,3 14 56,0 19 43,2 
12 63,2 • 24 ,0 18 40,9 
4,0 2,3 
3 15,8 4,0 4 9,1 
12 63,2 21 84 ,0 33 75.0 
4 21 ,1 3 12,0 7 15.9 
5,. 1. 66,7 2,4 
8 44,4 • 25,0 24 57,1 
7 38,9 2 8 ,3 13 31 ,0 
2 11 ,1 25 100,0 4 9,5 
19 100,0 44 100.0 
ThiS trend is supported by the reporting of the source of material in Table 6.22. Respondents indicated 
that 16% of ABEs used the cheapest supplier of materials that they could find, whilst 4% (one 
contractor) of non-ABEs did so. Reporting on this factor has a higher level of neutral answers for ABEs 
(21 %) that for non-ABEs (12%). 
Results of the X • Test and T-18st for product quantity factors 
TABLE 6,23: xa test of the differences between ABE and non-ABE contractors on product 
quality focto",. 
STATISTICS 
FACTORS X' value Deg ..... of Fl'Mdom p-values 
1. Understood the purpose of contract . - -
2. Maintained contract standard+ 2,707 1 0 ,099 
3. Produced a higher standard- 5,807 1 0 ,015 
4 . Removed any portion due to poor quality 1,929 2 0 ,381 
5. Used substandard materials+ • 7,422 2 0 ,024 
6. Used the cheapest suppliers+ 2,831 2 0,242 
+OVer a quarter of all calls in these tests are empty, and therefore the statlSllcs presented for these fadors should be 
interpreted with caution. 
• p <0,.05 
The )if test shows that three factors appear to indicate statistically significant differences between 
ABEs and non-ABEs. 
• In maintenance of contracts standards (p<O,05) the performance of ABEs is significantly lower than 
non-ABEs, with up to a quarter of ABEs contractors not maintaining contract standards. 
• In production of higher standard (p<O,05) one third of non-ABEs appear to produce a higher 
standard than contract requirements, whilst 95% of ABEs are unlikely to do so. 
• In the use of substandard materials (p<O,05), non-ABEs are unlikely to do so at all, whilst more 
than 1 in 5 ABEs may do so. 
TABLE 6,24: T -teat results for performance acorea of ABEs and non-AB Ea on Product Quality 
Factors 
Score on time factors Number of cases _nScore T-V.lue DeatHS of Freedom Significance + 
ABE ,. 46,31 -3,20 42 0,,003" 
Non-ABE 25 58,00 
-p < 0,01, + two tailed 
The T-test shows that the differences between ABEs and non-ABEs above in respect of product quality 
are statically significant (P=O,003). 
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6.5 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
6.5.1 General 
The research into completed contracts was conducted through a structured questionnaire in the 
following areas: 
• Time frames; 
• Mobilization of contract securities; 
• Management; 
• Labour; 
• Safety; and 
• Product quality. 
Table 6.25 summarises the areas of research and lists the selected primary questions from the 
structured questionnaire, which were subjected to tests for statistical significance. The results of the 
application of the T-test to the groups of primary questions are also recorded in the table for 
comparative purposes. 
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TABLE 6.25: Areas where statistical differences were observed between ABE and non-ABE 
perfonnance 
Area of .... earch X" p-value T -tee! significance 
Tlmefrolme 0,008 
Contractor started on time 0,111 
Establish site quickly and efficiently 0,044 
Contractor kept to programme 0,013 
Completed contract within allowed time 0,135 
Contractor worked extra hours 0,783 
Contractor worked over weekends 0,104 
Contractor submitted payment on time 0,005 
Securities 0,225 
Contractor provided required security 0,486 
Difficulties in providing securities 0,027 
Mobilised securities on time 0,353 
Management factors 0,047 
Number of full time employees 0,015 
Managed spending and cash flow 0,293 
Supplies problems resulting from non-payment 0,054 
Difficulty obtaining credit from suppliers 0,089 
Agreement to final quantities without dispute 0,117 
Maintained drawing register 0,044 
Maintained good relations with architects staff 0,340 
Reacted DOsitively to variations by architect 0,041 
Labour factors 0,876 
Mobilised suitable personnel 0,474 
Hired majority of labour locally 0,113 
Hired labour for the contract only 0,665 
Submitted employees for external training 0,276 
Submitted employees for on-the-job training 0,174 
Fonnal contracts with employees 0,023 
Anv labour unrest 0,201 
Safety 0,009 
Any major accident -
Frequent minor accidents 0,000· 
Provided suitable first aid facilities 0,069 
Maintained the first aid facilities on site 0,010 
Published safety procedures 0,153 
Provided safetv-clothing and equipment 0,076 
Product quality 0,003 
Understood the purpose of the contract -
Maintained contract standard 0,099 
Produced a higher quality standard 0,015 
Removed any portion due to poor quality 0,381 
Used substandard materials 0,024 
Used the cheapest suppliers 0,242 
-V.lue stKluld be dISregarded .s only one minor 9<X:ident was reported on. 
It may be observed from Table 6.25 that at p<O,05 the observed differences in perfonnance between 
ABE and non-ABE contractors are statistically significant with respect to time frames, management 
factors, safety and quality control . The statistical differences are not Significant at this level in respect 
of the mobilization of securities and labour factors. 
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The results of a T-test on the overa11 performance of ABEs on all factors, derived from the full data 
set. is presented in Table 6.26. 
TABLE 6.26: T-test results for overall performance scores of ABEs and non-ABEs on all 
factors 
Number Mean OOg .... of 
OVerall performance score T·value Significance + 
of cases score Freedom 
ABE I. 238,94 -2,33 42 0,006" 
Non·ABE 25 294,00 .. p < 0,01 , + two taIled 
The T-test indicates that there is statistical significance in the overall performance between ABEs and 
non-ABEs across all of the factors recorded. The degree of significance (P=0,006) serves to disprove 
the null hypothesis Mthat no performance differences exist between ABEs and non-ABEs in general 
contracts in the price range R100 000 to R2 000 000·, and thereby confirms the sub-hypothesis. 
6,5,2 Time Frames 
General 
The author's research into aspects of contractor performance against time frames examined aspects of 
relevance to the management of the contract. As such, the research focused on aspects such as 
commencement and completion times, site establishment and adherence to programmes. In addition, 
the matter of submission of payment certificates is covered, which is relevant to management of cash 
flow for both the Department and the contractor. 
Late contract start 
The research probed concerns relating to the ability of contractors to furnish securities and accept 
hand over of the project site from the Department. The author proposes that records of performance in 
this first phase of a project illustrate important management capabilities of contractors. 
The bivariate analysis of sample data indicates in Table 6.7 that delays in the start of contracts occur 
frequently in general contracts in the research price range. Almost 30% of contracts start late, and both 
ABE and non-ABE contractors are liable to start late. The bivariate analysis from the sample suggests 
that ABEs are more likely to start late, but the >f test does not attach statistical significance to this 
observation. The author contends, therefore, that the Department can anticipate that roughly a third of 
general contracts having prices below R2 000 000 will start late and that no difference in performance 
is expected between ABE and non-ABE contractors. 
The bivariate analysis suggest that 75% of projects which start late will start within 8 weeks of the 
planned start date, whilst almost 40% will start within 4 weeks of planned start date. The observed 
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trends in the data suggest that ABEs which start late tend to start later than non-ABEs. The data 
records that 25% of late starting ABEs start within 4 weeks of planned start date, whilst 60% of late 
starting non-ABEs made a start within this period. The level of response to this secondary question in 
this research questionnaire was not sufficient to conduct the >f test. As a result, no statistical 
significance can be attached to the observation. This aspect of contractor performance therefore 
remains open to further research to obtain a sample of sufficient size for the application of the more 
sophisticated techniques. 
Recorded difficulties encountered by ABEs, which caused delays, were; mobilisation of security, late 
completion of previous DPW jobs, lack of adequate human resources at the contractor's disposal, lack 
of adequate equipment on site (e.g. plant), and financial problems encountered by the contractors. 
Reasons presented for the delay in contract starts by non-ABEs were: consultation between head 
office and regional office leading to late hand-over of site to the contractor, contractor not delivering 
material to the project site in time, cancellation of contract due to failure by contractor to commence or 
start within reasonable time thereafter. None were recorded as being due to difficulties in mobilising 
security. 
A common problem to both ABE and non-ABE contractors has been the inability to commence on 
time due to commitments on other jobs awarded by the DPW. This suggests that these contractors 
are at times awarded jobs which result in workloads their businesses cannot handle. This does not 
benefit the APP objectives and neither does it benefit the contractors in any way to be penalised for 
finishing late. 
Variable allowances for late start were found in the research. The management style of different 
project managers rather than set departmental procedures appears as a determining factor. 
Reluctance of managers to cancel or re,tirect a contract once some progress in the appointment has 
been made may underly these differences. 
The recorded data on factors which created late starts were not adequate for non-parametric testing 
and no statistical Significance can be attached to them. Results show tendencies to differences 
between ABE and non-ABE contractors, which will be better illuminated if additional research is carried 
out. The data suggest that ABEs tend to have endogenous business factors causing delays. The 
identified causes include financial delays and personnel or plant shortages. The identified causes for 
non-ABE delays are almost entirely exogenous to the enterprises, where the Department has been late 
due to contract changes or late site hand over. Further research to clarify any differences between 
ABEs and non-ABEs in this respect is recommended. The author asserts that better knowledge will 
assist the Department to focus APP adjustments on this part of the project cycle. 
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The research indicates that any programme of service delivery that is managed by the Department 
through contracts conforming to the research type and price range is most likely to experience start 
delays in 30% of projects in the programme. This wilt have impacts on management focus and 
effectiveness, and on cash flow planning for the Department. It will also impact on the Departments 
clients, whose planning for related activities or expenditure wilt be similarly affected. The author is not 
aware of research in public works programmes with simitar characteristics to this research that 
provides a benchmark for late start frequencies. Data has not been locally researched for contracts 
above R2 000 000 let by the Department. The author contends that the level of late starts that has 
been identified is high. 
Site establishment 
The research investigated the efficiency of site establishment by contractors once a site has been 
formally handed over in terms of the contract. The bivariate analysis of research data reported in 
Table 6.7 suggests that non-ABEs are more effective in this phase of a project. They are indicated to 
establish a site quickly and efficiently in 92% of researched projects. In contrast, ABEs were evaluated 
to be efficient in almost 70% of projects. The >f test indicates a p-value of 0,044, confirming that this 
observed difference in performance between the two types of contractor is statistically significant within 
the p<0,05 limit. 
The author concludes that once contracts are active ABEs will benefit to a greater extent than non-
ABEs from any assistance with site establishment that may be given by the principal agent or project 
manager. 
Contractor adherence to programme and timeous completion of contract 
The bivariate analysis presented in Table 6.7 suggests that ABEs are more likely than non-ABEs to 
keep to programme by a small margin. The data indicate that 7S%of ABEs and 72% of non-ABEs in 
the sample maintained their project programme. The data suggest further that ABEs are likely to 
contain slippage more effectively than non-ABEs to within 4 weeks. Application of the >f test to this 
data confirmed statistical significance in the observed differences at p=0,013 level. 
Slow progress in certain stages of the project, faults identified in manufactured products, delays in 
commencing with the work, unjustifiable absence from site for lengthy periods at a time, and poor 
workmanship resulted in the observed ABE failures in keeping up with their programmes. 
Matters reported which contributed to failure of non-ABEs to keep up with programmes and complete 
in time were variation to the work and subsequent waiting for the approval of the extended budget, the 
bankruptcy declaration of a contractor and liquidation during execution of a contractor, and increases in 
scheduled and non-scheduled rates. 
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Interpretation of the bivariate data for completion of contract on time, and working extra hours and 
weekends suggest that non-ABEs perform better (84% finishing on time compared with 75% of ABEs) 
and make up time lost in their programme more effectively than ABEs. Application of the XZ test does 
not indicate statistical significance in these observations. As recorded in the Table 6.8 not all of the 
cells in these tests are filled. and a larger sample may increase the strength of the observations. 
The author concludes that the research suggests that ABEs may manage slippage better than non-
ABEs but are less likely to overcome slippage and complete contracts on time. Non-ABEs may 
improve their project completion performance by working extra hours and weekends more frequently 
than ABEs. 
Whilst the research remains inconclusive, it suggests, through comparison of rates of late start and late 
finish, that ABEs appear able to improve from 42% late start to 25% late finish. The data for non-ABEs 
suggest a less dramatic improvement in performance, from 20% late start to 16% late finish. The 
research data reported in Table 6.7 does not clearly indicate reasons for the relative differences in 
performance. 
The research indicates that approximately 20% of all contracts of this type and price will finish late. 
This will impact on programme planning and on Department and client cash flow estimates and 
budgets in a similar manner to that discussed above for late project starts. Because the rate of late 
completion is lower than that of late start (approximately 20% versus 30% of all contracts) the author 
reinforces here the recommendations for the introduction of flexible project start management. Any 
improvement in rates of late start that can be achieved through flexible management techniques will 
have more than proportional impact on the rate of late finishes due to the observed ability of 
contractors to reduce contract slippage. 
The author's research has not revealed comparative research that can confirm or contradict these 
conclusions, or that can provide comparisons for the rates of late contract completions. The author 
recommends that the Department conduct further research in these aspects to confirm the 
observations and to determine whether there are additional management procedures that may be 
influenced to change overall performance of contractors in these aspects. 
The author proposes that these findings extend the structural understanding of this sector by indicating 
that project time management problems are not confined only to ABE contractors. The Department 
and its clients will benefit from any reduction in the scale of late contract completions achieved in the 
research contact price range. 
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Submission of payment certificates 
The research data collected is relevant for reviewing contractors' management of their cash flow, which 
is an essential element of sustaining and developing a viable enterprise. The bivariate data in Table 
6.7 indicate that almost all non-ABEs can be expected to submit payment certificates timeously (96% 
of the sample did so). In contrast over one third of ABEs (37%) are likely to be late with submission of 
payment certificates. The >f test confirms the statistical strength of the observed differences in 
performance to a probability of occurrence of 99,5% (p=O,005). The author has not tested the 
relationship between poor management of payment certificates and late completion by ABEs due to 
the small size of data, and the fact that some of the cells in this test were empty. 
Results of poor cash flow management are likely to be problems with the purchase of materials and 
payment of labour. Both of these may prejudice the survival or growth of an enterprise. Comments 
from participants in the research point to a causal relationship between use of quantity surveyors and 
timeous submission of payment certifICates. Respondents noted that those ABE contractors who did 
not use quantity surveyors to assist with payment certificate submission were irregular in submissions, 
suggesting that speCialised skills are requ ired in this area. A considerable percentage of ABEs are 
reported to have relied on quantity surveyors' expertise to make timely submissions. 
The author concludes from the bivariate data in Table 6.7 that a greater degree of problem 
performance is indicated for ABEs in this factor than for late completions (37% versus 25%), and that 
some ABEs are able to survive despite poor cash flow management. A major improvement in 
performance therefore appears possible through supporting the employment of quantity surveyors by 
ABEs. The results are clearly demonstrable to contractors from the data reported here. The author 
recommends consideration of this motivation by the Department and supports it by indicating that it will 
provide external input into ABE projects. As such contractors themselves do not need to acquire 
training or experience and measurable results will be achieved in a short time without attracting time 
and fee-based costs for contractors. The author anticipates that such action may improve the rate of 
timeous project completion by ABEs by virtue of improved cash management, and by improving 
enterprise viability This may have a knock on effect in improving timeous start rates, where contractors 
win consecutive tenders from the Department. 
General data relationships 
The results of the application of the T-test are presented in Table 6.10 and summarised in Table 6.25. 
The level of significance of 0,008 confirms that the observed differences in performance between ABEs 
and non-ABEs in the data are statistically significant. 
What was not tested in the research was whether or not the contract period which was set is realistic. 
The fact that both ABEs and non-ABEs alike experienced late starts, suggests that research is required 
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to establish what a realistic contract period for contracts in this value range should be. Watermeyer and 
Band (1994) identified -contract duration- as being a SMME barrier to entry, but assigned a low value 
to it. The weighting assigned to this should be increased in the light of the current research. 
8.5.3 Contract securitle. factors 
In this section the author discusses the data presented in section 6.3.3.3. The issue of provision of 
project securities has been recognised by a number of researchers. The author designed part of the 
data collection to test the strength of the generally held concepts under the experience of the APP. 
The provision of contract securities has always been regarded as being an SMME barrier to entry. 
Waterrneyer and Band (1994) in their survey rate the provision of sureties as being the highest ranked 
barrier to entry. This barrier in their research was ranked higher than Mlack of financial resources· and 
Minability to obtain credit. · 
The reporting of bivariate analysis in Table 6.1 ° suggests that ABEs are more likely to experience 
difficulties than non-ABEs in providing securities. Proportions of contractors who experienced 
difficulties are recorded as 32% and 4% respectively. The application of the x! test indicated 
statistical significance in the observed differences, where p=0,0272. 
This difference between ABEs and non-ABEs does not appear to influence the overall performance of 
the two types of contractor. The bivariate analysis reported in Table 6.10, suggests that observed 
occurrences of provision of securities occur almost equally by both types of contractor, in 
approximately 90% of cases. The application of the >f test does not indicate statistical significance to 
the observed minor differences between contractor types. The author therefore concludes that levels 
of provision of securities are almost the same for the two contractor types. 
More importantly, the author concludes that both ABEs and non-ABEs are equally likely to provide 
securities on time, with about 16% of all contractors not being on time. This conclusion is derived from 
the observations indicated by the bivariate analysis and by the lack of statistical significance in the 
observed differences (p=0,353) indicated by the x: test. The Department can therefore anticipate 
delays in its scheduling of projects within a programme or projects up to this stage in the project cycle. 
Research data report that some problems have been experienced with continuity between projects, 
where contractors' guarantee capacity has been tied up in an existing, incomplete project. Some 
flexibility has been shown by the Department to resolve these occurrences; in particular by creating a 
retention reserve from cash flow. Whilst solving the problem in the short term, the impact of this 
practice on contractor cash flow viability needs further investigation. 
2 Not all the celts in the test were populated, and the author recommends additional research to confirm this finding. 
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The author submits that the observations above advances the understanding of issues related to the 
provision of securities because comparative research has been done. The )(2 test suggest that ABEs 
are more likely to experience difficulties in providing securities. However, no differences between ABE 
and non-ABEs are observed in respect of actually providing the security on time. Thus ABEs appear 
to be able to provide securities, even through some may experience some difficulties. Ultimately, the 
performance between the two types of contractor does not differ. The T-test result for these factors 
confirms th is. (A significance level of 0,225 is reported in Table 6.12 and summarised in Table 6.29.) 
The research findings do not support the outcomes of the survey reported on by Watermeyer and Band 
(1994) which ranked the provision of sureties as being the most important barrier to new entrant 
SMMEs to overcome. The research was however conducted on a closed sample of contractors who 
had in fact been awarded contracts and any conclusions should as a result be viewed with caution. 
The author suggests that the strategy of reducing the levels of surety between 2,5 and 5% from 10% in 
this value range of contracts may be the reason for this finding. The author accordingly proposes that 
the Watermeyer and Band rating for this item be down graded should the levels of sureties called for 
be in accordance with government's 10 Point Plan (MOF and MOPW, 1995). 
6.5.4 Management Factors 
The author researched general aspect of management, seeking to establish relationships to overall 
performance. Although the sample size does not support the exploration of relationships between 
factors, valid observations are derived. 
The observed differences between ABEs and non-ABEs are shown to be statistically significant in 3 of 
the 8 management factors under the)(2 test, and generally by the T-test. They are thus considered to 
generally support the sub-hypothesis. 
The comparative nature of the research has, however, provided a clearer picture of the comparative 
performance of the types of contractor. The three factors, on which the )(2 test revealed statistically 
significant relationships , are not considered to be the most critical of all of the eight factors researched. 
They are the size of the firm, maintenance of a drawings register and positive reaction to variations by 
the architect. 
No statistical differences in performance bet'oNeen the types of contractor are identified by the )(2 test 
for management of spending of cash flow, supply problems resulting non-payment, difficulties obtaining 
credit from suppliers, or agreeing to final quantities without despute. The bivariate analysis suggests 
differences in ABE and non-ABE performance. The)(2 test. however, must be interpreted with caution. 
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The author cautions that the T-test result strengthens the observed differences indicated for supply 
problems and credit difficulties. Inconclusiye statistical relationships are revealed, and impacts of 
these factors on project time management and quality of output deserve further research. The author 
comments that a high proportion of ABE contractors did not submit payment certificates on time 
because they did not employ quantity surveyors. A causal relationship may be postulated between this 
and credit and materials supply problems, because the latter are attributable to poor cash flow 
management. The author recommends additional research to explore the nature, if any, of such 
causal relationships. The author further recommends that the impact of introducing quantity surveyors 
to ABEs who do not employ them may have measurable impacts through improved materials supply 
and delivery. Such improvements will improve timeous project completions, and may improve product 
quality. 
6.5.5 Safety Factors 
The author concludes that the comparative research has shown, with the limitations of the data 
spread due to sample size, that ABEs do not always perform below non-ABEs in these management 
factors. 
With respect to both types sets of contractor, safety requirements were not adhered to sometimes 
because they were perceived to be unnecessary. This was the case in most renovation projects, 
where most contractors involved provided only hard-hats. Sometimes this was influenced by the fact 
that some sites already had these facilities, such as police stations and SANDF bases. Some 
contractors, however, just neglected to provide first aid facilities on site. 
It should be noted here that a considerable number of the DPW project managers could not respond to 
questions on safety requirements and it neceSSitated contacting principal agents, some of which did 
not know either. 
Watermeyer and Band (1994) identified ~compliance with safety act" as a SMME barrier to entry, but 
assigned a low weighting to it. The research confirms their findings. 
6.5.6 Labour Factors 
The author sought to explore the structure of labour management and relations in this component of 
research. 
Data on local hiring, although not indicated by Xl to be significantly different between contractor types, 
may indicate that ABEs tend to be locally based and/or have a smaller permanent establishment 
which is brought into projects. Further research to test the correlation between contract type and price 
may provide stronger explanations. 
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Respondents reported that the ABEs experiences of labour unrest were a result of non-payment of 
wages. In some of the contracts the labourers subsequently refused to continue with the work. 
Whilst some non-ABE contractors neglected to submit their employees to any training whatsoever, a 
considerable proportion of them had contracts in which training was not part of the specifications, or 
otherwise that their contracts duration was too short and did not accommodate for training. 
The considerable difference in performance between contractor types with respect to employment 
contracts is the only observed difference to which statistical significance is attached by the >f test 
(p=O,023). Those non-ABE contractors who were reported not to have entered into formal employment 
contracts with their employees are said to have used casuals through "word-of mouth'" agreements. 
The research findings are that ABEs in the sample have fewer than 10 permanent employees. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of the BCI survey (1996) which found that "emerging contractors~ 
on average employed 7,3 staff members. 
6.5.7 Product Quality Factors 
The research found within the limited data set statistically significant differences in the quality produced 
between ABEs and non-ABEs in two factors, being the production of higher standards than the 
contract demanded, and the use of substandard materials. 
In the former, the bivariate analysis reported in Table 6.22 indicates that 36% of non-ABEs did so, 
compared with 5% of ABEs. Sodenund and Schutte (1998) make the observation that quality 
assurance, with its associated procedural system, quality control, is a culture which to be successful, 
must be inculcated into an organisation over time. ABEs in the main are companies which have only 
recently been formed. This may be the reason for their apparent inferior performance. On the 
Malmesbury Prison contract where ABEs performed at the subcontract level and were supervised by 
an experienced large contractor, 78 % of the respondents to a survey (Soderlund and Schutte, 1996) 
rated quality as being good, 11% as moderate and 11 % as poor. The author contends that given time 
there is no reason for ABEs to perform differently to non-ABEs. 
The research did not, however, provide information which could be used to determine the impact of the 
substandard quality on either the contractor or the Department. Substandard quality can affect a 
contractor's profit if such quality necessitates the removal and reconstruction of portions of the works. 
The acceptance by the principal agent of substandard quality on the other hand, can lead to increased 
maintenance or repair costs. Any increased maintenance or repair costs will cause any financial 
premiums associated with the APP to increase. It is, however, not possible from the data to link 
substandard quality to the removal of portions of the works. As a result, no inference can be made as 
to the impact of observed differences in quality on the APP. 
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With respect to the use of sub-standard materials, Table 6.22 indicates that 21% of ABEs are adjudged 
to have done so, while no non-ABEs are recorded as having done so. In contrast to the above the 
author proposes that this is a management aspect that can be changed in the short term. Further, 
although there is no statistically indicated relationship between performance in this factor and the use 
of quantity surveyors, the introduction of these professional to ABEs who do not use them may have a 
positive impact on relative performance in this factor. The author proposes that controlled associated 
research could rapidly provide strong statistical data. The relationships are measurable, and this 
research provides a base data set against which to evaluate any change. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
The research in this chapter is shown to partially support the sub-hypothesis: 
Performance differences exist between Affirmable Business Enterprises and Non-
Afflrmable Business Enterprises In building contracts in the price range Ri00 000 to 
R200000. 
The establishment of differences in performance between ABEs and non-ABEs suggest that 
notwithstanding the increased procurement opportunities that were offered to ABEs via the Affirmative 
Procurement Policy, supply side constraints and overall management limitations impacted negatively 
on their ability to perfonn to the same level as their nan-ABE counter parts. This finding partially 
support the conclusion that the principal hypothesis tested in the chapter is confirmed, viz: 
Increased procurement opportunities to Affirmable Business Enterprises via 
governments Affirmative Procurement Policy are a necessary, not sufficient condttlon 
for the full enablement of Afflrmable Business Enterprises in the construction sector. 
The author contends that the recommendations for interventions in the contract management process 
indicated above will provide substantive support to improving ABE performance and therefore 
sustainable enterprise growth. The author reinforces here the recommendations made for further 
research to accompany the interactions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
IDENTIFICATION OF SUPPLY SIDE CONSTRAINTS 
7.1 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the introduction and review sections of chapter 6 the author identified the reformed procurement 
regime and the principles underlying the structure of reform being implemented. In this chapter the 
consideration of the impact of the APP is extended to cover components of supply side measures. 
The following sub-hypothesis is tested: 
Affirmative Business Enterprise participation varies according to different construction 
$ub-sectors entry level thresholds 
7.2 RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPLY SIDE INITIATIVES 
Recent supply side initiatives which are aimed at addressing SMME constraints identified in the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme include the establishment of: 
• the Small Business Council and the Ntsika Enterprise Agency in terms of the Small Business Act 
of 1996: 
• the Centre for Small Business promotion within the Department of Trade and Industry: 
• the Khula Credit Guarantee scheme : and 
• the Emerging Contractor Development Programme within the Department of Public Works. 
The Centre for Small Business Promotion, located within the Department of Trade and Industry, 
embarked during the latter part of 1997 upon programmes such as the National Procurement Support 
Programme and the Business Referral and Information Network (BRAIN). The Department of Public 
Works' Emerging Contractor Development Programme, which seeks to provide emerging contractors 
with access to specific categories of work opportunities and to training and support programmes, 
became fully operational only during the latter part of 1998. It was initiated in each of the 
Department's regional offices. 
Procurement refonn preceded the implementation of supply side measures, and the period covered 
by this study in the main preceded the introduction of the supply side measures indicated above. 
7.3 GENERAL APPROACH TO TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS 
The introduction of various supply side initiatives aimed at addressing SMME constraints is introduced 
above. In Chapter 5, the author established that participation in the general sub-sector is significantly 
higher than in the civil, electrical and mechanical sub·sector5. The particular experience of 
participation across all construction sulrsectors in the Department of Public Works contracts need to 
be explored. The author conducted extensive structured research to identify particular factors which 
7.2 
may present obstacles to, or restrict entry of ABEs into all the construction sub-sectors. Levels of 
participation by ABEs in Prime (Minor) contracts is characterized in Chapter 5. 
The research presented in this chapter sets out to identify such obstacles, which are termed entry 
level thresholds. 
The research directed at understanding business practices and decisions was directed in two areas. 
The first area seeks to understand the role of sub-sector Associations in the establishment of 
thresholds, and specifically whether the Associations themselves impose participation criteria which 
act as barriers to entry to a sub-sector for ABEs. The focus of this research did not require internal 
knowledge of the business operations of individual enterprises. It was conducted through interviews 
with association representatives. 
The second area of research was directed at understanding business practices and decisions made 
by companies to operate in a particular sector or sectors. The conduct of interviews with project 
managers and principal agents reported in chapter 6 clearty indicated that external knowledge of 
business practice of contractors is limited to the central requirements of the implementation and 
evaluation of contracts on site. The respondents in that research had very limited knowledge of the 
structure or operation of enterprises off the contract sites. 
The focus of research to test this hypotheSiS required internal knowledge of the business operations 
of the enterprises. The research was therefore conducted directly with owners or senior managers in 
contracting enterprises, through a structured quest;onnaire. The author's literature research has not 
identified any other examples of structured questionnaires of similar complexity aimed at SMME 
business owners and senior managers. 
7.3.1 Definition of entry level threshold. 
It will be useful to define the concept of entry level thresholds in order to focus the research. The word 
'threshold' is defined (Brown, 1993) as a doorway. gate or entrance. It is a point or place over (or 
through) which movement occurs from one place to another, generally from 'outside' to 'inside' or vice 
versa. It is also an obstacle or stumbling block. 
The word is used metaphorically in this research and refers to the point beyond which sub-sector 
tenders from the Department can be successfully won and completed. The threshold is made up of a 
number of factors whtth carry different weights. For the research, the following groups, based on a 
study by Watermeyer and Band (1994) and the author's experience, were considered to be 
Significant: 
• personal experience in the sub-sector; 
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• specialised technical expertise and work processes; 
• access to finance and credit; 
• guarantees and warrantees; 
• access to plant and equipment; 
• capitalisation requirements; 
• established relationships with sub-contractors and lor suppliers; 
• steady availability of projects; and 
• compliance with statutory requirements. 
It is anticipated that different combinations of these factors will create a 'capacity' which a company or 
enterprise must possess before attempting to tender for work in a sub-sector. 
For the purposes of this research, therefore, the entry level thresholds are defined as: 
~those business factors which, when combined, create the criteria for participation in a sub-
sector which an enterprise must have the capacity to satisfy in order to successfully tender 
and operate~. 
7.3.2 Methodology outline : the role of sub-sector Association Interviews in the 
establishment of thresholds 
The author considered the role of sub-sector Associations in the matter of formal and informal 
participation barriers. General discussions were held with representatives of the following 
associations: 
1. Building Industry Federation of South Africa. 
2. South African Federation for Civil Engineering Contractors. 
3. National Black Contractors Association and Allied Trades. 
4. Electrical Contractors Association. 
The interviews were conducted in August and September 1998. 
The discussions with the representatives were directed at determining whether any of the 
Associations impose entry criteria on membership which thereby create entry thresholds into a sub-
sector. The author sought to understand at an early phase of research whether Associations imposed 
formal restrictions on participation which would act as external barriers to sub-sector participation for 
an enterprise. 
The external character of any barrier was considered to be the imposition of participation thresholds 
requirements which are not part of the short term management activities within contracting 
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enterprises. These activities are described as the management of the technical activities and 
outcomes of a contract; the management of the contractual relationship between the enterprise and 
the client; and the business management of the enterprise. 
The author wished to understand whether Associations tend to create additional requirements of a 
technical, experiential, or financial or managerial nature which a partiCipant would need to satisfy in 
order to enter a sub-sector. 
Interviews were conducted on a face-ta-face basis and were structured around five areas of enquiry. 
The five questions listed below were faxed to each participant prior to the interviews. 
1. What are the abilities your organisation requires from a contractor to enter and remain in the 
industry? 
2. Are the above requirements formalised, and if so, where? 
3. What other abilities outside those required by your organisation/have you encountered to be a 
problem for contractors to enter and remain in the industry? 
4. What assistance with regard to abilities can your organisation provide to contractors to enter 
and remain in the industry? 
5. General comments. 
7.3.3 Methodology outline: structured sutHsector threshold research 
The research directed at understanding business practices and decisions (second area of research 
indicated above) conducted through a structured questionnaire in order to develop improved 
understanding of the business decisions that impact on participation in particular sub-sectors. The 
author sought to test the willingness, or propensity, of contractors to enter another sub-sector. The 
structure of the questionnaire seeks to explore the issues of managing and operating an enterprise 
from a business perspective. The author has not identified equivalent research in the literature and 
believes this research perspective to be unique in this field of research. 
The research was conducted in the contract value range from R100 000 to R2 000 OOO.The selection 
of the sample was based on the criterion that enterprises had been awarded at least one contract in 
the period from May 1996 to January 1998. 
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7.3.3.1 The research sample 
The research was conducted on a probability sample stratified by firms having ABElnon-ABE status, 
comprising 51 enterprises of which 13 were ABEs and 38 were non-ABEs (Cochran, 1977). The 
sample was drawn from a known universe of 101 qualifying contracts let by the Department of Public 
Works in all provinces. The universe was determined from the records of a comprehensive database, 
which was in the process of being complied by the Department. The database was completed 
subsequent to the selection of the sample and a size of the full universe of 210 qualifying contracts 
was established. 
The questionnaires were completed between November 1998 and April 1999. Questionnaires were 
completed through telephonic interviews in 47 cases. Respondents in telephonic interviews were 
taxed questionnaires prior to the interview. In some cases more than one interview was required to 
obtain all data in the questionnaire. In four cases the questionnaire was faxed to respondents, was 
completed by respondents and returned. The quality of data obtained from questionnaires completed 
by respondents was comparable to that obtained from telephonic interviews. 
The sample of 51 enterprises from the full universe of 101 contracts awarded to enterprises, 
determined by the availability of contact details for enterprises and the willingness of respondents to 
participate, was obta ined. The length of telephone interviews ranged from 45 minutes to 90 minutes 
including time for explaining the research background and scope. The derivation of the sample from 
the universe at the time of sample selection is indicated in Table 7.1 below. 
TABLE 7.1: Derivation of the sample for research Into supply side constraints 
SAMPLING ACnVITY Number % 
Telephone number not registered •• 43,6 
Contacted, refused to participate 4 4,0 
Contacted, denied OPIN contract 2 1,. 
Contacted, participated In research " SO,S Total records October 1998 101 100,0 
Respondents were contacted at the last telephone number held in the records of the Department of 
Public Works. Where this number was no longer valid, attempts were made to trace companies 
through the directory enquiry services of the national telephone service provider, Telkom. Where 
necessary, variations of company spellings were submitted in an effort to obtain current telephone 
numbers. The proportion of companies that could not be contacted through these means was higher 
than anticipated, at 44%. 
Through this method 51 enterprises were contacted. Of these, 7% (N=4) refused to participate citing 
lack of time (N=2) or offering no explanation (N=2), and 3,5% (N=2) denied that they had ever been 
awarded a contract by the Department of Public Works. 
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A more complex questionnaire than that used for the research reported in chapter 6 was necessary to 
cover the range of business issues. The complexity and depth of some questions resulted in 
reluctance to participate by some participants, and the refusal by some potential participants. Where 
the reasons for the reluctance were addressed by assuring respondents of the research purpose, they 
participated willingly. The author contends that further research in this field will yield additional 
valuable data and extend the range of analysis that can be performed. The author proposes that the 
conduct of such research through interviews with contractors when they are active in a contract will 
greatly reduce the effort required to acquire data. 
The composition of the sample of 51 enterprises was compared with the composition of the full 
universe of 210 contracts in the R1 000 000 to R2 000 000 price range let by the Department. This 
universe was determined when the Department's comprehensive database was complete. Table 7.2 
illustrates the comparison. 
TABLE 7.2: Comparative distribution of contract types between the research sample and 
the corresponding universe for the study period 
. 
Contract type Sample Unlv ..... for study period 
Number % Number % 
General 18 35,3 115 54,7 
General and Civil· 8 15,7 0 0,0 
Civil • 11 ,8 20 9,5 
Electrical and Mechanical 
" 
37,3 75 35,7 
Total 51 100,0 210 100,0 
.. 
The deSignation of general and CMI was presented in Department records at the time of sample identificatIOn, but not used as 
a classification in the comprehensive database. 
The combination of general and general and civil contracts in the research sample comprise 51 % of 
the universe. 
For reasons out/ined on page 7.6 the research sample is sufficiently representative of the range of 
contract types in the contract universe for the study period. Allowance is made for respondents to 
have classified work on site services as civil, whilst the tenders for such work are technically recorded 
as general contracts. The relative spread of contract types between General, Civil, Electrical and 
Mechanical contracts is comparable. 
Table 7.3 presents the distribution of ABE and non-ABE enterprises across the research sample and 
qualifying universe for the study period. 
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TABLE 7,3 : Distribution of ABE and non-ABE enterprises between the sample and the 
corresponding universe for the study period. 
Contract type Sample Universe for study period 
ABE Non-ABE ABE non-ABE 
N % N % N % N % 
General 8 61 ,5 10 26,3 22 84,. 93 50,6 
General and Civil 3 23,7 5 13,2 0 0,0 0 0,0 
Civil 1 7.7 5 13,2 1 3,9 19 10,3 
Electrical and Mechanical 1 7,7 18 47,3 3 11 ,5 72 39,1 
Total 13 100,0 24 100,0 2. 100,0 184 100,0 
The Table indicates a bias towards ABE contractors in the research sample for the combined 
contracts. The distribution of ABE and non-ABE enterprises for Mechanical and Electrical Contracts in 
the research sample corresponds with the distribution in the universe. 
The character of the sample in terms of the key areas of enquiry is shown in Table 7.4. 
TABLE 7,4: Character of the sample for research into supply side constraints 
DESCRIPTION Number of cases 
Number % 
R .. pondent position 
Owner I Director ...................................................... . 29 78.4 
Manager ........ . .................................... .......... .. 4 10.8 
Other .......... ........................................ .. 4 10,8 
V •• r of establishment 
less than 10 years ...... . .. ........ . 21 42,0 
10 • 20 years ............ .. 18 36,0 
More than 20 years .............................. ........ . ... .......... . 11 22.0 
Company structure 
Sole trader ... ... ... ... .. ...... ... ... ... ... ... .. . ........... . 7 14,0 
Single member CC . . ................................. . • 12,0 Multiple member CC ..................................................... . 20 40,0 
Pty ltd ....................................................................... . 17 34,0 
ABE status 
ABE ........................................... . ................. . 13 25,5 
NON·ABE ...... ........................................ .. 38 74,5 
Are. of activity 
General .................................. . 18 35,3 
General & Civil 8 15.7 
Civil ....... .... ... ........... . .. .. . .......................... .. • 11 .8 Electricatl Mechanical .. .. 19 37,3 
Member of an association 
Ves ... ........ .................................... . 33 84,. 
No ...................... ....................... . • 15,4 No of pennanent employees 
less than 10 person ..................................................... . 12 23.5 
10 to 25 person ............................................ ........... .... . 18 35.3 
26 or more persons ..................................................... . 21 41 .2 
Number of cases 51 100.0 
H2l!i In each category, the misSing cases are excluded. 
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7.3.3.2 Survey Instrument 
A structured survey method was selected for this research, utilizing a structured questionnaire as the 
survey instrument (see Appendix 7.1). The questionnaire was structured in six sections as follows : 
• Enterprise information; 
• Human resources; 
• Finance; 
• Equipment and plant; 
• Business thresholds. and 
• Sub-sector thresholds. 
The third section, covering finance, incorporates some questions from the structured questionnaire 
used for the research into mobilization of sureties and contracts compliance. The author's intention 
was to gather this information over a wider sample. 
The primary data determined in the questionnaire was descriptive, with open fields for respondents to 
indicate use of human resources, years of experience and qualifications for questions on human 
resources, business thresholds, sub-sector thresholds and equipment and plant. 
Data relating to use of sub-contractors was collected on a three-point scale of 'always use', 'usually 
use' and 'sometimes use'. 
Nominal data was collected for the section on finance, with the majority of questions requiring a 
yes/no answer. 
The data was captured and analysed in the SPSS package. 
The questionnaire was designed in anticipation of detaited information across the full range of 
questions, but this could not be obtained consistently, and variable levels of data were received. In 
some cases detail was incomplete or missing. As a result the data does not comprehensively cover all 
sections of the questionnaire. Data is presented and discussed for those variables with a tolerable 
number of missing cases. 
Three levels of analysis were carried out on the data. Firstly the percentage distributions of the 
responses with adequate levels of analysis were calculated and are presented. The second level of 
analysis involved statistical test of the significant of the differences that result in the bivariate analysis. 
For this analysis the Pearson Chi Square ()(2) test was used. The third level of analysis involved the 
statistical testing for significant associations of sets of variables. For this analysis a regression model 
was used. 
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The size of the sample at 51 cases restricted the possible level of cross·tabulations for some 
variables across all contract types. 
The author proposes that the questionnaire be applied by the Department on a continuous basis. 
When a sample of sufficient size is obtained, analysis of the propensities to move both horizontally 
and vertically will be possible. The sample size presently precludes analysis of the propensity to move 
vertically in a sutrsector. 
7.4 PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS ON THE ROLE OF SUB-
SECTOR ASSOCIATION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THRESHOLDS 
7.4.1 Building Industries Federation of South Africa 
Membership of the Building Industries Federation of South Africa (BIFSA) is not mandatory for 
participation in the general construction sub-sector. Membership of BIFSA is structured on 
membership of regional Master Builders ASSOCiations, which are affiliated to BIFSA. BIFSA 
membership does not, therefore, act as a sub·sector entry threshold unless a client requires BIFSA or 
MBA membership as a pre--condition for tendering. 
The procedures for membership follow the four steps below : 
(a) demonstration by the applicant of compliance with relevant construction industry legislation; 
(b) review of references supplied by the applicant; 
(c) adjudication of application by regional MBA's; and 
(d) transmission of application to BIFSA. 
For contractors wishing to apply for membership the author interprets four apparent levels of 
threshold. The first lies in developing a track record of references to appropriate levels for 
membership purposes. The second lies in demonstration of compliance with legislation. The final two 
are in the formal acceptance of a membership applications by MBA regional structures and then by 
BIFSA itself. 
In the interview the respondent stated that Memerging contractors~ do not necessarily want to become 
members because they will have to comply with relevant legislation. BIFSA and the MBA are 
positioned to 'protect the industry,l by providing comfort to potential clients that members have been 
checked by the associations. 
1 Interview with P Butt. BIFSA, 11 September 1998 
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7.4.2 South African Federation for Civil Engineering Contractore 
Membership of the South African Federation tor Civil Engineering Contractors (SAFCEC) is not 
mandatory for participation in the civil sub-sector. The membership procedures require applicants to 
be proposed and seconded by existing members. Applicants are evaluated on their track record and 
experience on previous contracts. The interviewees proposed that the necessary expertise can be 
obtained through training and participation in contracts over a 2 to 3 year period.1 A preference was 
expressed for inexperienced applicants to obtain their experience on a membership basis with 
established members. This could be done through 5ub-contracting or joint venture relationships. 
These comments are moderated by the interviewers' recommendations that new entrants tend to tack 
sectoral managerial skills which may be acquired through years of experience. A period of 12 years 
was suggested as a bench mark for managers to acquire skills appropriate to that of a Director. 
7 .... 3 National Black Contractors Assoclatlon and Allied Trades 
Membership of the National Black Contractors Association and AU ied Trades (NABCAT) is not 
mandatory for so-called Black contractors entering into general construction contracts. The 
organisation was formed in 1993 as a negotiating agency for builders' associations, at a time when 
representation was fragmented. Individual contractors do not join, and the organisation is not 
concerned with the evaluation of members' compliance with statutory requirements. 
7...... Electrical Contractors Association 
Membership of the Electrical Contractors Association (ECA) is not mandatory for participation in the 
electrical sub-sector. This sector does, however, have stringent technical safety requirements for 
participation and the ECA requires applicants to be members of the Bargaining Council as a pre-
requisite. This provides certified compliance with relevant labour and safety legislation, which must be 
backed by references substantiating a company's credibility and expertise. The ECA monitors 
compliance with relevant legislation by members. 
The ECA recognises the levels of technical skills required for participation in the sub-sector, but does 
not foresee these as impossible thresholds.2 
1 Interview with H Langenhoven and H Richardson, 14 August 1998 
2 Interview with Mr Killian , consulant to the ECA, 1 September 1998. 
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7.5 PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS ON STRUCTURED SUB-
SECTOR THRESHOLD RESEARCH 
7.5.1 Overview 
In this section the author reports on results for bivariate analysis of the following : 
• basic enterprise characterisation; 
• personal experience in the sub-sector; 
• specialised technical expertise and work processes; 
• access to finance and credit; 
• guarantees; 
• access to plant and equipment; 
• capitalisation requirements; 
• established relationships with sub-contractors and lor suppliers; 
• steady avaifability of projects; 
• compliance with statutory requirements; and 
• own perceptions of thresholds. 
7.5.2 Basic Enterprise Characterisation 
A most striking feature of the character of the sample is the degree of concentration of ABEs in 
general , and general and civil contracts, where 84,6% of contractors operate in these sub-sectors. In 
contrast, 37,8% of non-ABE contracts are in these sub-sectors. For non-ABEs, activity is more 
balanced across the sub-sectors, with almost half operating in the electrical/mechanical sub-sectors, 
as indicated in Table 7.5. 
7.12 
TABLE 7.5 : Batlc enterprise infonnation for ABEs and non-ABEs 
DESCRlPTlON 
A,... of activity 
General ...... ................................. . 
General & Civil ........................... ..... ..... ... .. 
Civil .... .. ... ...... ... ... .... .................. ..... ... . ... .. 
Electrical I MechanicaL ...................... ... . 
Vear of establishment 
Le» than 10 yrs .... .... .... .. .. ... .. ... ... . ....... ... .. 
10-20yrs .... ................. ... .. . ... .. .. .......... .. . 
More than 20 yrs ................ .... ... . ............. .. .. 
Nodata . .. ...... .. .. .. ... ........ .. .. ... .. .. .. . 
Company structu,. 
Sole Trader ... .. ............................. ..... .. .. .. . .. 
Close Corporation .................. ..... .... ............ . 
Pty Ltd .. ... ............................... .. 
No dala ... ... .. .. .. ...... ............... ..... .. .. .. . . 
No of permanent employ ... 
Less tha n 1 0 persons .. ............ .. .. ....... ....... .. 
10 - 25 persons .. . .. ... . .................. ...... ... ...... . 
























































































Number of cases ............... ................ ........ . 13 100,0 38 100,0 51 100,0 
Date of establishment 
The ABE and non-ABE samples have equal proportions of representation in companies of less than 
ten years standing. ABEs are seen to have many fewer companies in the sample of more than twenty 
years standing. 
The decay in the proportion of ABE enterprises in the sample older than 20 years is explained by the 
structural restrictions to participation and business development under Apartheid legislation. Indeed, 
the author anticipated a higher weighting of the non-ABE sample in enterprises of less than 10 years 
age, because most of the restrictive legislation has only been repealed in the last ten years. 
The decay in the number of non-ABE enterprises presents an antiCipated pattern. The decay will be 
the result of enterprise closures and amalgamations, and of proprietors leaving the industry. SMMEs 
are known to have very htgh rates of business failure, and in the construction industry this 
characteristic will be reinforced by the Impacts of periodic down-swings in the business cycle. 




The majority of ABEs are operating through Close Corporations4 with less than 10% (N=1) formed as 
limited liability company. The spread of company structures is more even for non-ABEs with a more 
balanced ratio of Close Corporations and Limited Liability companies (45% and 42% respectively) . 
The author concludes that non-ABEs tend to operate through more formal company structures. 
Number of Employees 
ABEs exhibit a generally equal spread of the sizes. The non-ABE sample exhibits a positive 
relationship to size. 
7.5.3 Personal Experience In the Sub-sector 
The sample data suggests, through the bi-variate analysis reported in Table 7.6 that most enterprises 
operating in the research contract price range are managed by individuals with ownership of the 
enterprise. Across the full sample less than a quarter of companies are managed by non-equity 
individuals (N=10, 21 ,7%). The trends for ABE and non-ABE enterprises are the same in th is respect. 
TABLE 7.6: Company general management 
DESCRIPTION 
Self/owner/director/members ..................... . 
Manager. ................ ... .... , ................ . 
Years of experience 
0-15yrs ............................................. .. 
16 - 29 yrs ................ .. ......... .. 
30+yrs ........... .. ...... .. .. 













































Maine I Experience ........... ........................ .. 
DiplOlTla IOegree ....................................... . 
No data .............. .. 
























ABE enterprises appear to be more frequently managed by individuals with fewer years of industry 
experience, with 41 ,7% of ABE managers having less than 15 years experience, compared with 
32,4% of non-ABE managers, ABE companies have fewer managers with experience of 16 to 29 
4 A close corporation is a company formed in tenns of 8 particular act of parliament in South Africa. 
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years, and more with over thirty years. The author concludes that the recent removal of restrictions to 
entry and participation by ABEs in construction may explain in part the relative weighting of the ABE 
sample by managers of fewer years experiences. The supply side measures introduced through the 
APP would not solely account for this, however, and more general activity is likely to have influenced 
manager participation. 
The author notes the contrast between ABEs and non-ABEs in respect of the qualifications of 
managers. Half of the ABE managers do not have fonnal technical or professional qualifications, 
whilst only 22% of non-ABE managers are similarly reliant on secondary education and experience as 
the basis of their management expertise. 
7.5.4 Specialised T.chnlcal.xperti •• and wortc: proc ..... 
The data obtained from the structured questionnaire provided information relating to specialised tasks 
and expertise. In this respect, Tables 7.7 to 7.11 present data on: 
• completion of tender documents; 
• evaluation of contract technical requirements; 
• administration of contracts; and 
• adm inistration of tax and statutory obligations. 
Table 7.7 presents data obtained on completion of tender documentation. 
TABLE 7.7: Completion of tend.r documents 
DESCRIPnON COMPANY STATUS TOTAL 
ABE non·ABE 
Number " Number " Number " Setf/owoer/directorlmembers .......... ... .. .. .... .. 9 69,2 20 52.6 29 56.9 
Other staff .. .. .... .. .. ..... .... .. .. .. ..• .................... 2 15,4 15 39,5 17 33,3 
Other ...................... .......... .... ..... ............... 2 5.3 2 3.9 
No data .................................................... 2 15,4 1 2 .• 3 5 .• 
YNra of expertence 
0 - 15yrs .................................... ... ..... ... .... • 46,4 14 36.8 20 29,2 
16 - 29yrs .. ... ... .. ............................. ...... .... 2 15,4 11 28,9 13 25,5 
30 + yrs .... .. .... ... .. ........ ............. ............... 3 23,1 7 18,4 10 19,6 
No data ............... ........ , ...... .. .. ... ... ... .. ... .... 2 15,4 • 15,8 8 15,7 
QualtftcaUons 
Matric I Experience .. .... ..... .. .. ..... .. ... ............. 7 53,8 11 28,9 18 35,3 
Diploma /Deg .... ................................ ........ . 3 23,1 15 39,5 18 35,3 
No data .. ............... ....... ..... ....... .......... .. ..... 3 23,1 12 31 ,6 15 29,4 
All cases ......... .......................... .... ....... , .... 13 100,0 38 100,0 51 100.0 
The data suggests that the majority of individuals in both ABEs and non-ABEs who complete tender 
documents have equity positions in the enterprises. The trend is more marked in ABEs with 70%. In 
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almost half of the non-ABE enterprises individuals who are not owners or directors perform this 
function , which must be done properly to obtain work for the enterprise. 
No distinct trend is suggested by the analysis of the years of experience of the individuals performing 
this function . The data suggests that tender documents for most of the ABEs in the sample are 
completed by individuals with no tertiary education. Individuals with tertiary education perform this 
function for at least 40% of the non-ABE sample. 
Table 7.8 presents data obtained on the evaluation of tender technical requirements by enterprises. 
TABLE 7.8: Evaluation of technical requirements 
DESCRIPTION COMPANY STATUS TOTAL 
,BE non-ABE 
Number .. Number .. Number .. 
Setf/owner/diredor/member .................... ...... 4 30.8 11 18,9 15 
Other .............................. ........ .. ................ 7 53.8 24 63.2 31 
No data ... . ........... ... ..... 2 15,4 3 7,9 S 
Yea,. of experience 
0-15yrs .. . ..................... 3 23,1 15 39.5 18 
16-29yrs ....... ............. . ....... . . ...... 3 23.1 10 26,3 13 
30 + yrs ............ ........................ . ...... .. 7,7 4 10,5 5 
No data ......... . ................................... 6 46,2 9 23,7 15 
Qualifications 
Maine I Experience ........... ......... .... 4 30,8 7 18.4 11 
Diploma /Degree .............. .... ...... ... ............ 2 15,4 22 57,9 24 











All c ........ .. .. .. ... ........ ..... .. ... ... .. .. ... .......... 13 100,0 38 100,0 51 100,0 
In contrast to the above, the data suggests that most individuals performing this function are not 
enterprise owners or directors and generally have less, rather than more, experience. The data on 
qualifications for ABEs is inconclusive due to the high rate of void answers, but the non-ABE data 
indicate a general reliance on individuals with tertiary education. The lack of valid data for ABEs 
prevents comparative analysis. The author proposes that this is an aspect of business management 
that is important to the success of enterprises in this market, and that further research be undertaken 
to evaluate the impact on ABEs. 
Table 7.9 presents data on administration of awarded contracts. 
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TABLE 7.9: Administration of awarded contracts 
DESCRIPTION COMPANY STATUS TOTAL 
ABE non-ABE 
Number " Numbo< " Numbo< " Self/owner/directorlmember ... ... ..................... 8 61 ,5 18 47,4 26 51 ,0 
Bookkeeper .... " ... ....... ........ ..... ......... ....... .. • 30.7 1. SO.O 23 45,1 
Nod ... ................ ........ ... .... ............. ... ...... 7,7 1 2,6 2 3,. 
Years of experience 
0 -15yrs ... .•••.• .... .... . .. .•••. ... .• •••• ...• •.......•..• • 5 38,5 18 47,4 23 45,1 
16 -29 yrs ............ .. ......................... .. ....... . 3 23,1 8 21,5 11 21 ,6 
30 + yrs .. .. ... .. .. ... .. .. .. ... ... .. ..... .. .... 3 23,1 6 15,8 9 17,6 
No data ..................... ....... .......... ...... ......... 2 15,4 2 5,3 • 7,8 
Qu.llflcatIons 
Maine I Experience "'" ..... .. . , .. ... ... ... . ... ... .. ..... 8 61 ,5 15 39,5 23 45,1 
Diploma /Degree ......................................... 3 23,1 1. 42,1 1. 37,3 
No data .............................. ........... ... ....... .. 2 15,4 7 18,4 9 17,6 
Allc ................ .... ........................ ........... 13 100,0 38 100,0 51 100.0 
The data suggests that the majority of contracts won by ABEs are administered by enterprise 
proprietors (62%) whilst the function is performed almost equally by proprietors and other individuals 
in non-ABEs. In ABEs these individuals tend not to have tertiary education. No clear trend is evident 
in non-ABEs due to the level of void answers. 
Table 7.10 indicates from the sample that the management of tax and other statutory obligation is 
generally performed by individuals Who are not proprietors. In ABEs the function is more often done 
by financial personnel than in non-ABEs, where other skills are used. 
TABLE 7,10: Tax and statutory obligations 
DESCRIPTION COMPANV STATUS TOTAL 
ABE non-ABE 
Number " Number " Number Self/owner/diredor/members ... .. .................. . 3 23.1 6 15.8 • 
Book keeper/Accountant IAuditorlf ln ............. .. 8 61 .1 1. SO,O 27 
Other ..... .. .. ...................................... ...... .. 0 40.0 11 28,9 11 
No data . .. .. .. ....... ...... ..................... ...... ... .. 3 15.4 2 5,3 4 
v ..... experienc:a 
0-1Syrs .. .. .. ... .. ...... .. ......... . ............ ....... . 8 61.5 20 52,6 28 
16 - 29 yrs ............ ............ .. ...................... . 2 15,4 7 18,4 • 
~.~ ... .............. . ... . .•. .. . ...... ...• .. ... .. .......• 1 7,7 3 7,9 4 










All cases ............... ................ .. ...... ... ...... .. . 13 100.0 38 100.0 51 100,0 
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7.5.5 Access to Finance and credit 
Table 7.11 suggests a general use of qualified individuals to manage company finances. ABEs record 
a greater level of involvement by specialised personnel (75%). The data suggest that there are similar 
levels of experience, with a slight tendency for financial managers of ABEs to have less experience. 
The difference exhibited in the range of more than thirty years experience is not considered to be 
important from a practical business perspective. The data suggest a similar trend in qualifications of 
financial managers to that exhibited for general managers. Whilst both types of enterprises appear to 
rely more on qualified individuals for financial management, ABEs utilize individuals without formal 
tertiary experience to a greater degree than non-ABEs. 
TABLE 7.11: Company fi nances 
DESCRIPTION ABE STATUS TOTAL 
ABE non-ABE 
Number % Number % Number •• 
Self/owner/director/member ........ . 2 15,4 12 31,6 14 27,S 
Book keeper/Accountant /Auditor/Fin ........... . 9 69,2 21 55,3 30 58,. 
Other.. ................................................. . 7,7 5 13,2 11 ,7 
Nodala ............... . 7,7 2,0 
Years of e.penence 2. 
0-15yfS .................... .. .. .. ....................... . 7 53,8 17 44,7 1. 47,1 
16-29yfS ...... ..... . 4 30,7 12 31,6 5 31,4 
3O-yrs ... .. 7,7 • 10,5 • 9,. 
Nodala .................................................... . 7,7 5 13,2 11 ,8 
Qualifications 9 
MalriclE.perience ........... ... ..................... . 3 23,1 • 15,8 35 17,6 
Diploma/Degree ...... .. . • 61 ,5 27 71 ,1 7 68,6 
No ~~ ..................................... .. ....... . . 2 15,4 5 13,2 51 13,7 
All cases .....................................•............. 13 100,0 38 100,0 100,0 
7.5.6 Contract values 
The structured questionnaire obtained data on the value of contracts completed. This data gives an 
indication of the extent to which the enterprises in the sample have been able to manage finance and 
working capital credit in the past. This aspect of investigation was pursued to expand on the findings 
reported in 6.3, which suggest that SMMEs, both ABE and non-ABE, are able to obtain working 
capital for the projects in the research contract value range. Tables 7.12 to 7.17 reveal the extent to 
which contracts have been funded. 
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TABLE 7.12: Highest contract prlcelor public soctor contracts lor ABEs and non-ABEs 
DESCRIPTION COMPANY STATUS 
AVERAGE 
ABE non-ABE 
Area of activity 
General .. ... .. ..... .... ............... .... .. ... ... . .. ... . R3193 000 R 5757000 R 5091 000 
General & Civil .......................................... R1 933000 R 4520000 R 3550 000 
Civil ......................... ........ ............... ........ . R1 300000 R22100 000 R141 33000 
Electrical I Mechanical.. ............................... R 687000 R 1 644000 R 1390 000 
VN,. of estJIbftahment 
less than 10 yrs ........................................ R2108 000 R 4549000 R 2953000 
10 -20yrs ........... ............ .................. ..... R3631 000 R 3815 ()()() R 5035000 
More than 20 yrs ...................................... . 0. R 300 000 R 7411000 R 6671000 
Company structure 
Sole Trader ................................................ R 750 000 R 2 163000 R 2064000 
Single rnernber cc ...................... , ................. R3500000 R 1 200000 R 3717 000 
Multiple member cc ......... '" ... ............ .......... R3 234 000 R 2611000 R 2585000 
pty Ltd ......................................... , ............ R 687000 R 7930000 R 8045000 
No of p8nn11nent employees 
less than 10 persons .............................. .... R2160 000 R 5610000 R 3376000 
10 -2Spersons ....................................... ... R4 237 000 R 2753000 R 3585000 
26 or more persons ..................... ... ... .. ... . ...... R 875000 R 6750 000 R 5915000 
All casH ........ . ... ..• ...... . __ ...... .......... ... ........ R2 564 000 R 5147000 R 4446000 
The data in Table 7.12 highlights a clear distinction between ABEs and non-ABEs regarding highest 
public sector contract prices. The values indicate that non-ABEs have achieved contract values of 
generally twice the value 01 ABEs (approximately R5 150 000 and R2 560 000 respectively). This 
trend is evident for each factor in the bi-variate analysis. In respect of areas of activity, general 
contracts tend to indicate the highest values, with a decreasing value down electrical/mechanical, with 
one exceptional civil contract under non-ABEs (R22 100 000). No discernable trend is found in 
relation to the age of enterprises. No consistent trend between price and company structure, or price 
and size of company is evident. 
Table 7.13 presents data on highest contract values for private sector contracts. A clear value 
differential between ABEs and non-ABEs is less evident, with exception of the non-ABE extreme 
prices. 
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TABLE 7.13: Highest contract price for private sector contracts for ABEs and non-ABEs 
DESCRIPTION COMPANY STATUS 
AVERAGE 
ABE non·ABE 
Area of activity 
General ........ ... .. ... ... .................... ........ R1 250000 R 1 268000 R 1 831 000 
General & Civil ........ ................. .............. - R 92000 R 57000 
Civil .............. ........... ................ R 920000 R38 050 000 R15 537 000 
Electrical I Mechanical.. ........................... ... R 900000 R 2681 000 R 2262000 
Y&ar of establishm&nt 
Less Ihan 10 yrs ..... ..................... .. . ........ R1 184 000 R 354 000 R 1035000 
10 -20yrs ........ ........ ............................. R 733000 R 1 338 000 R 1 860000 
More than 20 yrs ...... . ......... ........... ........ R1500000 R12559000 RIO 271 000 
Company structure 
Sole Trader .................. ........ .......... ... .. .... R 600000 R 1 345000 R 1 112 000 
Single member cc ............ ............ .......... - R 1 100 000 R 2417000 
Multiple member cc .......... ............ ...... . ..... R1 389000 R 348000 R 795000 
Ply Ltd ... ....... ............................ .......... .. R 900 000 R 8923000 R 8061 000 
No of permanent employees 
Less than 10 persons ... .......................... R 300 000 R 20000 R 332000 
10 - 25 pe~ons ....... .......... ......... ...... ..... R1 940000 R 1 428000 R 2036 000 
26 or more persons ..... ... ... .. ........ ..... .. .. R 230000 R 8617 000 R 6326000 
Total .......... ......... ................................ R 909000 R 4653000 R 3 343 000 
The data for ABEs does not suggest any trends related to age of company, company structure or 
number of permanent employees. General contracts have achieved the highest price for ABEs. It is 
noted that the prices achieved are consistently lower than those reported for public sector contracts. 
The data for non-ABEs suggest trends of positive relationships between contract price and the age of 
the enterprise, the complexity of company structure and the size of the company. In each case the 
peak contract price is extremely high when compared with the generally prevaiting prices. The 
extreme value contract prices for non-ABEs are much higher than the highest prices achieved for non-
ABE public sector contracts, whilst the prices are generally lower than for public sector contracts. 
In the structured questionnaire respondents were asked to indicate the range of contract prices that 
they had achieved. The resu lting data are presented in tables 7.14 and 7.15. 
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TABLE 7.14: Average contract price range aa principal contractor for public contracts for 
ABEa and non-ABEs 
DESCRIPTlON COMPANY STATUS 
AVERAGE 
ABO non·ABE 
A .... of activity 
General ...... .... .. .................. ......... ... .. ... .. . R1 605000 R 521-4000 R3 289 000 
General & Civil ......... ........ . ........................ R1 933000 R -4110 000 R3 294 000 
Civil ....... ... ......... ............................ ... ....... R1 300000 RIO 750 000 R7 600 000 
Elecl:rica! I MechanicaL ............................... R 687000 R 1543000 R1 -465000 
VH' of estabUstvnent 
less than 10 yrs ............................... ......... R1 628000 R 1 503000 R1 551000 
10 - 20 yrs ..... . .................... ... . .... .. ... .. .. . R1 948 000 R 6111000 R4 «6 000 
More than 20 yrs .. . .. .... ......... . ... .. . .. . .. .. .. .. .. R 100 000 R 3851000 R3 383 000 
Company structure 
Sole Trader ... .. .... ..... ................ . ... ... ... ...... .. R1200000 R 3025000 R2 -417 000 
Close Corporation .. .......................... ........... RI 782000 R 2 -452 000 R2 165000 
Ply ltd ...................................................... R 687000 R 6558 000 R5905000 
No of pennanent employees 
l ess than 10 persons .......................... ... .... R1 485000 R 1 575000 R1 539000 
10 - 25 persons ...................................... .... R1 997000 R -4050000 R3 195 000 
26 or more persons ................ .. ... .. ... ... .......... R1 175000 R 5107000 R4 059 000 
Total •. , ....... ..... ... ...... ... .... .. ... .. .. .... .. .... .... ... R1 587000 R 3916000 R3 097 000 
TABLE 7.15: Average contract price range as principal contractor for private contracts 
for ABEs and non-ABEs 
DESCRIPTION COMPANY STATUS 
TOTAL 
ABE non-ABE 
Area of activtty 
General ......... ... ... .. ....................... . ... ... ... R 752000 R4 067 000 R2 560 000 
General & Civil ... ........................... ... .. . ... .. . R 350000 R-4 015 000 R3 282 000 
Civil .............. : .......................................... R2 050 000 R2 050 000 
Electrical/ MechanicaL ......................... .. .... R 900 000 R2 023 000 R1 898000 
V •• r of .. tabUstvnent 
l ess than 10 yrs ............................. .. ........ R 900000 R 613000 R 654 000 
10 -20yrs .... ..... .. .... ... ................. ....... .... . R 522000 R3 240 000 R2 269 000 
More than 20 yrs ... .. ..................... ... ...... ... .. R1 500 000 R4 792 000 R4321 000 
Company structure 
Sole Trader .. . ... .. . ... .................. ... .... ..... ...... R 60000 R1 720000 R1 305000 
Close Corporation .. ........................... .. ... . .. .. R 810000 R1 &48 000 R1 369000 
Ply Ud ... .. ... .............................................. R 900000 R4 994 000 R4539000 
No of pennaMnt employees 
l ess than 10 persons ........................ .. ........ R 487000 R 368000 R _06 000 
10 - 25 persons ............................ .. ... ... ....... R 888000 R2 683000 R2 030 000 
26 or more persons ........................... ... ... .... .. R5 075 000 R5 075 000 
Total ..................... .. .. ..... ... ... ...... ... .......... .. R 716000 R2 933 000 R2 379000 
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The data for ABEs does not suggest trends correlating price range to any factor for either public or 
private sector contracts. The non·ABE data suggest similar relationships to those found for maximum 
price, with no clear trend indicated in public sector contracts, and a generally positive relationship for 
private sector contracts. Thus, older, larger limited liability companies appear generally to trade in 
wider contract price ranges than other companies. 
There is a clear differential in the size of the range between ABEs and non·ABEs for both types of 
client. For both types of contractor a narrower trading range is indicated for private contracts than is 
indicated for public contracts in Table 7.14. 
Data was obtained for contracts completed as sub·contractors, to extend the knowledge of the 
operations of enterprises in the sample. The data obtained are presented in Tables 6.44 and 6.45 for 
public and private sectors respectively. 
TABLE 7.16: Average contract price range as sub -contractor for public contracts for ABEs 
and non·ABEs 
DESCRIPTION COMPANY STATUS 
AVERAGE 
.BE non·ABE 
Area of activity 
General ................................................... R1340oo0 R7 425 000 R4 383 000 
General & Civil .... ..................... ............... . R 850000 R 850 000 
Civil ................ ........................................ R 920000 R1 140000 R1 096 000 
Electrical I Mechanical. ........................... .... R 663000 R2 731 000 R2609 000 
V •• r of establishment 
Less than 10 ,B . ............... ..... . ......... ...... R2 960 000 R3 077 000 R3060 000 
26 - 20 yrs ... ...... .. ..... ... ... ....... .. . ..... . .... R 241 000 R1 507000 R1 127000 
More than 20 yrs .... .. .. .. ... ......... ......... .. R 300000 R4 557 000 R4 025 000 
Company structure 
Sole Trader ....... .. ... ..•••..•.......................... R 60000 R 803000 R 618000 
Close Corporation ....................................... R1 555000 R 846000 R1 064 000 
Pty Ltd .... .. ....... ... ...................................... R 663000 R4 954 000 R4668 000 
No of pennanent employees 
Less than 10 persons .......... .... ..... ... . ...... R 60000 R4 940 000 R4 127000 
10-25 persons ... ...... .... ..... ..... ... ... .. ...... ... R1 '91 000 R1 092000 R1215OO0 
26 or more persons .............. .................. .. R 920000 R3 737 000 R3 520 000 
Total ............. ... .. ...................... ...... .. .. ....... R1 157000 R3 053 000 R2 697 000 
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TABLE 7.17: Average contract price range as 8utH::ontractor for private contracts for ABEs 
and non ABEs -
DESCRIPTION COMPANY STATUS 
ABE noo·A8E AVERAGE 
A .... of activity 
General ..... .. .. ..... .... .... ... . .. ... .. ... .. .. ... . ... .. . R369000 R3 650 000 R1 681 000 
General & Civil .......................................... - R 600 000 R 600 000 
Civil ....•.................................................... - Rl 031 000 Rl 031 000 
Electrical I Mechanical ................................. R100 000 R3 698 000 R3473 000 
Vear of establishment 
less than 10 yrs ... .... ... ....... ............ .. ...... ... R2 507 000 R2 507 000 
10 - 20yrs ......................... ........ .... .... ... .. R302 000 Rl 597000 Rl 209000 
More than 20 yrs .......... ....... ..... ... .... ........ ... R300 000 R5408000 R4 679 000 
Company structure 
Sole Trader ................. ... ............ .... ......... .. R 6000 R 253 000 R 170000 
Close Corporation ... ... ....... ............ ............ .. R550000 R8 311 000 R 775000 
P1y Ud ............ .. .. ...... ............. ......... ..... ..... R100000 R4 734 000 R4 403 000 
No of p8nnanent employ ... 
less than 10 persons .. ... .. ................. .. . ... .... - R 845000 R 677 000 
10 - 25 persons .. ... ... ...... ....................... .... .. R 6000 R 652000 R 729000 
26 or more persons ....................................... R400 000 R5318000 R5 318 000 
Total •..••.•.... ....•. ...... ..•....... •.• .... ••• ..... ...•.••• • R301 000 R2 987 000 R2 589 000 
The restricted volume of data obtained has not indicated clear data trends for either type of contractor 
in sub-contracts for the two client types. The data suggests that sub-contracts in the public sector 
have achieved greater price ranges than in the private sector, although the extent of the range 
difference is less marked for non-ABEs. ABEs have achieved a markedly narrower range of contract 
prices than non-ABEs tor both client types. Over half of the non-ABEs ranges are over R2 million, 
whilst only one factor reflects this range for ABEs. , 
7.5.7 Guarantees 
Table 7.18 indicates that for the majority of enterprises in the sample, an owner or director is 
responsible for securing contract guarantees for ABEs: at least 77% of enterprises operate in this 
manner. The data for non-ABEs is less conclusive but indicates a majority (53%), with a void answer 
level of 26%. 
TABLE 7.18: Who secures guarantees 
DESCRIPTION COMPANY STATUS TOTAL 
ABE non·ABE 
Number " Number " Number 
Self/owner/director/member ......... ....... ...... ..... 10 76,9 20 52.6 30 
Other ...... ... .. ..... ... ... .. ... .... ... .... . .. ... ... .. .. ...... 2 15,4 e 21 .1 10 






7.5.8 Access to Plant and Equipment 
Through the structured questionnaire the author sought to obtain information on the use of plant and 
equipment by contractors, seeking to identify any statistical relationsh ips to participation in particular 
sub-sectors. The level of data return was sufficient for bi-variate analysis of differences between the 
types of contractor. Data for the type of office was also obtained in an attempt to characterize the 
permanence of company administration. Data obtained in sufficient quantity is presented in Table 
7.19 and 7.20 
TABLE 7.19: Pennanent Office 
DESCRIPTION 
Yes. 
No ... .............. . 
No data ...................... .. 














" Number " 
63.2 3. 70,6 
6,3 3 6,9 
39,5 12 23,5 
100,0 " 100,0 
From the data it is suggested that very few of the enterprises in the sample do not have permanent 
offices. The author's expectation prior to the research was that the requirements for proper tendering 
would result in all enterprises using permanent offices. There do not appear to be differences 
between ABEs and non-ABEs in this respect. 
Qualifying information on the type of office was also requested . Data was not returned with sufficient 
consistency to enable bi-variate analysis. Of the 24 responses that described the type of office, 21 % 
were in a part of a reSidential property, 38% were in rented offices, and 42% owned their office 
premises. 
Table 7.20 indicates ownership of vehicles and plant. 
TABLE 7.20: Vehicles and Plant 
DESCRIPTION COMPANY STATUS 
yes ........................................................... . 
No .......................... ... . ..... . .. . .. 
No data ........... ...... . .... .... ...... .. 
















" Number " 
94,7 48 94,1 
2,. 2,0 
2,8 2 3,8 
100,0 " 100,0 
Only one enterprise in the sample stated that it did not own any vehicle or plant. 
7.5.9 CapltallsatJon Requirements 
The author sought to identify any factors relating to capitalizatkln requirements for participation in the 
sub-sectors. The data obtained in respect of the value of vehicles and plant owned is presented in 
Table 7.21 . 
TABLE 7.21: Average value of vehicles and plant 
DESCRIPTION VALUE OF VEHICLES' PLANT 
AVERAGE 
ABE non-ARE 
Area of activity 
General ........ .. .................... .. .. ... .... .. . .. .. . R105 000 R 765000 R .0452000 
General & Civil ........ ... ............ ................... Rl03000 R2676000 R1 940000 
CMt .... ... ......... ..... ....... ....... .... ....... ........... R550000 R4 450 000 R3150000 
Eledricall MechanicaL ......... .. .. ... . ......... ... R 6 000 Ri 413000 R1 325000 
Year of establishment 
Less than 10 yrs ........ .. ......... .. . ... .. . ... ... ...... R203 000 R1 387000 R1 091000 
10 -20 yrs .......................... ................ .... R 94000 R2 545 000 Ri 626000 
More than 20 yrs ............ ....... .. .. ... ..... ... ...... R 848000 R 847000 
Company structure 
Sole Trader ........ ...... ... .... .... .. .......... ........ ... R 80000 R 888000 R 618000 
Close Corporation .. .... ... ........ ... ...... ............. R166 000 R 526000 R 395000 
Ply Ltd .............. ..... ................................... R 6000 R2 985 000 R2 772 DOO 
No of penn8nent employees 
Less than 10 persons ....... ....... .... ...... .......... R 63000 R 201000 R 151 000 
10 - 25 persons ................. .... ... ......... ...... .... R138 000 R 605000 R 472 000 
26 or more persons ..... .. ....... ....... ........ ... ....... .R230 000 RJ 018 000 R2 526 000 
Total ..• " ...•... ...••...•....••....••• _ ............. .. ....... Rl36 000 R1 603000 R1 219000 
The data for both ABE and non-ABE enterprises indicates that those active in civil contracts own the 
highest value of vehicles and plant. For non-ABEs, the second highest average value is indicated for 
the general and civil sub-sector. The low relative average capitalization for non-ABEs in general 
contracts supports the authors contention that participatkln in civil contracts requires the highest level 
of capitalization of enterprises. 
All of the data indicate that non-ABE enterprises are capitalized to a substantially higher level than 
ABEs across all sub-sectors and for all variables. 
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The data does not suggest any relationship between the age of enterprises or their company structure 
and the level of capitalization. The data for both ABEs and non-ABEs does suggest a positive 
relationship between the size of the company and the level of capitalization. 
A relationship between increasing investment and the number of employees is indicated for both 
ABEs and non-ABEs. The level of investment is much lower for ABEs, and their reported range of 
investment is smaller. It is seen above that contract prices achieved by ABEs are lower that for non-
ABEs. This suggests that a relationship between size of contract and use of labour may exist, and 
that ABEs may hire plant rather that own plant. 
7.5.1 0 Established relationships with sub-contractors and suppl iers. 
The data obtained from the structured questionnaire indicated that 86% (N=44) of enterprises 
regularly use particular sub-contractors, and that 92% (N=47) have suppliers that they generally use. 
Table 7.22 indicates patterns of negotiations of supply prices. 
TABLE 7.22: Negotiation of supply prices 
DESCRIPTION 
Selffownerfdirectorfmember .................. ........ . 
Other ....... . 
No data ...•.......... .... ............. 
Vear of experience 
0-15yrs .. ......... ...................................... . 
16 - 29 yrs .......... ....................................... . 
3O -yrs ... .. ... ... . ................................. . 
NO data .......... .. ... .................................. . 
Quallflcations 
MatriclExpenence ..................................... . 
Diplorna/Degree ........ ................ . . . 
Nodala 








































































The data suggest that for the majority of both ABE and non-ABE enterprises equity owners are 
directly involved in negotiation of contract supply prices. A negative relationship to the individual's 
years of experience is suggested by the data, for both types of contractor. 
Table 7.23 presents data on contract costing and pricing. 
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TABLE 7.23: Contract costing and pricing 
DESCRIPTION COMPANY STATUS TOTAL 
ABE non·ABE 
N..n ... % Number '" Number '" Self/ownerlMO ................................. ..... ..... . 8 61 ,5 25 65,8 33 64,7 
Other ..... .. .... ........... ........ ......................... .. 3 23,1 13 34,2 16 31 ,4 
No data ........ ..................... ...................... .. 2 15,4 2 3,6 
VHr of .xpertence 
0- 15yrs ......................................... .. ....... . 5 38,5 11 28,9 16 31 ,4 
16 - 29 yrs ....................... .. ........................ . 3 23,1 11 28,9 1. 27,5 
3O-yrs ................................................... .. 3 23,1 10 26,3 13 25,5 
No data ................................................... .. 2 15,4 6 15,8 6 15,7 
QU811f1C11tiOns 
MatrlclExperienoo ....................................... . 7 53,8 13 34,2 20 39.2 
Diplotna/Oegree ......................................... . • 30,6 17 44,7 21 4' .2 
No data ........................ ..... ...................... .. 2 15,4 8 21,1 10 19,6 
All ca ... ... ......... ..... .. .... .... .. .... .... ... ...... .... . 13 100,0 38 100,0 51 100,0 
The trend of equity individuals dominating this activity is indicated, at a higher level than for 
negotiation as indicated in Table 7.22. No relationships are suggested for years of experience. ABE 
data indicates that most participants in these activities do not have tertiary education (54%). 
7.5.11 Steady availability of projects 
The general trend which is apparent from the data reported in Table 7.24 is that non-ABEs 
consistently reflect higher average volumes of work than ABEs. The average number of contracts 
completed by non-ABEs is generally in the range of 5 times that of ABEs, across most of the variables 
measured. 
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TABLE 7.24: Average number of completed cont racts In 1998 for ABEs and non-ABEs 
DESCRIPTION 
Area of activity 
General ............ .. ....... ..... ............ . .... .. 
General & Civil . .. ................... ............... .. .. 
Civil ......... ...... .............................. . . 
Electrical I MechanicaL ......................... . 
Vear of establishment 
Less than 10 yrs ...... ........................... ... .. . 
10 -20yrs 
More than 20 yrs. 
Company structure 
Sole Trader ......... .. 
Close Corporation ............................... . . 
Pty Ltd .... ........... .. .. .. .. ........................ ... . 
No of pennanent employees 
Less than 10 persons ... ............ .. 
10 - 25 persons .... .. 
26 or more persons ..... ...... .. .. . .. ....... ... . 













• . 5 
13,4 































The level of activity for ABEs is markedly lower than for non-ABEs across all contract types. Greater 
level of participation by ABEs in general, and general and civil contracts is not based on higher 
numbers of contracts being completed. The first three types of contract see ABEs at less than 20% of 
the volume of non-ABEs, whilst electricaUmechanical are at about 32%. 
The ABEs company age correlation to the number of completed contracts appears to be positive, 
suggesting that older enterprises tend to manage higher volumes of work. For non-ABEs no direct 
relationship is observed, with higher numbers of contracts completed by companies of less than 10 
years standing and greater than 20 years standing. 
The ABE company structure appears to correlate positively with the number of contracts completed, 
suggesting a relationship between the complexity of the enterprise structure and volumes of work 
completed. 
Non-ABE companies also appear to exhibit a positive relationship away from Sole Trader type of 
structure, although the difference between Close Corporations and limited liability companies (Pty Ud) 
is not as strong as appears to be the case for ABE companies. 
ABE data indicates that company size of 10 - 25 permanent employees reflects the highest number 
of completed of contracts. 
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The data for non-ABE companies suggest a positive correlation with size with the most noticeable 
jump above 25 persons. This trend suggests that there may be practical relationships between the 
size of a company and the number of contracts that it can expect to successfully complete. 
Table 7.25 presents data for public sector contracts. 
TABLE 7.25: Average number of completed public contracts as principals for ABEs and 
non-ABEs 
DESCRIPTION 
Area of activity 
General . 
General & Civil ..... . 
Civil ........................................................ . 
Eledrical J Mechanical .... 
Ve.r of establishment 
Less than 10 yrs ..... .. . . 
10-20yrs ............ . 
More than 20 yrs .... . 
Company structure 
Sole Trader ........ . .......... ..................... .. .. .. . 
Close Corpora1ion ... .. .................. .. .. ... ....... . 
Ply Ltd .................................................. . .. . 
No of p8nnanent employees 
Less than 10 persons ... ... .. ... ... .. . ...... . ... ..... . . 
10 - 25 persons .......................................... . 
26 or more persons .. .. ... ............................... . 
Total ....•.... ..•... .... •••. ....•••. .. ••. .... .••. .... •••. ..... 
It appears in general that ABE levels of participation are moving closer to those of non-ABE 
companies, although they are generally still well below 50% of the levels of activity of non-ABEs. 
The exception for ABE contracts is the electrical/mechanical subsector, where significanUy better 
performance (N=1) is suggested. It is, however, still below the average for the type of contract relative 
to non-ABE companies. 
Non-ABE levels of activity vary across a narrow range of average number of contracts from 13,8 to 
15,4. This range of 1,6 oontrasts with the range of 7 (3 to 10) for ABEs. 
No positive relationship to company age is exhibited for either ABEs or non-ABEs. The age range 10 
to 20 years has generated the highest number of average contracts for ABEs, whilst 20+ reflects the 
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highest number of contracts for non-ABEs. ABEs exhibit a positive relationship between the number 
of contracts and the complexity of company structure. 
Non-ABEs have equivalent volumes exhibited by Sole Traders and Close Corporations, and a much 
higher volume of work completed by limited liability companies. 
ABEs exhibit again a higher volume of work achieved by companies of ten to twenty-five employees 
in size. 
Non-ABEs exhibit a more positive relationship between number of contracts completed and the size 
of the company. 
Table 7.26 presents data for private sector contracts 
TABLE 7.26: Average number of completed private contracts for ABEs and non.ABEs 
DESCRIPTION 
Area of activity 
General 
General & Civil 
Civil . 
Electrical I Mechanical.. 
Year of establishment 
Less than 10 yrs .......................... . 
10-Z0yrs 
More than 20 YfS ... .... ........ . . . . . 
Company structure 
Sole Trader 
C lose Corporation .. 
Ply lid 
No of pennanent employees 
Less than 10 persons .. 
10 - 25 persons ....... .. . .. .. ..... .... . 
26 or more persons .................... ................. . 











2,0 9 ,6 




2,5 44 ,7 
4,6 30,9 
TOTAL 
ABE levels of activity are almost the same as for public sector contracts, and the author therefore 
concludes that approximately 50% of ABE contracts are generated from public sources and 50% from 
private sources across all contract types. 
Non-ABEs exhibit higher levels of activity in all of the sub-sectors except civil. In general and civil 
contracts activity is higher than in the public sector with public activity accounting for approximately 
















in the public and half their work in the private sector. For electrical mechanical contracts, the private 
sector appears to generate 75% of contract activity. 
ABE data suggest positive correlation to age of company, with the companies of 20 years + having 
significantly higher average number of contracts. 
Non-ABE data appears to exhibit a negative relationship in the private sector, with the companies 
established for less than 10 recording greater contract completion rates than the older companies. 
ABEs reflect a positive relationship between the number of completed contracts and complexity of 
company structure. 
Non-ABE data indicate that highest level of activity are achieved by Close Corporations, with no 
apparent general relationships to complexity of structure. 
Non-ABE data again suggest a positive relationship to levels of activity with companies with less than 
10 employees having 38% of the volume of companies with 26 + persons. 
7.5.12 Compliance with Statutory Requirements 
Tables 7.27 to 7.29 present data obtained from the structured questionnaire on the administration of 
compliance with statutory requirements. Insufficient data was obtained to perform an analysis on the 
variables across the SUb-sectors. 
TABLE 7.27: Who admlnlstel$ health and lafety regulations. 
DESCRIPTION ABE STATUS TOTAL 
ABE non-ABE 
Number % Number % Number 
ONner/directors .. ..... . ... ... .. 1 7.7 13 34.2 1. 
Foreman ......... . 8 661,5 8 21,1 16 
Other ............. ..... .. 3 23,1 
" 
36.8 17 
No data ... ........... ......................... . 7.7 3 7 ,. • 
Vear of experience 
0-15yrs ............. ....... ............................ .. 6 46,1 20 52,6 26 
16 - 29 yrs .......................... . ..... .... .. 3 23,1 8 21 ,1 11 
~-~ .. ... . .... .......................................... . 1 7,7 3 7 .• • 
No data ... ... .............................................. . 3 23,1 7 18,4 10 
Quallflcatlons 
MatriclExperience ..... ................................. . 7 53,8 22 57,9 2. 
Diploma/Degree .. .. ...... .. .. .. .. ........ . ...... .... .. . 3 23,1 7 18,4 10 













All casee ..... ... ...... ......... ......... ....... ........ .. . . 13 100,0 38 100,0 51 100,0 
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TABLE 7.28: Who administers labour relations 
DESCRIPTION ABE STATUS TOTAL 
ABE non·ABE 
Num ber % Number % Number % 
OWnerfdiredor .............. ............. . ... ..... 2 15,4 11 28,9 13 25,5 
Foreman _. _- ................ .. _. 7 53,8 10 26,3 17 33,3 
Other .. _ .. ................. .. . .. ... ... .. ... -.. -.. 3 23,1 14 36,8 17 33,3 
No data ..... .......... .................... ..... 1 7,7 3 7,9 4 7,8 
Year of experience 
0-15yrs._ ..... ... ..... ............... .... ..... ... 5 38,5 16 48.6 23 45,1 
16-29yrs ................................. 4 30,8 9 24,3 13 25.5 
30 - yrs ........................ 1 7,7 3 7,9 4 7,6 
No data .... ....... .............. ..................... .. ... 3 23,1 6 21.5 11 21,6 
Qualifications 
Matric/Experience .. ............. ... . .. ... ...... ..... 6 61,5 19 50,0 27 52.3 
Diploma/Degree .. . -.... ... .... ...... 2 15,4 10 26,3 12 23,5 
No data . 3 23,1 9 23,7 12 23,5 
All cases . ........ , .............................. , .......... 13 100,0 36 100,0 51 100.0 
TABLE 7.29: Who administers other statutory requirements 
DESCRIPTION ABE STATUS TOTAL 
ABE non-ABE 
Number % Number % Number % 
Owner/director ...... 2 15,4 11 28,9 13 25,5 
Foreman ...... ................................ ............. 7 53,8 10 26,3 17 33,3 
Other 3 23,1 11 28,9 14 27,5 
No data ............. .... . .. ............ 7,7 6 15,8 7 13,7 
Year of experience 
0-15yrs .. ..... .. .. .... ... ... .. . 5 38,5 12 31,6 17 33,3 
16 - 29 yrs ...... . 5 38,5 10 26,3 15 29,4 
30 - yrs 7,7 3 7,9 4 7,6 
No data ... _ 2 15.4 13 34,2 15 229,4 
Qualifications 
Matric/Experience. 6 61,5 11 28,9 19 37 ,3 
OiplomalDegree 3 23,1 13 34,2 16 31.4 
No data .... ...... ..... .. . ............. 2 15,4 14 36,8 16 31,4 
All cases ... .......... ......... .... ..... ..... ... ... ......... 13 100,0 36 100,0 51 100,0 
Some general trends are suggested by the data in the tables. ABEs tend to rely predominately on 
foremen to perform or administer these functions. The majority of people doing this for ABEs have a 
matriculation certificate or have training-by-experience. 
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Non-ABEs rely less on foreman, and more on enterprise owners/directors to perform these functions. 
The high level of void answers for the qualifications of the individuals precludes analysis of the data. 
The author deduces from the educational trends indicated earlier that most individuals will have a 
tertiary qualification 
7.5.13 Own Perceptions of Thresholds 
Each participant in the research was asked whether they intended to work on larger projects and 
whether they had plans to expand (grow) their business. In the interview these questions were related 
to a growth threshold of 2,5 times the highest contracts value achieved by the contractor. Table 7.30 
reflects the sub-sector average threshold values calculated on this basis. 
TABLE 7.30: Threshold value for ABEs and Non-ABEs 
DE$CRIPnON ABE STATUS 
TOTAL 
ABE non-ABE 
Area of activity 
General ... ....... .. . ........ .. ...... .. .. .. . .. .. .. .... R6 642 000 R10 958 000 R 9989000 
General & Civil .. . .. .. ..... ............. ... .......... R4 833 000 R10 725 000 R8516000 
Civil ..... . ............... ........ ........ . . ... .. ....... .. R3 250 000 R45 250 000 R34 686 000 
Electrical I MechanicaL ................................ R2 250000 R10 247 000 R 8644000 
The responses are presented in Table 7.31 . 
TABLE 7.31 : Future business plans for ABEs and Non-ABEs 
COMPANY STATUS ABE STATUS TOTAL 
ABE non-ABE 
Number % Number % Number % 
Want to work on larger projects? 
yes ............ .. .. .. .. .. .. ...... .. ....... .. ... ............ 11 .... 6 37 97,4 46 94.1 
No ......................................................... .. 1 7.7 1 2.6 2 3 .• 
No data .. ... . ........ ... .. . ........ . ....... . ...... .... . .. 1 7.7 1 2.0 
Have a plan to grow own business? 
yes ....... ....... ... ... .. .. .. ... .. .... ....................... 6 61 ,5 2. 76,3 37 72,6 
No . ......... . ... ... ............... ...... ..................... 2 15,4 7 18,4 • 17,6 
No data ... ................................................... 3 23,1 2 15,4 5 9.6 
Only one ABE and one non-ABE respondent indicated that they did not wish to work on larger 
projects. Across the full sample approximately 95% of enterprises wish to secure contracts in the price 
ranges indicated in Table 7.30. A lower level of planning for growth is indicated for all enterprises in 
the sample in Table 7.31. at 73%. Of all the enterprises 18% have indicated that they have not 
planned for growth. Most respondents indicated in the structured questionnaire that they would secure 
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guarantees for the higher contract values through provision of surety-ship and extension of present 
arrangements with a financial institution. 
Table 7.32 records the experience of contractors in tendering in other sectors. 
TABLE 7,32: Inter-sector tendering 
COMPANY STATUS 
Other contracts tendered- General 
yes ................................................. .. 
No ....... . .......... .......................... . 
Other contracts tendered- Building 
Yes .. 
No ................. . 
Other contracts tendered- Civil 
Yes .. 
No .................................................. . 




















% Number % 
6,7 2 12,5 
93,3 1. 87 ,5 
28,6 6 6 
71,4 10 10 
50,0 15 15 
50,0 9 9 
75,0 16 16 
25,0 • • 
The data obtained from the research suggests the lowest propensity of contractors active in general 
contracts to tender in other sectors and the very limited number of contractors in the 
electrical/mechanical sector who have tendered in other sectors. This relationship is suggested by the 
data for both ABEs and non-ABEs, where the author makes the reasonable assumption that void 
answers to a question of this nature indicate a negative answer. 
Table 7.33 presents the reasons given by respondents for not tendering in other sub-sectors. 
Respondents ranked the responses from first to fifth . The reasons are presented in terms of rank 
order for the full sample within each grouping. 
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TABLE 7.33: Perceived barriers for ABEs and Non-ABEs 
DESCRIPTION 
Reason 1 for not tendering 
Contract falls outside core business ............... . 
lack of skills ............................................... . 
Nol much worK available in area .................... . 
Cashflow problems ..................................... .. 
Canl hire people unable to supervise ........... . 
Non~BE status ............ ... ...... ... .. ... . ... .. ... . .. . 
limited overdraft facility ............................... . 
SpeCialists in our field ............................... .. 
Always had enough jobs to do ........... ........ .. 
Reason 2 for not tendering 
Risky to cost unknown projects .................... .. 
Rather stick to what I know ....................... .. 
Company not interested .. ... ....... .... . ... .. . .. .. .. 
Tried did not cope .... .............................. .. 
Has nol considered it .. .. .. ............... .. ........ . 
lack of equipment.. ................................... . 
Reason 3 for not tendering 
Hands-on approach ................................ .. 
lack of skills ........................................ .. 
Risk of work with unknown people ................ .. 
lack of equipment ................ .. .... .... .. ........ . 
Reason. for not tendering 
lack of skills .. ...... .... .. ......... .... .. .. .. .... ...... . 
lose money ............................................. . 
lack of interest.. .... ....... ........ ..................... . 
Falls outside company activities .. .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. 
Reason 5 for not tendering 
lack of skills .......... .. ...... ........ .. .... .......... .. 
lack of interest .. .. .. ........................ ....... .. .. 

































































































































A greater range of responses is presented by non-ABEs. The general trend of highest ranked reasons 
is for companies to remain within core knowledge and skills and to avoid the risks of entering 
unfamiliar sectors. 
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7,6 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
7.6.1 Introduction 
The different construction sub·sectors are characterised by different statutory requirements pertaining 
to safety and different mixes of plant and equipment, labour and materials. The Department of Public 
Works (1999) in a recent publication suggests that the labour : plant and equipment : material ratios 
for selected construction activities are as follows : 
• Surfaced roads 11 : 64 : 25 
• Gravel road 15 : 66 : 19 
• Bridges 20 : 10 : 70 
• Sewer and water reticulations 18 : 19 : 63 
• Electrical reticulations 15 : 7 : 78 
• Buildings 35 : 5 : 60 
For the purposes of the research entry level thresholds are defined in 7.3.1 as: 
" those business factors w hich, w hen combined, create the criteria for participation in a sub-
sector, wh ich an enterprise must have the capacity to satisfy in order to successfu lly tender 
and operate", 
Research on supply side constraints was conducted into the role of sub-sector Associations in 
creating entry thresholds to a sub-sector, and into business practices and decisions in companies that 
determine the sector in which they operate. 
7.6.2 Sector partic ipation 
Table 7.3 indicates a tendency amongst ABEs to be concentrated in general contracts, at a level of 
61 ,7% of the ABE sample. The next highest level of participation is in the general and civil sector, 
where 23,7% participation is indicated. W hen these two sectors are combined, a participation of 
85,2% is indicated. A more even spread of participation is indicated for non-ABEs, where a 
concentration of 47% of contractors is recorded in the etectricaUmechanicat sub-sector. 
The application of the >f test to the data indicates a statistica l significance (P = 0.022) in the observed 
tendency of ABEs to remain in the general sub-sector. The results for the analysis of ABE status by 
sub-sector of activity are: 
x' value : 5,262 
Degrees of Freedom: 1 
Significance: 0, 0218 
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Where the level of significance is selected at p<O,05, as for the statistical analysis in chapter 6, the 
apparent concentration is found to be statistically significant 
7,6,3 Reasons for ABE concentration In Gene ... 1 Contracts 
The data was examined to identify any reasons that suggest why ABEs tend to be concentrated in 
general contracts. The author examined the association between various responsibilities in the 
enterprise and whether or not the enterprise is general or not. The results of the >f test for ABEs is 
presented in Table 7.34. 
TABLE 7.34: Results of >ftest on the relationship between responsibilities and sub-sector of 
activity lor ABEo. 
Responsibility & 
X'wlue DF P-val ..... 
Experience & Qualification 
Manllgement 
General management 1,311 , 0,252 
Financial responsibility 2,357 , 0,793 
Tax and statutory obligations 0,020 , 0,124 
Tender documents 0,020 , 0,886 
EValuation of technical requirements 0,010 , 0,921 
Costing of prices 0,016 , 0,898 
Administration of awarded contracts 2,743 , 0,097 
Health and safety 1,527 , 0,216 
expe-.. 
Years of management experience 0,143 , 0,735 
Years of financial experience 0,343 , 0,558 
QuallftcaUon 
Management qualification 0,343 , 0,558 
Financial qualifICation 2,357 , 0,124 
The results of application of the >f test are shown for these factors for which sufficient data was 
available to populate all cells. 
The data indicates no statistical Significant associations with the sub-sector in which ABEs operate. 
The application of the >f test to data for nan-ABEs in the same manner as above did not indicate any 
statistically significant associations. 
These results support the observations regarding specialised tasks and perceptions of thresholds. For 
the former, the bi-variate analysis suggests that ABE enterprise owners! directors appears to pelform 
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more tasks in estimating, tendering and contract administration and that fewer ABE owners have 
tertiary qualifications than non-ABE owners. The analysis of activity in other sub-sectors suggests that 
general contractors are least likely, on past record, to seek contracts in other SUb-sector. 
7.6.4 Volumes of work 
Tables 7.24 to 7.26 indicate that ABEs experience less consistent rates of work with lower volumes 
than non-ABEs. ABEs generally achieved higher numbers of contracts in the general sub-sector. 
The author tested for significance in the differences in the number of contracts completed during 1998 
by ABEs and non-ABEs and sought to identify any factors that can account for any differences found. 
None of the factors for either ABEs or non-ABEs that were entered into the regression model show a 
statistically Significant association with the number of contracts completed in 1998. 
For ABEs none of the factors in the model shows a statistically significant association with the number 
of contracts completed as the principal contractor for public sector contracts. 
For non-ABEs a significant relationship between the number of public sector contracts completed as 
principal contractor and both year of establishment and experience in financial management is found. 
The results are presented in Table 7.35. 
TABLE 7.35: Results of regression model to test the associations for number of public 
contracts completed as principal contractor. 
Sum of Significance 
Squ.,... OF F of F 
Year of establishment 1 049,796 1 11 ,321 a,D08 
Financial management experience 977,467 1 10,541 0,010 
The data indicate a correlation for non-ABEs between increasing age of a company and the number 
of public contracts completed as principal contractor. A positive relationship is also observed between 
experience of financial managers and the number cam pleted contracts. 
No significant association was indicated for the number of completed private contracts completed as 
principal contractors by ABEs or non-ABE. 
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7.6.S The role of sub-aector Associations on the establishment of thresholds 
The author does not interpret the membership requirements of BIFSA, SAFCEC, NABCAT and ECA 
to be barriers to participation in any of these sub-sectors. Where employing agencies may require 
membership as a tender requirement, then such membership will become an entry threshold or 
barrier in the short term. The Department, however, does not require that tenderers are members of 
these organisations for purposes of qualification for public tenders. 
A distinction must be made between membership of a general sector or sub-sector organisation and 
compliance with statutory requirements. Different standards are applied in practice between the 
different sub-sectors. The author concludes from the research that general and civil sub-sectors 
appear to have looser compliance management than the electrical sub-sector, and that compliance 
does not represent a firm entry threshold. 
The research into business practices clearly indicated that labour and safety requirements are not 
uniformly met by contractors in that research sample. The research indicated also that compliance is 
not uniformly reviewed by project managers and principal agents. Generally low levels of knowledge 
of these aspects were found. The author found that neither BIFSA, SAFCEC nor NABCAT are active 
in ensuring compliance with statutory requirements by members. ECA does monitor the enforcement 
of certain statutory requirements by members. The author concludes that heightened monitoring and 
enforcement of labour and safety regulations in the electrical sub-sector differentiates it from the 
general and civil sub-sectors and imposes a more onerous threshold. The capacity of an enterprise 
to comply or not comply will determine its ability to satiSfy those participation criteria. 
In the interviews with each organisation a distinction was made between the technical requirements 
for participation and managerial and business requirements. Both BIFSA and SAFCEC have business 
management components in their certified training programmes. At the time of the interviews ECA 
was preparing similar training programmes for submiSSion for accreditation. NABCAT is not directly 
involved in training but strongly motivated the need for entrepreneurial contractors. 
The author concludes that membership of these sub-sector organisations does not constitute a barrier 
to entry and does not appear to constitute a barrier to horizontal movement between sub-sectors. 
None of the aSSOCiations themselves operate actively or passively to create restrictive entry 
thresholds. The author acknowledges the weighting given in the interviews to the non-technical 
business management factors. The interviewers did not identify these as barriers to entry, but did 
recognise that failure by contractors in these aspects would lead to failure of an enterprise itself. 
The author also notes that most of the representatives also identified managerial and business 
components as being important participation thresholds. They are broadly identified as determinants 
of the viability of an enterprise. which impact on the capacity of companies to enter a sub-sector 
competitively and survive and grow in it. 
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7.6.6 Structured sub-sector threshold research 
Through this research the author sought to test the propensity of contractors to enter another sub-
sector through an understanding of business decisions taken. The sample size achieved in the 
research was not of sufficient size to provide adequate data across all variables. The author 
recommends that the Department conduct rea l time research on all awarded tenders through the 
structured questionnaire. 
On the basis of the data analysed, the author found that the following areas do not constitute 
obstacles to participation in a subsector: 
• basic enterprise characterisation; 
• personal experience in the sub-sector; 
• specialised techn ical expertise and work processes; 
• access to finance and credit; 
• guarantees; 
• access to plant and equipment: 
• capitalisation requirements; 
• established relationships with sub-contractors and lor suppliers; 
• steady availability of projects: 
• compliance with statutory requirements; and 
• own perceptions of thresholds. 
The research suggests that the most important variables in the concentration of ABEs in general 
contracts are managerial. ABE owners tend to delegate tasks in a different manner to non-ABE 
owners. They tend to perform most technical aspects of contract acquisition and management 
themselves, which is in contrast to owners of non-ABEs. It is observed that ABE owners are more 
likely to rely on matriculation education and work experience as the foundation of their management. 
The author concludes that by concentrating key tasks under owners, and not delegating them to 
professionally and technically qualified individuals ABEs establish operational limitations that have 
more influence on their activities than sub-sector thresholds. 
Masiyiwa (1994) makes the observation that there was no black construction industry in Zimbabwe to 
speak of when independence was attained in 1980; the activities of black contractors accounted for 
less than 1% in terms of monetary value of the construction work available. This situation remained 
unchanged for nearly 10 years and then in 1994 rose to 10% of the available work by volume. 
Masiyiwa attributed this to : 
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1. The change of government economic thinking which led to a restructuring of the national 
economy. 
2. The emergence of experienced black construction professionals through the programme 
known as ~Presidential Civil Service", the objective of which was to correct the imbalances in 
the civil service and parastatals in terms of employment. (The spinoff to this programme was 
that by 1988 there was a steady stream of experienced black professionals into the industry 
who had been exposed to meaningful management activities). 
3. The conversion of the Emergent Building Contractors Association of Zimbabwe into the 
Zimbabwe Building Contractor's AsSOCiation, an organisation which began to address factors 
such as the capacity enhancement of black contractors. 
4. The World Bank Study on the Zimbabwe Construction Industry which exposed the 
characteristics of the industry regarding racism, cartels and unfair trade practice and provided 
the impetus to develop an effective Affirmative Action Programme which incorporated fixed 
subcontracting quotas and direct preferences in favour of black contractors and capacity 
building programmes. 
The catalyst to growth of the black construction industry in Zimbabwe was the emergence of 
experienced black professionals who had been exposed to meaningful management activities. They 
were needed to take advantage of the opportunities presented through governments procurement 
policies. The author asserts that the research supports the Zimbabwe experience. 
The author concludes that the growth in the number of professionally qualified persons with suitable 
management exposure in the electrical, mechanical and civil sub~sectors is necessary to increase 
ABE participation in these sub~sectors. Supply side measures should accordingly focus on the 
development of such professionals and their exposure to management and business practices. 
7.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The research into construction sub-sector thresholds supports the hypotheSiS namely: 
"Affinnable Business Enterprises participation varies according to different construction sub~ 
sector entry level thresholds." 
The full enablement of Affirmable Business Enterprises does not rest on being provided with 
participation opportunities; it requires focussed supply side interventions that are structured to 
address: 
• The identified disparities in performance which the research identified. 
• The development of black electrical, mechanical and civil engineers technologists and 




THE IMPACT OF THE AFFIRMATIVE PROCUREMENT POLICY ON 
CONTRACTING RELATIONSHIPS IN THE CONSTRUCTION MARKET 
8.1 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the impact which the Affirmative Procurement Policy has had on 
subcontracting and joint venture relationships at prime contract level in the construction market. Two 
hypotheses are tested, viz.; 
1) The application of the policy has resulted in better regulated relationships between 
prime contractors and subcontractors. 
2) The policy promotes joint venture relationships between established contractors and 
Affirmable Business Enterprises. 
The TP1(APP1) specification for the Targeting of Affirrnable Business Enterprises and the TP2(APP2) 
specification for Structured Joint Ventures (Affirmable Partners) are the two resource specifications 
which are used to implement the Affirmative Procurement Policy in engineering and construction 
works contract (DPW, 1998). 
In Chapter 2, construction industry was defined as being a broad cong lomeration of industries and 
sectors which add value in the creation and maintenance of fixed assets within the built environment. 
The Implementation Manual for the use of Targeted Procurement to Implement an Affirmative 
Procurement Policy (Strategic Procurement Systems, 1999) in harmony with this definition defines 
engineering and construction works contracts as being : 
-the provision of a combination of Goods and Services arranged for the development, 
extension, installation, repair, maintenance, renewal, removal, renovation, alteration, 
dismantling or demolition of a fixed asset including building and engineering infrastructure, 11 1 
The aforementioned specifications target Affirmable Business Enterprises in the full delivery chain. 
Credits towards the attainment of resource goals may be passed for obtaining services, goods or 
works from such enterprises who participate in the delivery chain including suppliers, manufacturers, 
transporters. service providers and the like, 
The definitions for both the construction industry and engineering and construction works contracts 
implies that there are relationships between participants in the provision and refurbishment of assets. 
There are a number of reasons for the existence of such relationships and a number of factors which 
form and shape the nature of such relationships. 
, This Implementation Manual further defines: 
• Goods 85 being "the supply of raw maten'als or commodities made available for general sale. 
• Services as the provision of labour endlor work carried out by hand , or wffh the assistance of equipment and plant and 
Including the input, ss necessary. of knowledge bssed expertise,· 
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The author in this chapter deals only with relationships between the prime contractor and 
subcontractors who are providing services or works which are directly related to physical construction 
and joint venture relationships between established contractors and Affinnable Business Enterprises 
at prime contract level only. 
8.2 SUBCONTRACTING RELATIONSHIPS 
8.2.1 Background 
General building contractors have historically employed supervisors, artisans and labourers directly. 
However, recessions and trade union action caused contractors, increasingly, to shed their labour 
forces and resort to subcontracting to finns who specialised in certain construction activities or 
provided labour to undertake specific trades. This practice has enabled contractors to respond 
flexibly to abNpt changes in demand (Debrah and OIori. 1997). 
Debrah and Ofori (1997) when reviewing the literature found that the management rationales· for 
subcontracting included access to specialist technology; down loading financial risk; off-loading direct 
employment responsibilities; labour flexibility; reduced indirect control cost; use of cheaper labour; 
dispersion of risk; as a buffer to core production and as a managerial strategy to divide the working 
class. 
By contracting to pay subcontractors monthly in arrears and introducing -pay when paid- clauses, 
contractors did not have to finance the subcontractor's labour, plant or materials. Subcontractors, 
however, had to pay their labour fortnightly and pay promptly for materials and hired plant. In some 
cases ·pay when paid- came to mean -pay-when-paid, or later" and sometimes -much later", or even 
~ not at all- . 
Today, subcontractors have very little negotiating power with prime contractors, since there is a~ays 
a Unext job syndrome-, a threat of non-payment by the prime contractor and the possibility of 
victimisation. 
Some of the problems of which subcontractors commonly complain include the ghawking" of their 
prices by prime contractors in order to obtain lower prices from others, the risk of non-payment, the 
use by prime contractors of hard earned subcontractors' monies as an interest free overdraft facility 
and having their interests represented by prime contracting bodies at forums. 
Subcontractors undertake a significant proportion of the total value of work on building sites. 
Subcontractors are specialists in their own right and fonn the backbone of the building industry 
(Latham, 1994). Most subcontractors are small, medium and micro enterprises, a group which the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (ANC, 1994) seeks to develop and affinn. 
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The author is of the view that the failure, in the past in South Africa, by government as an employer to 
address subcontracting issues has led to the situation that many targeted businesses in the public 
sector development programmes spurn subcontracting opportunities and exert pressure on the public 
bodies to fragment works to enable them to participate as prime contractors. The attitude of the 
previous government to subcontractors is most evident in its failure to provide for interlocking 
subcontract agreements in its inhouse conditions of contract such as the COL TO Conditions of 
Contract and The Department of Public Works' OW 677 Conditions of Contract. In contrast. all 
standard industry conditions of contracts in South Africa have interlocking conditions of subcontract. 
Furthermore, the government forms of contract did not require main contractors to enter into written 
subcontracts with subcontractors. 
8.2.2 Review of policy provisions for subcontracting arrangements 
8.2.2.1 Green Paper proposals on subcontracting 
The Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South African (MOF and MPW, 1997) 
made reference to subcontracting issues as follows : 
~Invan·ably, as employers only have a relationship with the prime contractor, they regard 
subcontracting issues to be the prime contractor's problem and of no concern to them. 
Subcontracting is an effective means of involving small, medium and micro enterprises in 
public sector procurement activities. As such, the plight of subcontractors cannot be ignored. 
Accordingly, measures need to be taken to address the shortcomings in the cu"ent 
subcontracting arrangements, particularly in respect of engineering and construction works 
contracts. Such measures could include some or all of the following : 
1) The establishment of Trust Funds or other such secured payment routes. 
2) Mechanisms to deal with fate payments. 
3) Protection against prime contractor insolvency. 
4) Outlawing of pay-when-paid practices; the use of unfair set-off; provisions which seek. to 
prevent access to adjudication or frustrate its conclusions. 
5) Introduction of fair conditions of subcontract. 
6) Introduction of Altemative Dispute Resolution procedures in standard forms of 
subcontract. 
The Green Paper proposed that 
• The conditions of subcontract should be regulated in public sector Procurement in order 
to ensure that subcontractors are engaged in terms of fair conditions of contract. 
• Contractors who contravene the proposed provisions contained in the code of 
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conduct relating to sub-contractors should be deregistered. 
• Secured payment routes should only be considered should the other measures 
Which have been proposed not address the root causes of late, or non-payment ... 
The Green Paper attracted written responses from a total of 106 individuals, organisations and 
bodies, of which 27 addressed this section of the paper. Respondents ranged from industry based 
contracting organisations to small subcontractors and from individuals to parastatals and, with the 
exception of the South African Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors (SAFCEC), all welcomed 
the proposals and endorsed them. SAFCEC's opposing view was that the state should not interfere 
in commercial agreements between principals and their subcontractors.2 
8.2.2.2 The provisions made In the Affirmative Procurement Policy for subcontracting 
The Affinnative Procurement Policy makes use of resource specifications to create subcontracting 
opportunities for targeted enterprises as outlined in Chapters 4 and 5 and the introduction to th is 
chapter. Cognisance was taken of the reason for targeted enterprises spurning subcontracting 
opportunities that arose during the development of the policy, viz., the harsh and unfavourable 
conditions of subcontracts. 
It was, furthermore, recognised that targeted enterprises participating in Government programmes as 
subcontractors could not reasonably be expected to depend on the integrity and sympathy of the main 
contractor in order to achieve a fair outcome to their subcontracts. A well established and 
experienced subcontractor is in a far better position both to assess the risks imposed on him by a 
conventional subcontract agreement and to manage those risks. The drafters of the resource 
specifications, accordingly, identifted a group of unfair conditions of subcontract in the resource 
specifications in order to regulate the subcontracting relationship between the targeted enterprises 
and the prime contractor. In terms of the resource speciftcations, it is mandatory for prime contractors 
to enter into written subcontracts with targeted enterprises. Credit towards the attainment of a 
contract goal obligation is denied should the contract contain any of the following provisions (OPW, 
1998): 
• -A right of set-off in favour of the employing contractor. 
• Authoritarian rights given to the employing contractor. or his agent, with no recourse 
to independent adjudication in the event of a dispute ariSing. 
• Payment procedures based on a pay-when-paid system, 
• A dispute resolution procedure which does not include inexpensive Alternative 
2 Industry has now accepted the principle of fair conditions of subcontract. The Construction Industry Development Task 
Team's focus group 6 has released a best practice guide in this regard. (August 1999). 
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Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedures such as mediation or adjudication, but only makes 
use of formal proceedings such as arbitration or litigation. 
• Unreasonable retention percentages and periods of retention after completion. 
• A requirement for a surety to be provided in contracts of value less than R100 000. 
• Conditions which are more onerous than those which exist in the main contract. " 
8.2.3 Methodology outline 
8.2.3.1 General 
The TP1 (APP1) specification (Targeting of Affinnable Business Enterprises) (OPW, 1998) requires 
that contractors engage ABE subcontractors in terms of written contracts which do not include unfair 
conditions of contract as set out in 8.2.2.2. Accordingly, the resource speCification TP1 (APP1 ) 
captures the essentials of the policy and regu lates the relationship between the prime contractor and 
subcontractors in accordance with the policy. In order to test the hypothesis, however, it is necessary 
to : 
i) Examine the forms of subcontract used on a sample of contracts, in order to establish 
whether, or not, the provisions of the TP1 (APP1) specification are, in fact, reflected. 
il) Interview a random sample of ABE subcontractors in order to establish : 
a) Their understanding of the nature and form of the subcontract agreement used. 
b) What training, if any, they had to enable them to understand the subcontract agreement 
used. 
c) What the nature of their subcontracting relationships was on previous contracts where the 
policy was not applied. 
d) What their percepUons (positive, or negative) were of the subcontracting 
arrangements promoted by the policy. 
e) What improvements should be made to the policy. 
f) Whether, or not, a written subcontract resulted in improved relationships with the Prime 
Contractors. 
iii) Ascertain the views regarding the policy of the prime (main) contractors, and principal agents 
involved in the sample of contracts 
iv) Ascertain the views of the largest established employer association in the building industry, 
Building Industries Federation of South Africa (BIFSA) , on the policy. 
A desk study was performed on the forms of subcontract agreements used in the sample in order to 
confirm compliance with the policy. Interviewing techniques as set out in 8.3.2.3 were utilised to 
establish the aspects surrounding the implementation of the policy described in (ii) above, and 
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questionnaires were set up as described in 8.3.2.3, to test the views of principal agents, prime 
contractors and BIFSA regarding the policy. 
The author recognised that different aspects would be important to the different parties and the 
questionnaires referred to above were structured accordingly. The prime contractor questionnaire 
probes the sub-contracting process, the methodology for obtaining targeted sutH::ontractors during or 
before a contract, the qualities or attributes that were important in the selection of subcontractors and 
the prime contractors' response to the conditions of the resource specifications. The principal agent 
questionnaire probes the interface between the prime contractor and client's agent and the 
implications, or consequences, of the specifications on the execution of the project 
8.2.3 ,2 Sample Select/on 
A list of all current National DPW projects at construction stage for Johannesburg and Pretoria was 
obtained and analysed in order to identify suitable projects for auditing purposes. The original 
projected expenditure for the two areas as contained in the NDPW budget for the current 98/99 
financial year was found to be R234 million. Of th is expenditure, R141 million could be classified 
-general-, as distinct from "civil , mechanical or electrical·. Projects were further broken down into 
capital expenditure, which comes from the budgets of client departments, and repairs and renovations 
which is funded from the Department's own budget An analysis of the expenditure split between 
capital projects and repairs and renovations is shown in Table 8.1 : 
TABLE 8,1 : BREAKDOWN OF PROJECTED EXPENDITURE FOR JOHANNESBURG AND 
PRETORIA (1998/99 FINANCIAL YEAR) 
PROJECT LOCATION CAPITAL (R MILLION) REPAIRS (R MILLION) 
All projects 
Johannesburg 81 ,5 13,6 
Pretoria 39,5 99,_ 
Total '2' 113 
GctMnll projects 
Johannesburg 65,3 -,. 
Pretoria 28,2 42 ,8 
Total 93,5 47,7 
% of All ProjKts .. 34 
Two capital projects and two repair projects in Johannesburg and one capital project in Pretoria were 
examined. The projects selected were for client departments for whom Departmental project 
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managers administer the projects. Of the five projects audited, two fell under the auspices of the 
South African National Defence Force (SAND F), two were for police station construction or upgrading, 
and one was a restoration project for the Department of Justice. Two of the prime contractors were 
Affirmable Business Enterprises. 
The projects selected complied with the criterion that 20-40% of the planned project expenditure for 
the 1998/99 financial year had been spent, implying substantial project progress in the current 
financial year. Projects on which there had been little or no expenditure were disregarded. 
A list of the projects to be audited was forwarded to the Department and relevant information and 
data, including contract documents, was obtained from project managers and consultants, in order to 
focus the interviews conducted with the prime contractors and subcontractors. A sample of 
subcontracts for labour, plant, materials or combinations thereof and the natures of the ABEs involved 
(sole proprietor, close corporation) were examined. The numbers of subcontractors employed on the 
five audited projects are shown in Table 8.2. 
TABLE 8.2: KEY SUBCONTRACTOR STATISTICS OF SAMPLE 
TYPE OF SUBCONTRACT TOTAL FOR DOCUMENTS RECENED % OF SELECTED ABEs 
AUDIT !INTERVIEWED EVALUATED 
Labour and materials 37 7 " 
Laboor only 1. 6 31 
Materials only 5 0 0 
A further two projects (one capital project and one repairs project within the Johannesburg/Pretoria 
area) which satisfied the abovementioned criteria were identified to increase the number of likely 
respondents to the questionnaires prepared for prime contractors and principal agents in order to 
obta in at least 5 responses in each category. The number of questionnaires sent out and those 
completed is set out in Table 8.3. 
TABLE 8.3: QUESTIONNAIRES FOR PRIME CONTRACTORS AND PRINCIPAL AGENTS 
TYPE OF QUESTIONNAIRE QUESTIONNAIRES SENT OUT QUESTIONNAIRES RECEIVED •• 
Prime Contractor 7 7 100 
Principal Agent 6 5 84 
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8.2.3.3 Survey instruments 
Subcontractor Interviews 
A series of structured interviews were conducted (see Appendix 8.1). The names of those 
interviewed, their projects and the results were kept confidential to ensure a positive, honest response 
by participants. The interviews were based on a descriptive interview technique. 
The questionnaire presented in Appendix 8.1 contained the following sections : 
1. Company profile 
2. Subcontract profile 
3. Nature of subcontract 
4. Sureties and retention monies 
5. Payment procedures 
6. Dispute resolution mechanisms 
Section one captures the particulars set out in Appendix B.2 and enables conclusions to be drawn 
regarding the impact of the policy on the formalisation of the subcontracting industry, e.g., company 
registration with South African Revenue Services. Section two establishes the basic footprint of the 
subcontract in question, whilst section three establishes the nature and form of the subcontract and 
probes issues such as previous subcontract agreements, understanding of the document, training 
received and suggestions for policy improvement as set out in the TP1(APP1) specification. The 
remaining section deals with various aspects of the policy. 
The ABE declaration affidavit (Annex C of the TP1(APP1) specification) was completed by the 
subcontractors to provkte background information on each contract. (See Appendix 8.2). 
During the interviews, questions were structured to determine previous relationships between the 
subcontractor and the prime contractors. This provided the basis for an analysis of the problem and 
positive elements of the current subcontract. 
Principal Agent QuesUonna/re (Appendix 8.3) 
The questionnaire is divided into six sections. Section one takes the criteria for fair conditions of 
subcontract, as set out in 8.2.1.3, and applies a five point scale to each criterion to determine the 
principal agents' views thereon. The answers were able to be expanded by the use of descriptive 
comments on each criteria. 
Section two looks at the status quo relationship for subcontracts. It compares the principal agents' 
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perceptions of subcontracts during the previous dispensation with the current relationships. It asks 
questions on the benefits and problems of using formal subcontracts. 
Section three reviews the need for regulating and formalising subcontracting arrangements and 
evaluates the available documentation. It looks at mechanisms to ensure that any new 
documentation would be acceptable to the industry and be utilised. 
Sections four and five look at compliance monitoring, dispute resolution and the interface between 
current documentation and the APP requirements. 
Section six examines training aspects associated with subcontracting agreements. 
Prime Contractor Questionnaire (Appendix 8.4) 
Section one is an introductory section which examines the structure, human resources and capacity 
of the contractor. Section two is similar to the principal agent questionnaire and looks at the status 
quo of subcontract documentation. It requests responses on the benefits and problems experienced 
during the subcontract relationship. It investigates the sourcing of ABEs within projects and, using the 
five point scale, evaluates the attributes that are important when sourcing ABEs. 
Section three looks at subcontract administration and dispute resolution and evaluates the prime 
contractor's viewpoint on the principles emanating from the APP specifications. 
The acceptance of the criteria for fair conditions of contract is, as in the principal agent questionnaire, 
determined using the five point scale. 
Sections four and five look at the adequacy of the subcontract documentation currently used in the 
industry and contractors' individual short to medium term strateg ies with respect to subcontracting. 
BIFSA Interview (Appendix 8.5) 
The first section establishes the historical development of the BI FSA document, the latest reviews of it 
and how the documentation is reviewed and amended. 
The second section uses the five point scale to determine reaction to the criteria contained in the APP 
specifications. 
Sections three and four evaluate the need for general format subcontract documentation and BIFSA 
subcontract documentation's degree of compliance with the APP specifications. 
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8.2.4 Presentation and Interpretation of results 
8.2.4.1 Subcontractor interviews 
Nllture and form of the subcontract 
The interviews with subcontractors and an examination of the documentation obtained revealed the 
following : 
1. The preferred industry standard form of subcontract for general use on building subcontracts 
is the BIFSA subcontract. The BIFSA subcontract document is used both on contracts where 
the subcontractors are required to provide materials and labour and where subcontractors are 
contracted to perform large labour only subcontracts. (subcontract value ~ R50000). 
2. For small labour only contracts, the contract is frequently a verbal one. It was, however, 
found that, in some instances, subcontractors would insist on receiving written orders before 
commencing work, such orders then constituting the contract. 
The BIFSA document contains two separate subcontract documents, one being a specialised 
engineering services subcontract document (for mechanical, electrical and other services, piling and 
ground engineering, etc.) and the second a building subcontract document. The subcontract 
documents differentiate between nominated and non-nominated, or domestic, subcontractors. The 
latest edition of the contract which could be obtained was dated 1988. (The new JBCC subcontract 
agreement was not yet in print). The document contains annexures which must be used when a 
subcontract falls under the Joint Building Contracts Committee (JBCC) Principal Building Agreement. 
The -Agreement and Schedule of Build ing Sub-Contracf which is used for labour only subcontracts 
and the MAgreement and Schedule <;>f ConditionsH which was used for material and labour contracts is 
25 pages in length and contains a 3 page schedule which is to be completed by the subcontractor as 
a summary of essential information. 
The schedule, for both subcontract documents, gives the following information : 
• Contractor and subcontractor particulars; 
• Location of site and description of the subcontract works; 
• Subcontract documentation; 
• Subcontract sum; 
• Employer's, Quantity surveyors and Agent's particulars; 
• Insurance and programme requirements; 
• Payment conditions; 
• Arbitration details; 
• Cessions. 
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The subcontract is very detailed and contains 42 clauses. Not all the clauses were evaluated. Only 
those requirements mentioned in the TP1(APP1) specification as being criteria for an acceptable form 
of subcontract were examined. 
None of the subcontractors had received any formal training on the nature and form of the 
subcontract agreement. However, most of them had an idea of the nature of the schedule and of the 
practical details regarding programme and completion dates, invoicing, retention payable and the 
nature of the contract works. When asked if they had ever read the contract document they replied in 
the negative, or were vague and evasive, which tends to suggest. that they may have read it, but had 
not fully understood it. The written subcontract had not been used on most previous subcontracts and 
the subcontractors considered that they had all been subjected to exploitation by the main contractor 
at one time, or another, in the absence of a written agreement. On one project where no written 
subcontracts had been used, there was major dissatisfaction from the labour-only subcontractors, 
who felt that they had been underpaid and exploited. No written orders to sub-contractors could be 
produced by the main contractor on this contract. 
Dispute Resolution Procedure 
The TP1(APP1 ) document (Clause 3.3.4) states lIlat : 
uCognisance will be taken of the proposed conditions of contract and subcontract between 
ABE and non-ABE. Cl"9dits claimed towards participation goals will not be allowed if such 
contracts contain : 
• A dispute resolution procedure which does not include inexpensive Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) procedures such as mediation or adjudication, but only makes use of 
formal proceedings such as arbitration or litigation. 
• Authoritarian rights given to the employing contractor, or his agent, with no recourse to 
independent adjudication in the event of a dispute arising. ~ 
The BIFSA subcontract document (Clause 37) stipulates arbitration as the standard manner of 
dispute resolution. Some of the documentation obtained from contractors named the arbitrator and 
some stated Uto be appointed-. Clause 37 is very detailed and defines the arbitrator's functions (Cl 
37.4). All communication for arbitration is to be written and the arbitrator's powers are binding and 
irrevocable (Cl 37.6). 
In all cases where the BIFSA subcontract document was used, no ADR procedures were specified. 
Therefore none of the subcontract agreements was in compliance with the TP1 (APP1) specification. 
Accordingly , no resource goal credits should have been granted on any of these contracts. 
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For labour only, or small subcontracts, including those for specialised work such as fencing , pest 
control, gutters, ceilings, waterproofing, etc. the normal procedure was for an order to be given to the 
subcontractor. This order normally contained standard terms and conditions, which varied 
constderably in regard to dispute resolution, but usually favoured the main contractor. 
Payment Procedures 
The relevant portion of the TP1 (APP1) specification, Clause 3.3.4, states: 
"Credits claimed will not be allowed if such contracts contain: 
• A right of set-off in favour of the employing contractor 
• Payment procedures based on a pay-when-paid system . .. 
The salient points from the BIFSA subcontract document are : 
• Monthly certificates are to be submitted by the subcontractor for work completed and 
materials on site. 
• Payments due to the subcontractor must be made not later than 10 days after the due 
date for payment to the contractor by the Employer. 
• Should the contractor not make payment as stipulated above, the settlement discount w ill 
be forfeited and interest at prime plus 2% will be payable. 
• No payments are due unless certified by the Principal Agent. 
• The subcontractor has the right to suspend work on giving 7 days written notice if not 
paid. 
Contractually the BIFSA subcontract document has payment procedures based on a pay-after-
certification basis. Once the certificate is certified by the Employer's Agent, a due date for payment is 
determined and the contractor is bound to pay the subcontractor timeously or the SUbcontractor is 
automatically entitled to the payment of interest and has the right to suspend the work. 
In practice, the following arrangements were found to be operational on all BIFSA subcontracts. 
Projects extended over periods of several months and certificates were submitted and payments 
made monthly or fortnightly. This enabJed the ABEs to pay their staffs and suppliers. The prime 
contractors were large companies and, if they were not paid timeously by the Employer, had no option 
but to fund the work in order to allow it to proceed. The ABEs, generally, did not have reserves to 
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enable them to operate without monthly payments. The implications of possible go-slows, labour 
unrest etc., was found to be the motivating factor in ensuring that the prime contractors paid their 
subcontractors timeously. 
Orders for small work, on a supply and install basis, were generally pa id 30 days after presentation of 
invoice, normally on completion of the work. 
The BIFSA subcontract document (Clause 31) does give the prime contractor the right of set-off 
against any money due to the subcontractor provided that the subcontractor has been given 
reasonable prior written notice to remedy the cause of the set off. This is in breach of the TP1 (APP1 ) 
specification. 
Retention and Sureties 
The relevant section of Clause 3.3.4 of the TP1(APP1 ) document states: 
NCredits claimed will not be allowed if such contracts contain: 
• Unreasonable retention percentages and periods of retention after completion 
• A requirement for a surety to be provided in contracts of value less than R 100 000 . .. 
All contracts were found to be in compliance with the specifications. The retention amount used by all 
prime contractors and subcontractors was 10% subject to a maximum of 5%. On labour only 
contracts a 5% retention amount was used in 20% of the cases. The BIFSA schedule sets a 
maximum value of 5% of the subcontract sum for retention. The retention is to be paid out 6 months 
after the date of practical completion of the Contract Works, unless an earlier date is agreed in writing. 
The retention amounts are essentially the same as those provided for in the Department of Public 
Works OW 677 General Conditions of Contract. viz., 10% subject to a maximum value of 5%. The 
retention period was found to be 3 months in 60% of interviewed cases, which is half the BIFSA 
requirement. The OW 677 conditions of contract provides for 2/5 of the retention monies to be 
released upon issue of First Delivery Certificate, a further 215 upon issue of Final Delivery Certificate, 
which is issued 3 months after the First Delivery Certificate, and the final 115 on acceptance of the 
final certificate. 
No sureties were requested by the prime contractors from any of the sub-contractors interviewed for 
contracts of value less than R100 000. In one instance, on a labour only contract with a value greater 
than R100 000, no surety was requ ired . 
Previous Experience in Subcontracting 
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All subcontractors interviewed had previously experienced exploitation when there was no written 
subcontract. The attitude of the prime contractors was described as being authoritarian. Additionally, 
there were no formal dispute resolution procedures, which produced a feeling of helplessness. 
There was little or no stipulation of payment procedures, project scope, time, or penalties and this 
sometimes led to reduced payments. There was very little transparency regarding payments that the 
main contractor received from the client. The only statements made on payments received from the 
client were verbal and this led to abuse, whereby the main contractor was paid in full, but gave the 
subcontractors reduced amounts. However, there was no method of checking these allegations. The 
formal written subcontract has resulted in a transparent relationship with the prime contractor in most 
cases. 
Positive Elements 
The positive elements of the written subcontract were discussed with the various subcontractors. The 
statements below are drawn from the more significant comments made at the interviews. 
The most important aspect is that the written subcontract is a legal document and is binding on the 
prime contractor. It provides a basis for payment, defines the contractual situation, describes the 
work and expectations of both parties and assists in ensuring that payment will be forthcoming. This 
was bome out in the audit where, when no written subcontract was in place, the subcontractors 
(mostly labour only) felt exploited and prejudiced by the fact that their expectations were not defined 
at the beginning of the subcontract Prices for the work to be performed were, almost always, 
stipulated, but, because there was no written subcontract, the subcontractors formed unrealistic 
expectations of payments due to them and had no basis for complaint about underpayments, or late 
payments. 
The formalising of the subcontract relationship through the Affirmative Procurement Policy has 
resulted in an increased formalisation of subcontractors' businesses. Eighty percent of the 
subcontractors interviewed had formed close corporations during the period after 1994 and had 
registered with the South African Revenue Services. 
Formal subcontracts have added to their understanding of the projects and the contractual process 
and has lessened the exploitation that was previously evident. Better returns are being experienced 
by the subcontractors, due to the defined scope of works with variations and extras being 
documented and paid for. 
Problems 
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In the interviews and discussions regarding the problems with current subcontract documentation it 
was observed that many of the problem areas are common to emerging contractors in general. The 
problems related to the administrative, financial , programming. cash flow and legal aspects of a 
contract. However, the absence of a written subcontract document, agreement, or order, was 
highlighted as the most important problem. 
As the BIFSA Agreement of Building Sub-contract was chosen as the form of subcontract agreement 
by the prime contractor in most instances the other problems experienced are, effectively, a critique of 
th is document. The following problems were highlighted: 
• The document was felt to be too long, too complicated and difficult to understand. 
• The conflict resolution procedure was too remote and costly to be of any benefit. 
• The length of the payment procedures were highlighted and the time for payment was felt to be 
too long, particularly as most subcontractors did not have adequate capital reserves. 
Other problems experienced were how to programme and administer contracts. It was felt there were 
so many laws and regulations to follow and comply with, that it often left very little time to complete 
the work. 
Schedules and bills of quantities were sometimes described as complicated and a request was made 
for some sort of planUlabourl material overheads division within documents. 
Improvements 
A simple labour only subcontract document and a subcontract document that covers materials, plant 
etc., were requested. 
The subcontractors requested management training and help in other areas of contract management 
(cashflow, programming, capital management, administration). A shorter payment cycle and a simple 
conflict resolution procedure were requested , to be defined for all contracts. 3 
8.2.4.2 Questlonnalres4 
General 
The completed BIFSA interview form is reproduced in Appendix 8.5. Mr. P. Griessel, General 
) The DPW developed and published in September 1998 a subcontract for labour only and labour and materials which 
complies with the pril'lCiples contained the TPl(APPI) specification . This document took account of some of the concerns raised 
during these interviews. 
• The documents in use at present have been used as the basis for the discussion although this may not be the latest 
documentation as issued by BIFSA. BIFSA are presenlly issuing the JBCC 2000 documentation series. The domestic sub-
contract was being printed during the December 19981January period when the research was conducted and was unavailable 
for evaluation 
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Secretary (Gauteng), completed the form on behalf of BIFSA5. The responses to prime contractor and 
principal agent quesUonnaires are collated and presented in Appendix B.6. 
8.2.4.3 Responses on fair conditions of subcontract 
The corresponding sections of the questionnaires for prime contractors, principal agents and BIFSA 
were tabulated and combined (see Table 8.4) in order to compare responses to the TP1(APP1) 
specifications for the fair conditions of contract. These responses were rated on the scale (1-5) where 
score 5 represents the most supportive response and score 1 represents the least supportive 
response. 
TABLE 8.4: COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS APP "FAIR" CONDITIONS OF 
CONTRACT 
PRINCIPLE TO BE INCLUDED IN SUBCONTRACT SCORE ON FIVE POINT SCALE (1-5) 
PRIME PRINCIPAL BIFSA 
CONTRACTORS AGENTS 
Right of set off by employing contractor 3,6 . ,0 1 
Authoritarian rights given to employing contractor or agent 3,7 . ,1 1 
Pay when paid, payment procedures . ,1 . ,2 3 
Alternative dispute resolution procedures : mediation or adjudication 
3,. 3,. .,-
Retention percentages same as main contract . ,0 . ,0 0 
SUrety requirements must be provided for values< R100 000 
2,6 3,2 1 
Conditions of subcontract same as main contract .,. .,. 3 
• • NOTE . 1 least supp0rtiv9, 5 most supportN& 
In general, BIFSA is supportive of the principles of fair conditions of subcontract being included in 
subcontracts with ABEs as laid down in the TP1(APP1) specifteation. On the other hand, prime 
contractors and principal agents generally disagree with the TP1(APP1) provisions. 
Right of set-off by employing contractor 
The majority of main contractors and principal agents supported the right of set off by the employing 
contractor. The main reason given is the external requirement imposed on the main contractor by 
suppliers of materials and other goods. Many ABE subcontractors do not have credit facilities and are 
5 The views are not necessarily representative of t~ organisation as a whole. The questionnaire was sent in December 1998 
to BIFSA. lit was not possible at this time of the year to obtain wider inputs. AI a meeting held at the Public WOntS Department 
on 9 February 1999, Mr. I.Roblnson, President of BIFSA confirmed with the Director General and the leader of the etOB Task 
Team that BIFSA accepted all the provisions of the TP1 (APP1) SpecifICations relating to subcontracts without reservation. 
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unable to purchase materials at competitive prices. The suppliers require set-offs by the main 
contractor for direct payment to them and these conditions then need to be incorporated in the 
subcontract agreement. This may help the ABE subcontractor to obtain contracts of greater value, 
but the primary motive is the right of the supplier, who demands payment. The right also gives the 
main contractor greater leverage with the sub-contractor. 
Authoritarian rights given to employing contractor or agent 
No comments were received from the principal agents for their support for this principle. The 
contractors' reasons for authoritarian rights were to ensure acceptable fin ish and quality of work. 
Pay·when-paid system 
Most of the prime contractors and principal agents supported this clause. Although there was strong 
support for the concept of pay-when-paid , the comments received indicated that the practical reality is 
completely different. Small contractors and ABEs do not have the cashflow to permit this and most 
contractors were, therefore, paying the subcontractors on a fortnightly , or monthly, basis irrespective 
of the contractual background. This enabled the subcontractors to pay for materials and to pay their 
labour. Most contractors commented on the long lead times being experienced before payments 
were received from government clients. BIFSA commented on the subcontractors' dislike of th is 
clause, but indicated that it was widely accepted in the industry. BJFSA stated that the clause was not 
applicable to domestic subcontractors, who are entitled to payment whether, or not. the main 
contractor is paid. The clause is only applicable between the main contractor and nominated 
subcontractors. The evaluation of the documents received from subcontractors showed that although 
BIFSA has issued new domestic subcontract documentation (1995) the old documentation (1988), 
which includes a pay-when-paid clause, is still being widely used. 
Alternative dispute resolution procedures 
There was a majority support for alternative dispute resolution procedures wh ich appears to be a 
result of the introduction of the New Engineering and Construction Contract (NEC) forms of contract. 
BIFSA pointed out that. although arbitration was supposed to be an informal and cheap method of 
dispute resolution , the reality is that it is not. Arbitrators' fees are high and arbitrators have tended to 
come not from within the building industry, but rather from the legal profession. Th is has caused the 
process to become lengthy and costly. 
Retention same as main contracts 
There was majority support from main contractors and principal agents for retentions being the same 
as on main contracts. BIFSA stated that retention had been removed from the JBCC documents 
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since 1992 and replaced by construction and performance guarantees. However, architects were still 
using the old documentation. 
Surety requirements for contracts valued at less than R100 000 
The main contractors disagreed with this requirement, BIFSA stated it was not necessary and the 
principal agents were divtded. Some said that it was a matter between the prime contractors and their 
subcontractors. The prime contractors and BIFSA stated that smaller contractors are normally not 
able to provide sureties, the administrative procedures to obtain them were often difficult and that they 
were seldom used, or called upon. One main contractor recommended that the main contractors 
should provide reduced sureties which excluded the ABEs portion of the work and that retention, as 
agreed, be used as the surety for that portion. 
Contractusl Conditions 
Comments here depended on the principal agreement. The OW6?? document was felt to place 
onerous conditions on the main contractor. In the standard JBCC contract the main contract and 
subcontract documentation is compatible and refer to each other. BIFSA stated that many labour only 
sub-contractors did not have the administrative capacity to analyse and respond to conditions of 
contract. They felt that for small contracts the documents need not necessarily be the same. 
Specialist sub-contractors tended to impose their own conditions on the main contractors if 
guarantees were to be honoured. 
8.2.4.4 Smtus Quo responses 
The status quo questions in the prime contractor questionnaire indicated that there has been an 
increase in the percentage of fennal contracts signed. All the prime contractors with the exception of 
one indicated that formal subcontracts had been signed previously. The principal agents also 
indicated that formal subcontracts were always signed in the past. This is in direct contrast to the 
subcontractors who indicated that they had not had formal subcontracts. This anomaly may be due to 
the breakage of previous subcontracting linkages and the establishment of new ones. Previously, 
ABE subcontractors did not have formal bUSinesses and were employed as labour teams by the main 
contractors and would have been regarded as part of their own labour forces. They have now 
become part of the formal subcontracting environment by registering businesses and require to be 
treated as such. 
The BIFSA subcontract document is the preferred subcontract document, this being the old standard 
document (1988), as opposed to the domestic SUb-contract document issued on 1 September 1995. 
The 1995 document is 23 pages long and has the following clauses which need to be examined in the 






Clause 31 .6 
Settlement of Disputes uses the alternative dispute resolution procedure of 
Retention shall be the same as the main contract (10% of the value of work 
and materials to a maximum of 5% of the sub-contract sum). 
3. Clause 31 Deals with payment from the main contractor. Should the employer default 
on payments to the main contractor and the main contractor fail to pay the subcontractor, then 
payment guarantees may be called up by the sub-contractor. Clause 31 is principally a pay-
when-paid clause, except that Clause 31 .4 states that where there is no agent appointed in 
terms of the principal agreement the contractor shall make monthly payments to the sub-
contractor. 
4. Sureties are not required and performance guarantees and payment guarantees have been 
substituted. However, the right to set off is still given to the main contractor. 
5. Clause 34 Gives the main contractor the right to make deductions from the 
subcontracting money owed to him. 
It also has an appendix for relevant information. 
It should be noted that some companies have developed their own subcontract documentation. 
8.2.4.5 Responses on subcontract documentation 
A variety of reasons for the use of formal documentation were put forward . These included; 
accountability, responsibility, quality of work, proper management and good contractual practice 
which defines the relationships and covers both parties. It was felt that the subcontract 
documentation formalises the agreement and is a form of record . It limits the risk incurred by the 
main contractor and defines cash flow, defects, rates, treatment, etc. However, it was felt that it is 
difficult to define procedures. 
Prime contractors considered that the current subcontract documents for labour only, material supply, 
and labour and material were adequate, but supported the notion that there is a need for standardised 
subcontracts which satisfies the TP1(APP1) specifications. 
The Principal Agents did not. in the main, consider that there is a need for separate documents for 
labour only, plant, materials and labour, or materials only. In contrast, BIFSA felt that there is a need 
for separate documentation, but saw no need to develop a standard document for the supply of 
materials. 
Some problem areas with the use of formal subcontracts, identified by certain prime contractors, were 
that subcontractors did not necessarily understand the conditions of contract and failed to follow 
administrative procedures. 
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8.2.4.8 Responses on sourclng of ABEs 
Most ABEs were sourced from long term relationships, through previous contracts and, to a lesser 
extent. from visits by ABEs to site. It depended to a large extent on the community structures 
involved in the project. The same rules tended to apply for ABE and non-ABE prime contractors. 
ABEs were sometimes sourced through lists, local builders associations, or local civic associations. 
The perceived importance of the selection criteria used for the sourcing of ABE subcontractors for a 
project is set out in Table a.5. 
The attributes that were most important to the prime contractors were past experience, rates, 
reliability and competence. Most ABEs were sourced at post-tender stage with pre-tender sourcing of 
ABEs only occurring infrequently. Formal subcontracts were entered into during the post-award 
phase of the main contract, either before commencement, or during the contract. All respondents 
stated that contracts were explained to ABEs prior to signing. 
Although respondents stressed the importance of rates, only two of the respondents called for 
quotations every time, one most of the time, three some of the time and one never. All respondents, 
however, plan to develop medium term relationships with ABEs. 
TABLE 8.5 : IMPORTANCE OF SELECTION CRITERIA FOR THE SOURCING OF ABE 
SUBCONTRACTORS FOR A PROJECT 




Past experience 3." 
Resources 3.6 
Close proximity to site 3.4 
Business experience 3.2 
Empowerment I development 3.1 
Union linked 2.3 
NOTE. 1 Not a factor . • 5 Most mportant 
8.2.4.7 Responses on compliance monitoring 
Compliance monitoring of contracts was mostly carried out by the Quantity Surveyor appointed by the 
Department or main contractor. There were formal meetings either weekly or as required. The 
meetings were minuted, but not attended by the Principal Agent I Project Manager. 
In most cases the current subcontract documentation was found not to have been tested for 
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compliance with the APP specifications. 
8.2.5 Research findings 
The period since the 1994 elections and the publishing of the Affirmative Procurement Policy 
specifications has acted as a catalyst for the formalising of the ABE subcontracting industry. Over 
80% of the ABE subcontractors interviewed had registered companies during the study period and 
registered for VAT, Workmen's Compensation and other statutory regulations. This has, however, 
resulted in many of the ABE subcontractors experiencing problems with the legal, financial and 
business management areas within their companies. This finding is consistent with observations 
made in the Soderlund and Schutte (1998) review of the R234 million Malmesburg Prison project 
where contractors, when commenting on problems encountered, stated that they had to employ a tax 
consultant to assist ABEs with South African Revenue Services reg istration. 
The Department of Public Works has used its OW 677 Conditions of Contract for many years. This 
document is a department specific document, having been purpose written for the department. This 
form of contract recognises only nominated subcontractors. The Department of Public Works, in line 
with previous government policy. did not produce a companion subcontract agreement to OW 677. 
The recently launched JBCC 2000 series documents contains. inter alia, a mandatory 
nominated/selected subcontract agreement for use in conjunction with its principal building 
agreement. This subcontract agreement complies with the TP1(APP1) subcontract principles. No 
provision in the suite of documents is, however, made for domestic subcontractors. 
The preferred form of subcontract for engaging domestic subcontractor on NDPW building projects 
appears to be the 1988 BIFSA form of subcontract. Both the 1995 and 1988 BIFSA subcontract 
agreements fail to satiSfy the criteria for the "fair" conditions of contract as set out in the TP1(APP1) 
speCification, the 1988 agreement satisfying less of the TP1 (APP1) principles than the 1995 
agreement. The questionnaires indicated very clearly that whilst BIFSA is introducing reform in 
subcontracting conditions as evidenced by the differences between the 1988 and 1995 agreements 
and the recent JBCC 2000 series, its constituents do not share its en lightened stance. 
It was apparent during the research that in the majority of contracts there is compliance with the TP1 
(APP1 ) specification at tender stage and initially during the contract. The value of the subcontract 
allocated to ABE subcontractors was easy to quantify and information was readily available. However 
in areas of the subcontract agreement there was found to be non-compliance due to the current forms 
of subcontract used by the prime contractors. 
The Prime Contractors and Principal Agents interviews supported the following four set of APP fair 
conditions of subcontract: 
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• Retention percentages to be the same as the main contract. 
• No surety requirements for sub-contractors. 
• Alternative dispute resolution procedures. 
• Conditions of contract to be the same as the main contract. 
The Prime Contractors and Principal Agents disagreed with the following three APP fair conditions of 
subcontract 
• Right of set off by employing contractor 
• Authoritarian rights given to employing contractor or agent 
• Pay-when-paid procedures 
Although prime contractors and principal agents supported the inclusion of alternative dispute 
resolution procedures such as mediation and adjudication, the subcontract agreement which was 
predominantly used on projects provided for arbitration. The reason put fOlWard by Prime Contractors 
and Principal Agents for supporting the inclusk>n of a right of set off by the employing contractor was 
the external requirements imposed on main contractors by suppliers of materials and other goods. 
It was very evident from the questionnaires that both the Principal Agents and the Prime Contractors 
had not studied the TP1(APP1) specification. Two thirds of the Prime Contractors interviewed 
admitted that they had not tested the subcontract agreement against the TP1 (APP1) requirements. 
Only three of the Principal Agents responded to this question; all of them indicated that they had not. 
Similar findings were found in the Malmesburg Prison Project where none of the subcontracting 
agreements were found to comply with the TP1 (APP1) specifications. (Sodertund and Schutte, 1998) 
Most of the ABE subcontractors had a basic understanding of the nature and form of the subcontract 
document but none had received any formal training. All subcontractors felt that the formal 
subcontract agreement had provided security of relationship and had reduced exploitation. It had also 
formalised areas of payment procedures, work description, quality and provided transparency in the 
subcontract relationship. 
Most of the ABE subcontractors had a basic understanding of the nature and form of the subcontract 
document. However, none had received any formal training in this regard. All subcontractors felt that 
the formal subcontract agreement had provided security of relationship and had reduced exploitation. 
It had also formalised areas of payment procedures, work description, quality and provided 
transparency in the subcontract relationsh ip. 
Improvements that the ABE sub-contractors requested are a simple form of labour only and general 
subcontract and training in the understanding of business management. The written subcontract has 
improved relationships with the prime contractor. 
The research also revealed that contractors were planning to develop medium term relationships with 
ABEs. 
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8.3 JOINT VENTURES 
8.3.1 Background 
A venture is by definition an ·undertaking of a risk" (Sykes, 1976) and implies -8 speculation to make 
money" (Bamhart and Barnhart, 1992). A joint venture is simply a venture in which the risk is shared 
by two or more parties. In the context of the construction industry, joint ventures are formed to realise 
commercial opportunities presented by the construction and maintenance of assets which may occur 
at any point in the project cycle. Sridharan {1997} describes joint venture formation as an -economic 
marriage~ which like a marriage itself, offers great opportunities to exploit and share resources, skills 
and financial strength. There is an indispensible need for mutual trust, sharing of resources and 
information, and confidentiality in joint venture relationships. 
There are several possible reasons for forming a joint venture for a construction contract. Historically 
the most common reason in South Africa has been that a contract which is being tendered on is too 
large, or too complex, for one company, or requires specialist experience or skills which that company 
cannot provide. If the contract could be handled satisfactorily by breaking it down into smaller, more 
manageable, or distinct portions, two or more companies could form a joint venture and tender for the 
contract. 
Another historical reason for forming a joint venture is that the resources of a company, which could 
normally handle the contract being tendered on, are committed to other contracts. A desire to be 
involved in the contract would encourage the company to form a joint venture with another company, 
or companies, in order to enable it to participate in a tender for the contract. Alternatively, joint 
ventures are entered into to provide employment for unoccupied personnel who are too few in number 
to undertake a contract on their own. In some instances joint ventures have been entered into to 
share the exposure to the risks involved in undertaking high risk contracts. 
The abovementioned reasons for joint venture formation will probably be found in most developed 
countries. In developing countries, however, joint ventures are formed for different reasons . 
Sridharan (1997) reports that international construction firms have extensively used joint ventures as 
a vehicle to enter new construction markets in South East Asia since the early seventies. Countries 
such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines do not allow fully owned foreign subsidiaries to 
operate within their countries. They require minimum percentages of local participation in most 
business ventures operating within their countries. Joint ventures are seen as a popular form of entry 
to markets because of the perceived benefits they bring to the host country, namely, technology 
transfer, job creation and capital inflow (Sridharan, 1997). Ofori (1991) comments that joint ventures , 
from a developing country's perspective, are seen as a means of effecting the transfer of technology 
and ensuring managerial and technical improvements in indigenous contracting companies. 
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International firms as such are seen to nurture local contractors through large and sophisticated 
projects. Ofori (1991), however, reports that despite there being a number of success stories, joint 
ventures seldom result in the effective transfer of expertise. Sridharan (1997) in reviewing the 
literature on jOint ventures between international and domestic firms in developing countries 
concluded that there is a one in three chance of failure of a newly formed joint venture. 
In South Africa, Watermeyer and Band (1994) proposed a model for contractor development based 
on the successive introduction to developing contractors of labour, transport, materials, plant and 
finance in a progressive manner. They proposed that once developing contractors had established 
themselves as small scale prime contracting firms, joint venture formation with well established and 
larger firms would be one of the ways in which such firms could develop into medium and large firms. 
The BCI working committee recognised that joint venturing with existing firms was one of five ways in 
which new entrants to the market could be made where economies of scale present barriers to entry 
(BCI, 1996). 
Joint ventures can be formed on virtually any basis that the partners agree upon. Irrespective of how 
they are formed, two aspects need to be addressed in any joint venture formation viz., the 
M Management~ and the MWor1<force". lIManagement" focuses on who is responsible for the control 
and execution of the works: the "Workforce" focuses on who performs the physical work or provides 
the necessary resources used to perform the physical work. 
The manner in which these two aspects are addressed can be used to categorise a joint venture. 
There are three basic approaches to the establishment of a joint venture (Strategic Procurement 
Systems, 1998): 
• Work breakdown method : 
In the work breakdown method the parties divide the work into discrete elements or sections 
usually on the basis of the locality or nature of the work. Each joint venture partner is then 
assigned a portion of the works and assumes full responsibility and accountability for its 
execution, usually with their own workforces. 
• Establishment of a new entity : 
Where a new entity is formed each partner seconds staff and resources to the new entity which 
then in effect operates as an independent company. The entity assumes responsibility and 
accountability for all aspects of the works. 
• Construction management method: 
In the construction management method, the parties divide the work into discrete elements or 
sections usually on the basis of the resources required to execute aspects of such portions. Each 
joint venture partner is then assigned a portion of the ~ork and assumes full responsibility for 
managing and acquiring the resources (internal and external) required to execute such portion of 
the work. 
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In practice, joint ventures are a combination of the above and fall somewhere between the three 
methods. If the three methods form the boundaries of a triangle, any joint venture will fall somewhere 
within the confines of the triangle. 
The overall management of the joint venture is, normally, independent of the separated 
responsibilities of the partners and is, generally, handled in one of two ways, viz.: 
• one partner is chosen to represent the joint venture in all dealings with the Employer; and 
• overall joint venture management body is formed of personnel from the jOint venture partners, or 
persons employed for the purpose. 
8.3.2 Review of policy provisions for joint venture formation 
8.3.2.1 General policy provisions 
The 10 Point Plan (MOF and MPW, 1995) recogn ised that construction is the synthesis of four 
functional activities viz construction management, materials management, materials and labour. 
Three types of building and construction contracts were identified in this plan viz.: 
• prime contracts in terms of which the contracting entity is responsible for all four 
functional activities. 
• structured joint ventures in terms of which the four functional activities are shared 
betvveen the parties which constitute the contracting entity in response to the Employer's 
requirement to do so. 
• development contracts in terms of which the contracting entity is responsible for some 
of the functional activities and the Employer provides third party management support for 
the remainder. 
Provision is made in the Affirmative Procurement Policy for joint venture formation to secure the 
participation of a variety of targeted enterprises in a number of ways. Voluntary Joint Venture 
formation is encouraged between ABEs and non-ABEs in the TP1{APP1) Specification for the 
Targeting of Affirmable Business Enterprises (OPW, 1998a) at both prime and subcontract level. In 
the TP2(APP2) Specification for Structured Joint Ventures (Affirmable Partners) (DPW, 1998b) and 
the TP3(APP3) Specification for Structured Joint Ventures (Targeted Partners) (DPW, 1998c) joint 
venture formation at the prime contract level with the target group is obligatory. 
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These specifications define a Joint Venture as being (DPW, 1998a, band c) : 
~An association of non-target group enterprises and target group enterprises for which 
purpose they combine their expertise, property, capital, efforts, skill and knowledge in order to 
execute a contract or a portion thereof, and in so doing secure resource goal credits". 
In terms of these specifications, Joint Venture formation for the purpose of goal credits is recognised 
when the following three conditions are satisfied: 
a) The targeted partner shares in the following aspects of the Joint Venture in an appropriate and 






b} The targeted partner is responsible for a clearly defined portion of work to be performed or service 
to be provided. 
c) The targeted partner actually executes a portion of the contract using its own resources or 
resources hired by it independent of the non-targeted partner. 
The abovementioned joint venture "recognition characteristics" test whether or not the targeted 
partner : 
a) exercises ownership and control in the joint venture and hence shares in the risks and rewards; 
b) assumes responsibility for a distinct portion of the management and control of the works; and 
c) assumes responsibility for the provision of a portion of the resources required to execute the 
contract. 
The specification measures the "Commercially Useful Function- performed by targeted joint venture 
partners, and establishes a Participation Parameter to do so. The Participation Parameter is defined 
as being (DPW, 1998a, b and c) 
"the fraction of the Award Value of the work performed by a Joint venture which may be used 
to represent the value of the contribution and Commercially Useful Function performed by 
targeted partners" 
Commercially Useful Function is defined as : 
Uthe performance of real and actual work, or the provision of services, in the discharge of any 
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contractual obfigation which shaff include, but not be limited to the performance of a distinct 
element of work which the business has the skifl and expertise to undertake and the 
responsibifity for management and supervision ~. 
The Award Value is defined as : 
"the value of the Contract at the time of the award, exclusive of VA T, provisional sums and all 
allowances for 8scalation and contingencies provided for by the Employer". 
The specifications do, however, stipulate that the targeted partner must perform, using its own 
resources or resources hired by it independent of the non-targeted partners, work of value equal to at 
least a percentage of the product of the Participation Parameter and the Award Value of the work for 
which the Joint Venture is responsible. (50% in respect of the TP1 (APP1) and TP2(APP2) 
specifications and 75% in respect of the TP3(APP3) specification). The Participation Parameter 
accordingly measures the management responsibilities of the targeted partner. The requirement that 
this percentage of the work be carried out with resources independent of the non-targeted partners 
effectively limits the amount of work which can be managed by a targeted partner to either 1,33 or 2,0 
times the value of work performed by its own workforce or subcontractors which it hires independently 
from its partners, depending upon which specification is employed. This requirement ensures that the 
targeted partner does contribute to the resources required for the performance of the contract and 
does not merely perform some management function . 
In the ·work breakdown method- in its purest form, where the contract is split into discrete areas of 
responsibility, each partner manages the portion of work for which he is responsible for executing and 
resourcing , and usually does not get involved in the management of portions of work outside of his 
responsibility. Although the partners are jointly and severally bound and assume risk at prime 
contract level, the split contract approach limits interaction between the partners. This is undesirable 
in a development context as targeted partners will have limited exposure to the overall management 
and control of the project. In the "new entity- and ·construction management approaches· to joint 
venture formation, there is considerably more scope for interaction between the targeted partner and 
his other partners. There is furthermore more scope for the targeted partner to manage the 
workforces of his partners. 
The Structured Joint Venture formation promoted by the resource specifications is one in which the 
targeted partner manages and controls workforces in addition to his own or those sourced 
independently from his partners. (Established contractors who engage ABEs in accordance with the 
work breakdown method will in terms of the TP1 (APP1) specification be credited with the same 
amount of credits had they engaged such ABEs as subcontractors. If, however, these ABEs are 
engaged as joint venture partners and the structure of the joint venture formation is such that they are 
permitted to manage resources provided by their non-ABE partner, the credits can be upto twice that 
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which would have been passed had they been engaged as subcontractors). 
8.3.2.2 Initial resource specification provisions 
The initial resource specifications (i.e . those published in the early half of 1996) did not measure the 
Commercially Useful Function performed by a targeted partner in terms of a Participation Parameter, 
but rather on the basis of percentage ownership. Goal credits were granted where Joint Venture 
formation satisfied the ·recognition characteristics· referred to in 8.3.2.2 with the exception that item 
b) read as follows : 
'b) The targeted partner ;s responsible for a clearly defined portion of the work to be performed, 
equivalent to the target partner's ownership percentage. ,. 
The measurement of the Commercially Useful Function performed by a targeted partner on the basis 
of ownership is open to abuse and manipulation. Costs of the various partners can be readily 
manipufated in order to minimise any declared ·profif wh ich would ultimately be divided between the 
partners in proportion to their ownership percentage. The revised versions of the specifications 
addressed this shortcoming by effectively measuring Commercially Useful Function in terms of how 
the Joint Venture is structured. 
8.3.2.3 Joint Venture Formation In order to secure bonus credits for the attainment of 
Affirmative Action Milestones 
The TP1 (APP1) specification makes provision for the awarding of bonus credits to firms who within 
their companies have implemented Affirmative Action Programmes along the lines suggested by the 
Black Management Forum and the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
or firms who do not fully meet the requirements for classification as an ABE. The amount of bonus 
credits is dependent upon the percentage of full time Executive Directors and Senior Managers who 
are Previously Disadvantaged Individuals and in the case of privately owned companies, the 
ownership percentage by Previously Disadvantaged Individuals. 
The TP1(APP1) specification had to address the situation in which the prime contractor might be a 
joint venture and some or all of the jOint venture partners were eligible for bonus credits . The initial 
versions of the specification awarded bonus credits in proportion to a partner's shareholding. This 
practice was discontinued as certain contractors manipulated profits and shareholdings in a joint 
venture in order to maximise their bonus credits. In some instances, "partners" who qualified for full 
bonus credits made little or no contribution to the joint venture. At best, joint venture partners made 
limited contributions. In the later specifICations, bonus credits were confined to partners who were 
engaged primarily in the majority of activities that would be required of a main contractor for the 
execution of the contract and were awarded such credits in proportion to their Participation 
Parameter. 
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8.3.2.4 Provisions for establishing the bona fides of targetedjo;nt venture partners 
The TP1 (APP1) specification contains a number of control documents to enable the bona fides of joint 
venture partners and compliance with the provisions of the specification to be determined. These 
documents comprise: 
• Joint Venture Disclosure Forms 
• Affirmable Enterprise Declaration Affidavits 
8.3.3 Methodology outline 
8.3.3.1 General 
The TP1(APP1 ) specification (Targeting of Affirmable Business Enterprises) (DPW,199B) permits 
contractors to achieve contract participation goals in the performance of their contracts through the 
engagement of ABEs as joint venture partners at prime contract level, ABEs as subcontractors, 
suppliers, service providers and manufacturers, and joint venture subcontractors which involve ABEs, 
Voluntary jOint ventures can also be formed with companies which may not qualify as ABEs in order 
to source ABE subcontractors.6 
Accordingly in order to test the hypothesis it is necessary to; 
i) Examine the Departmental 1993 head office record and the record for the study period in 
order to identify which contracts were awarded to joint ventures. (The author did not attempt 
to identify joint ventures established at subcontract level as data on such arrangements was 
not logged within the department.) 
ii) Establish the status of the partners. viz. ABE or non-ABE. 
iii) Obtain copies of joint venture contracts entered into with ABEs and Joint Venture Disclosure 
Forms in order to confirm that a bona fide joint venture had been entered into. 
iv) Establish by means of questionnaires the reason for joint venture formation and certain 
statistics pertaining to the partners, 
6 The author in collductlng tile research came across several instances In which joint venture partners who did nol qualify as 
ABEs were engaged as joint venture partners to ad as "ABE brokers", A good example of this may be fCKJnd in the 
Malmesbury Prison Contrad where the Atlantis alld District United Builders asSOCiation become a jOint venture partner at prime 
contract level in order to facilitate and secore the participation of its ABE members on the contract. 
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Accordingly, the approach was in the first instance to interrogate the departmental record for the study 
period in order to identify which contracts were awarded to joint ventures and thereafter by means of 
questionnaires to establish the reason for joint venture formation, the nature of the relationship and 
the outcome of such relationships. 
8.3.3.2 Survey Instrument 
The survey instrument used to gather data is a questionnaire. This questionnaire (see Appendix 8.7) 
is divided into 5 sections and is designed to be completed by each partner in the joint venture. 
Section one establishes the profile of the jOint venture partner i.e. the principal business activities, 
annual average turnover and the largest contract handled by a partner on his own prior to the contract 
in question. The remaining questions in this section establish particulars pertaining to joint venture 
formation before and after the contract executed for the Department during the study period. The 
value of the next largest job executed by a partner is also identif.ed. 
Section two establishes the identity of the partners viz. ABE or non-ABE. 
Section three establishes the reason for joint venture formation and identifies in the ABE partner the 
perceived benefits which were derived from executing a contract with an established contractor. 
Section four probes the control of resources and the management structure within the joint venture. 
Section five probes aspects of the nature of the relationship i.e. when and how the joint venture was 
established. It also establishes patterns for repeating joint venture arrangements. 
8.3.3.3 The research sample 
The Departmental record for head office contracts which were awarded during 1993 and the entire 
record for contracts awarded during the study period (1 August 1996 to 1 July 1998) were examined 
in order to establish the universe of contracts awarded to joint ventures. No record of any contract 
award to a joint venture was found in the Oepartment's 1993 head office record. The 15 contracts 
tabulated in Table 8.6 were awarded to joint ventures over the study period (August 1996 to July 
1998) ' . 
7 The Malmesbury Prison contracts (prison complex and housing complex) were awarded to joint ventures. These contracts 
were, however, awarded during July 1996, prior to the State Tender Board granting permission for the Department to pilot the 
inplementatlon of the policy on . 1 its contracts and have therefore been excluded from the study. 
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TABLE 8.6 : CONTRACTS AWARDED TO JOINT VENTURES 
CONTRACT NAME O F JOINT VENTURE DESCRIPTION OF CONTRACT PROCUREMENT TENDER 
NUMBER PARTNER ARRANGEMENTS VALUE 
960114 • Grinaker Construction Lld Wingfield Prison: Erection of single "RDP points· R24915000 
• VRP (SA) (Ply) Lld quarters 
960134 • Group Five Building (Ply) Ltd Oiepkloof Prison: Erection of single "RDP points' R20407010 
• Mnomzana Contractors cc quarters 
960344 • Group Five Building (Ply) Lld Christiana Prison: Upgrading Prime(Major) R7 260 300 
• Makhosi Projects (Ply) Lld TP1 (APP1 ) 
970152 • Alfdav Construction cc JC Stayn Prison: Single Quarters Prime{Major) R9 741 587 
• SBT Construction (Ply) Lld TP1 (APP 1) 
970167 • Alfdav Construction cc Southdene SAP: Regional Garage Prlme(Major) R12 867 407 
• SaT Construction (Ply) Ltd TP1 {APP1 ) 
970178 • Group Five Building (Pty) Lld Knysna: New Magistrate's OffICe & Prime(Major) R21 991 919 
• Makhosi Projects (Ply) Lld PoliCe Stalion TP1 (APP1 ) 
970260 • Elmo Projects Ivory Part< Police Station: Erection Prime(Major) R3043 930 
• Stocks & Stoc;l(,s TP 1(APP1) 
970265 • Concor Engineering Simonstown Naval Base: Dry Dock: Prime(Major) R13011440 
· Marine • Mineral Resources Repairs and Renovations TP 1(APP1) 
(Ply) Lld 
970256 • Brevus Joint Venture Empangeni: New Prison Prime(Major) R1 91 2266:xl 
TP1(APP1) 
970337 • Ediicon Construction (Ply) Lld Eidorado Pa~ Police Station: Prime(Major) R5 777 520 
• Kronen Construction & Paving cc Erection TP1 (APP1) 
970345 • S Raciti Construction cc Maitland Special Guard Unit: Prime(Minor) Rt 580000 
• Enogh & Sons RepairsJ Renovations 
970398 • Concor Holdings Langebaan Road: Rehabilitation of Prime (Major) R16 794 813 
• Lethlabile Construction cc Runways TP1 (APP1 ) 
970412 • Stocks & StoCks (Gallleng) (Ply) Pretoria: Agricultural Buildings: Prime(Major) R21 173250 
Lld Repairs & Renovations TP1 (APP t) 
• Biyana Developments cc 
970420 • P Geroiemou Construction (Ply) Modderbee Prison: Upgrading Prime(Major) R49 498 000 
Lld TP1 (APP1) 
• Nunch Construction 
980003 • Ediicon Construction (Ply) Lld Unden: New Police Station Prime(Major) R5133420 
• Kronen Construction & Paving cc TP1 (APP1) 
Table 8.6 which presents the universe of contracts awarded to joint ventures during the study period 
reveals that : 
• two of the contracts which were awarded during the study period were awarded in the transition 
period prior to the introduction of the APP; 
• one Prime (Minor) contract was awarded to a -voluntary~ jOint venture; and 
• twelve contracts were awarded to joint venture contractors in Prime (Major) contracts where use 
was made of the TP1 (APP1 ) specification for the Targeting of Affirmable Business Enterprises. 
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An attempt was made to secure information on all 15 contracts awarded to joint ventures from the 
archives of the Department of Public Wor1<s. Contractors were approached to obtain their joint 
venture agreements. The detailed information which was obtained is set out in Table 8.7 
Telephonic interviews were conducted with joint ventures which did not complete questionnaires. 
Accordingly, the universe of contracts awarded to joint ventures was interrogated. 
TABLE 8.7: INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM CONTRACTORS 
INFORMAnON REQUIRED NO CONTRACTS FOR WHICH INFORMAnON WAS AVAILABLE 
oN Disclosure Forms (Annex D) 2 
oN Agreements between partners 10 
ABE Declaration Affidavits (Annex C) • 
Questionnaires 12* (see Appendix 8.8) 
* The questionnaires In respect of contrad 970412 was completed by only the non-ABE partner. Accordingly. only 11 
completed questionnaires were obtained. 
8.3.4 Results and the Interprvtatlon thervof 
8.3.4.1 Contracts awarded to joint ventures with ABE Partners 
An examination of the head offtce record for contracts awarded in 1993 revealed that no contracts 
were awarded to joint ventures. An examination of the records during the study period revealed that 
15 contracts had been awarded to joint ventures. 
Statistics pertaining to contracts awarded to joint ventures in the study period are set out in Table 8.6. 
The reasons cited by contractors for joint venture formation and certain key parameters aSSOCiated 
with the contracts are set out in Table 8.B. 
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TABLEB.B : REASONS CITED BY CONTRACTORS FOR JOINT VENTURE FORMATION 
CONTRACT TYPE OF NUMBER OF ABE REASON FOR JV FORMATION 
NUMBER CONTRACT PARTNERS 
Non-ABE ABE 
960114 General 1 "RDP" Points' lack of resources 
960134 General 1 ' RDP' Points' Picked by Non·ABE 
960344 General 1 TP1 (APP1) credits Lack of resources 
970152 General 1 TP1 {APP1) credits Lack of resources 
970167 General 1 TPl(APP1) credits Lack. of resources 
970178 General 1 TP1(APP1 ) credits: ' la aid Lack of resources 
development' 
970260 General 1 TP1(APP1) credits No resources 
970265 Mechanical 0 Technical -
970266 General 0 Affirmative action milestone -
credits' 
970337 General 1 TP1 (APP1) credits Desire to enhance capabilities 
970345 General 0 Joint Venture in name only . 
(contract awarded on basis of 
lOwest financial offer) 
970398 Civil 0 TP 1 (APP1) Affirmative action -
milestone credits 
970412 General 1 Initiated by ABE Lack of capital 
970420 General 1 Initiated by ABE l ack of expertise (capital not a 
problem) 
980003 General 1 TP1 (APP1 ) points Desire to enhance capabilities 
Numerous organisations, some of which were not opera11ng as constructIOn companies, were engaged as JOint venture 
partners in order to secure bonus credits. 
• Contrads awarded during an experimental phase in the run up to the introduction of the policy 
An interrogation of the partners involved in the contracts listed in Table 8.6 revealed that : 
• contract 970265 was formed for technical reasons and did not involve any ABE partners; 
• contract 970345 was awarded to a company which purported to be a jOint venture, but was clearly 
not a joint venture; 
• contract 970398 was formed to access affirmative action milestone credits and did not involve any 
ABE partners; and 
• contract 970266 was awarded to a joint venture comprising a number of companies, some of 
which were not operating as construction companies, in order to access affirmative action 
milestone credits.8 
• This contract caused the Department to review the provisions pertaining to the granting of credits for affirmative action 
milestones, a decision which led to the substantia l revision of the provision of the TP1 (APP1 ) specification in this regard. 
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• contracts 960114 and 960134 were awarded immediately prior to the introduction of the 
Affirmative Procurement Policy. 
Table 5.7 of Chapter 5 presented the full universe of contracts during the study period where ABEs 
were targeted. This table revealed that the total expenditure amounted to R1 652 944 775 and the 
expenditure on the 131 Prime (Major) contracts where use was made of the TP1 (APP1) specifications 
amounted to R1 511 272 845. The contract value of the 9 contracts involving ABEs amounted to 
R136 487 333. These contracts accordingly represent: 
• 8,3% of the total value of contracts where ABE participation was sought in terms of the policy. 
• 9,0% of the total value of contracts where use was made of the TP1 (APP1) speCification. 
• 6,9% of the total number of contracts where use was made of the TP1(APP1) specification. 
All nine contracts awarded to joint ventures involving ABEs were classified as being "general". The 
average value of general contract awarded to such joint ventures amounted to R15,1 million. This 
figure is higher than the average value of contract of R11 ,5 million derived from Table 5.7. 
Questionnaires were completed by the ABE partners who entered into joint venture contracts 
immediately prior to the introduction of the policy. The author has not included these two contracts in 
the results as they were awarded in the run up to the introduction of the Affirmative Procurement 
Policy. Accordingly the universe of joint ventures contracts entered into with ABEs at prime contract 
level during the study period is 9; the universe of ABE firms involved in such joint ventures being 6 as 
3 of the ABEs were involved in more than one jOint venture. 
8.3.4.2 Analysis of questionnaires 
General 
Completed questionnaires were obtained from both the ABE and non-ABE partners involved in seven 
of the nine joint venture contracts involving ABE partners. (see Appendix 8.8) (Two of the three 
repeat joint ventures are included in this sample). This sample of five ABEs is considered to be 
representative of the universe. 
An analysis of the questionnaires filled in by the five ABEs involved as joint venture partners in these 
contracts revealed the following : 
• four of the ABEs described their principal business activities as being building and civils and only 
one as buikjing only. In contrast, their non-ABE partners listed themselves as being building 
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contractors: 
• the current estimated average annual turnover of three of the ABEs was in the range R1 ~R2 
million: one in the range R20~25 million and the other greater than 25 million: 
• two of the ABE partners indicated that they no longer enjoy ABE status at the time they 
completed the questionnaire as their tu movers exceeded the limits laid down in the definition for 
an ABE : 
• two of the ABE partners indicated that they had entered into a couple of joint ventures prior to 
being awarded contracts by the Department: 
• three of the ABE partners indicated that the largest contract which they had handled as a prime 
contractor was less than R1,O million; one in the range R3~R5 million; one in the range R5~10m; 
and 
• all ABE partners classified themselves as being prime contractors. 
Capacity consideration 
Four of the five ABEs cited ~Iack of capacity" as being a reason for joint venture formation . An 
analysis of reasons cited by ABEs for lack of capacity is tabulated in Table 8.9. Only statistics 
pertaining to the first of the joint ventures entered into are recorded in Table B.9 in the case of ABEs 
who entered into more than one joint venture during the study period. Data gathered from the two 
contracts awarded during the study period but not in terms of the policy are included in Table B.9 in 
order to increase the number of responses. The reasons cited by the six ABEs are also ranked and 
presented in order of importance in Table S.9. 
The ranking of ABEs in order of importance in Table B.9 indicates the following trends: 
• The primary reason cited by most ABEs entering into joint venture formation with non-ABEs was 
to secure access to start-up capital, capital to first certificate, capital between certificates, 
sureties and expertise in contract administration. 
• The second most important reason cited for joint venture formation was to secure access to 
management expertise, plant (major and minor), suitable staff and management and 
organisational administrative knowledge. 
• Access to finance for retention , legal expertise, guarantees and staff with skills and premises 
was seen by some to be a factor. 
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• lack of staff with available skills and lack of client liaison expertise were not consktered to be a 
factor. 
TABLE 8.9 : ANALYSIS OF REASONS CITED BY ABEa FOR LACK OF CAPACITY • 
DE8CRIPTlON PERCENTAGE OF RANKING IN TERMS OF FREQUENCY OF 
RESPONDENTS REPORTlNG 
INDICAnNG A LACK DURING STUDY PERIOD WHERE POLICY WAS 
OF CAPACITY" APPLIED AND IN RUN UP TO IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE POLICY 
ExpertJ .. 
- Management 75 (SO) 2 
- legal expertise SO (SO) 3 
- contrad administration 75 (100) 1 
- dient liaison 0(0) -
Property 
- plant (major and minor) SO (100) 2 
- equipment SO (50) 3 
- premises SO (0) 4 
Capital 
- start-up capital 75 (100) 1 
- capital to first certificate 75 (100) 1 
- capital between certificates 75 (100) 1 
- sureties 75 (100) 1 
- guarantees SO (SO) 3 
- finance for retention o (SO) 5 
Efforts 
- No suitable staff in employ SO (.100) 2 
- No suitable staff available 25 (O) 5 
Skills 
- Staff did not have skills 50 (50) 3 
- Staff with skills not available -
Knowfedge 
Staff could not perform contract due to: 
- Technical kn~ 25 (0) 5 
- Management knowledge 75 (SO) 2 
- Organisation I administrative 75 (50) 2 
knowledge 
tf. Table only reflects data fat" ABEs who cited lack of capacity as a reason for forming a joint venture. 
• Values in brackets reflects data gathered from the two contracts awarded during the study period but not In terms of the 
policy. 
All ABEs who entered into joint ventures for capacity reasons confirmed that their joint venture partner 
performed the functions which were lacking and performed them adequately. They all also confirmed 
that they had benefited more as an ABE partner through the contract than as a subcontractor. The 
two ABEs having turnovers of less than R2 million per annum stated that as joint venture partners 
they had received more responsibilities and more work. The two ABEs who have now outgrown their 
ABE status stated that they had acquired technical, management and administrative skills through the 
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execution of the contract as a joint venture partner. 
One of the ABEs with a comparatively low turnover considered that the relationship provided his 
company with an opportunity to develop technical and administrative skills. The other three recorded 
that they had benefited through ·exposure~ in these contracts. 
The ABE who stated that "lack of capacitt was not a reason for joint venture formation stated with 
respect to both of the contracts which were executed in joint venture with the same partner, that his 
company had not benefited from the relationship as his ·partner ignored the agreement". 
The author, during the study, learnt that the joint venture involving this ABE (contract 980003) was 
acrimoniously terminated during the performance of the contract. The author notes, however, that the 
ABE in question claimed to have executed contracts having a value of less than R1 ,Om prior to 
entering into joint venture and currently had a turnover of between R1 and R2 million. The contract 
executed in joint venture had a value of R5,1 million and was clearly outside the capacity and 
capabilities of this ABE, should the ABE have attempted to execute the contract on its own. The 
author has accordingly not included data from this joint venture in the subsequent results for this 
specific aspect being analysed. 
The author notes, however, that the non-ABE partner in contract 980003 did indicate that the contract 
was completed successfully and on time. 
Performance of the Joint Venture 
80th the ABE and non-ABE partners in all 7 contracts indicated that the contract was completed 
successfully and on time. 
Potential for future joint venture arrangements 
The responses of the five joint venture partners (both ABE and non-ABE) to the questions posed in 
the questionnaires on future joint venture arrangements is summarised in Table 8.10. 
TABLE 8.10: RESPONSES FOR FUTURE JOINT VENTURE ARRANGEMENTS 
ASPECT 
The following trends emerge from an analysis of this portion of the questionnaire ; 
• Most non-ABE partners were prepared to form a joint venture with the same partner; the 
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exception being the nonMABE who terminated one of his joint venture relationships with a 
particular ABE. 
• The perception of all non-ABE partners was that their ABE partners did not take advantage of 
them during the contract On the other hand, the perception of ABEs to the non-ABE partner 
taking advantage of them was evenly divided. 
• All partners (ABEs and nonMABEs), with the exception of the non-ABE who terminated one of his 
joint venture relationships with one the ABEs in the sample considered that jOint venture 
formation, is worthwhile. 
Perceptions of roles played by partners in the Joint venture 
The partner's perceptions of the roles played by partners in all seven joint ventures for which 
questionnaires were completed is presented in Table 8.11 . 
TABLE 8.11: PERCEPTIONS OF ROLES PLAYED BY PARTNERS IN THE JOINT VENTURES 
ASPECT OF CONTROL 
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It is apparent from Table 8.11 that non-ABE and ABE partners in several of the joint ventures did not 
fully understand their roles and participation in the Joint venture as the responses for perceived 
theoretical participation and perception of who the lead partner was, was not always the same. Just 
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over half the ABEs claim to have managed or controlled resources of their non-ABE partner whereas 
only one non-ABE claimed to have managed and controlled the resources of his ABE partner. In 
contrast, just over half of the ABEs claimed that their non-ABE partners managed or controlled their 
resources. 
This lack of clarity in the roles and responsibilities of the partners may be attributed to a lack of 
understanding of the policy and failure to complete the relevant control form. Only two Joint Venture 
Disclosure Forms could be located. 
The ABE partner in contract 970152 who differed greatly in his perceived theoretical participation from 
his ABE partner indicated that he was not prepared to enter into a repeat relationship with his non-
ABE partner. 
8.3.4.3 Legal relationships 
The TP1(APP1) specification requires that written joint venture agreements be entered into. Joint 
Venture agreements were obtained in respect 8 of the 9 of the joint ventures formed with ABEs in 
terms of the TP1(APP1) specification. Table 8.12 sets out the areas covered in the various joint 
venture agreements. 
All 7 of the joint ventures involving ABE partners which completed the questionnaires indicated that 
they had entered into joint venture agreements prior to submitting the tender. 
Any analysis of the broad content of the jOint venture agreements revealed that aspects such as the 
powers and duties of the management committee, the functions and duties of the partners, banking, 
books of account, auditors, workman's compensation, safety and security and secrecy were not 
addressed in any of the documents. Agreements ranged from single page documents to 
comprehensive agreements. In two of the three repeat joint ventures, the content of the joint venture 
changed from the one contract to the next. 
One ABE partner in the first of the two contracts executed with the same partner indicated that the 
first joint venture agreement was not comprehensive. An analysis of the contents of both 
agreements indicated that in the second agreement provision was made for definitions, project 
management and administration, and plant and equipment. The ABE who entered into a joint 
venture using a one page joint venture indicated that the agreement was not comprehensive enough. 
Interestingly, although the ABE indicated a willingness to enter into future jOint venture arrangements, 
this ABE indicated an unwillingness to do so with the same partner. 
None of the partners in the seven joint ventures indicated that a lack of clarity in the joint venture 
agreement resulted in a dispute. 
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No record of any joint venture formation could be found in the head office record for contracts 
awarded during 1993. Evidence of forced joint venture formation could be found in the study period 
immediately prior to the awarding of tenders in accordance with the Affirmative Procurement Policy. 
It was found that during the study period, the Affirmative Procurement Policy resulted in 7% of the 
prime (major) contracts, accounting for 9% of the value of such contracts, being executed by joint 
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ventures formed at the prime contract level between one non-ABE partner and one ABE partner: such 
joint ventures being formed on a voluntary basis and not on the insistance of the Department. 
The research indicated that : 
• The ABE partners in most of these joint ventures entered into joint venture formation with non-
ABEs due to a lack of capacity to execute such contracts on their own. 
• The primary capacity constraints are access to start-up capital, working capital, sureties and 
expertise in contract administration. 
• Secondary capacity constraints included access to management expertise, plant (major and 
minor), su itable staff and management and organisational administrative knowledge. 
• A small number of ABEs cited access to finance for retention , legal expertise, and staff with skills 
and premises as a motivation for forming a joint venture. 
• Lack of available staff and lack of client liaison expertise were not considered to be a reason for 
entering into joint venture formation. 
• All ABEs who entered into joint ventures for capacity reasons confirmed that their joint venture 
partners performed the functions which they were lacking and performed them adequately. They 
also confirmed that they had benefited more as jOint venture partners than had they acted as 
subcontractors. 
• Only one of the joint venture agreements was terminated by the partners. 
• Most non-ABE partners were prepared to fonn a subsequent joint venture with the same partner. 
• Non-ABE partners considered that their ABE partners did not take advantage of them in the 
performance of the contract. ABE partners were divided on this issue in so far as their non-ABE 
partners were concerned. 
• Only the ABE partner whose agreement was terminated considered that joint venture formation is 
not worthwhile. 
• All joint ventures were constituted in terms of a written agreement. 
The author did observe a lack of clarity in the perception of the partners' roles of responsibilities and 
attributes these to a lack of familiarity with the policy and a failure to complete some of the relevant 
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control forms. Nevertheless, the author considers that the policy's recognition characteristics for a 
Structured Joint Venture were in the main complied with. 
The author concludes that Structured Joint Ventures are an effective means of transferring expertise 
as all the ABEs interviewed confirmed that they had benefited more as joint venture partners than had 
they acted as subcontractors. This finding differs from those of Ofori (1991) who made the 
observation that despite there being a number of success stories, joint ventures seldom resulted in 
the effective transfer of expertise. The author contends that the structuring of the joint ventures to 
conform with the stringent requirements provided for in the Affirmative Procurement Policy may 
account for discrepancies between observed results in the application of the policy and those from 
other countries. 
8.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The research reported on in 8.2.5 and 8.3.5 supports both the sub-hypothesis which were tested viz. : 
1) The application of the policy has resulted in better regulated relationships between prime 
contractors and subcontractors. 
2) The policy promotes joint venture relationships between established contractors and 
Affirmable Business Enterprises. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS IDENTIFIED 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
9.1 
9.1 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF 
RESEARCH 
9.1.1 Phase 1 : Focus of research and conclusions 
Phase 1 of the research provides the background and conceptual and theoretical framework 
within which the evaluation of the Affirmative Procurement Policy was conducted during Phase 2 
of the research. This Phase of the research focused on the nature of the construction industry in 
South Africa, its role in reconstruction and development and the role which the state can play in 
promoting the improved functioning of the South African construction market through selective 
interventions. The author, via a review of the most recent international and local literature, ( 
concludes that the South African construction industry, as with other construction industries in 1 
other developing countries, is £entral to the process of economic and social development. It may 
as such be regarded as a barometer for the level of economic activity taking place in the country. 
An evaluation of economic trends and policy pronouncements indicated potential growth for the 
South African construction industry, in the medium to long term. An analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the South African construction industry was then conducted, with the author 
concluding that this industry has several comparative advantages in the Southern African region . 
There is, however, a need for the development of an integrated industrial development plan for 
the construction industry, to ensure that the construction industry in South Africa is appropriately 
geared and located to meet the challenges of the envisaged growth trajectory in the medium to 
long term. The author proposes that the Construction Industry Development Programme, 
currently co-ordinated by the national Department of Public Works, could serve as an appropriate 
mechanism to engage the various industry stakeholders in the process of formulating a 
development strategy for the construction industry in South Africa, and also proposes a process 
for the development of such a strategy. 
In analysing the weaknesses of the South African construction industry, the issues of skewed 
ownership patterns arising from the system of apartheid within the South African construction 
industry and the barriers to entry for emerg ing construction enterprises were identified as barriers 
that needed to be resolved in order for the construction industry in South Africa to flourish . The 
role of the state in the construction industry was then explored. The multi-faceted roles of the 
state as an investor, as a regulator, and as a policy formulator, were identified as areas where the 
state could contribute in the development of a coherent industrial development strategy for the 
construction industry. 
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Public sector procurement as an instrument of policy was then investigated by reviewing 
international experience on the subject. This analysis indicated that most countries, in both the 
developed and the developing wortd, utilised public sector procurement as an instrument to give 
effect to certain policy priorities. An analysis of public sector procurement policy in South Africa 
in the pre 1994 and post 1994 era was then conducted. The author concludes that the South 
African government, in the post 1994 era, made an explicit commitment via Clause 217 of the 
Constitution to utilise public sector procurement as a vehicle to promote socio-economic policy 
priorities and as a mechanism to address historical inequities. 
The role of Affirmable Business Enterprises (small businesses which are owned, managed and 
controlled by previously disadvantaged persons) in the South African construction industry was 
then analysed, together with the constraints confronting ABEs in the South African construction 
industry. 
The rationale for the focus on ABEs in the South African construction industry, was also 
presented. The author concludes that the need to promote Affirmable Business Enterprises in 
the South African construction industry should not only be argued on the basis of addressing 
historical inequities, but more importantly, on the basis of enhancing competitiveness and 
efficiencies within the overall South African construction industry. The author contends that the 
adoption of the Affirmative Procurement Policy and its implementation by the National 
Department of PubliC Works in South Africa, is an attempt by the South African government to 
utilise public sector procurement as a mechanism to promote ABEs in the construction industry, 
thereby contributing to greater efficiencies within the overall construction industry in South Africa. 
Having defined the theoretical framework within which the Affinmative Procurement Policy is 
located, Phase 2 of the research focuses on the evaluation of the Affirmative Procurement Policy_ 
9.1.2 Phase 2 : Research Findings and Conclusions 
This phase of the research evaluated the primary policy outcomes of the APP, whis was adopted 
and operationalised by the National Department of Public Works, in order to test the effectiveness 
of the utilisation of public sector procurement to promote ABEs in the construction industry. The 
assessment of the primary policy outcomes of the APP was conducted through: 
• the development of appropriate indices; 
• the development of a diagnostic quadrant comparator, which measures ABE participation 
across different construction sub-sectors and categories; and 
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• the financial premiums incurred by the state in giving effect to this policy. 
An analysis of the contracts awarded by the Department of Public Works for the period 1 August 
1996 until the period 31 June 1998, indicated an order of magnitude increase in ABE 
participation, following the application of the Affirmative Procurement Policy, whilst incurring a 
nominal financial premium. The extent of ABE participation varied across construction 
categories, with the most significant benefits observed in contracts above a R2 million threshold, 
where ABE participation as sub-contractors increased significantly. For contracts in the less than 
R2 million category, where direct preferences for ABEs were provided, noticeable increases in 
participation were observed, but these were not as significant as in the above R2 million category. 
This analysis indicates that subcontracting provides a useful and important mechanism for 
increasing ABE participation in the construction industry, but that a greater effort should be 
placed on the promotion of ABEs as prime contractors in the different construction categories. 
The participation of ABEs across the different contracting subsectors, indicated significantly 
higher participation in the general construction subsector with limited increases in the civil, 
electrical and mechanical sub-sectors. The author concludes that the limited increases in the 
laHer three, could be ascribed to minimal ABE absorptive capacity in these specific subsectors, 
i.e. there are insuffiCient numbers of ABEs able to access this market segment despite there 
being direct preferences in place to favour the award of tenders to them. 
This research supports the Cluster 1 sub-hypotheses, namely: 
• The National Department of Public Works can promote Increased participation by 
ABEs in the construction economy via its Affirmative Procurement Policy. 
• The adoption of the Affirmatiave Procurement Policy has resulted in the state bearing 
limited financial premium, when compared to the initial projected outcomes and 
overall benefits. 
The author made an assessment of performance of ABEs and non-ABEs, who were awarded 
contracts by the National Department of Public Works, during the research period. This research 
found that non-ABEs performed better than ABEs as prime contractors in the general contracts 
subsector for the price range between R1 00000 and R2 million. More specifically, ABEs tended 
to start their contracts later than non-ABEs, once the contracts have been awarded. This was 
ascribed to various factors, including problems associated with the mobilisation of sureties, and 
their inability to mobilise adequate human resources and plant within the defined time frames. It 
was also noted that a significant percentage of ABEs tended to submit their payment certificates 
late, impacting negatively on their operating cash flows. Many of the ABE contractors did not 
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utilise appropriate expertise in formulating their payment certificate submissions. In analysing 
general aspects of management and its impact on overall contractor performance, it was found 
that in certain areas, ABEs had limitations. The areas of document management and lack of 
flexibility to handle variations during the construction phase were particularly noticed. It was also 
found that non-ABEs produced higher quality work. The occurrence of the utilisation of sub-
standard materials was identified with greater frequency, on ABE contracts. The research 
concluded that notwithstanding the increased procurement opportunities that were offered to 
ABEs via the Affirmative Procurement Policy, supply side constraints and overall management 
limitations impacted negatively on their ability to perform to the same level as their non-ABE 
counterparts. 
This research supported the hypothesis that performance differences exist between ABEs and 
non-ABEs in building contracts in the price range R100 000 to R2 million. This in turn supports 
the first of the Cluster 2 subhypotheses, namely: 
• Increased procurement opportunities to ABEs via government's APP in a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for full enablement of ABEs in the construction sector. 
Following from the analysis of the primary policy outcomes of the APP, where limited participation 
of ABEs was noted in the civil, mechanical and electrical subsectors, the research then tested if 
differing entry level thresholds restricted ABE participation in these subsectors. The research 
concludes that the concentration of ABEs in the general contract subsector, could be largely 
ascribed to the differences of approach in the management of construction projects by ABEs and 
non-ABEs. ABE owners tend to perform most technical aspects of contract acquisition and 
management themselves, whereas non-ABE owners tend to delegate this function to technically 
qualified individuals. The author concludes that by concentrating key managerial tasks under 
owners, and not delegating them to professionally and technically qualified individuals, ABEs 
established operational limitations which have had a significant impact on their ability to penetrate 
other construction subsectors. The author proposes that these management practices have a 
greater influence on subsector participation by ABEs than external entry thresholds. 
ThiS research supported the second of the Cluster 2 subhypotheses namely: 
• ABE participation varies according to subsector entry thresholds. 
The author noted the significance of ABE participation at a subcontracting level in the application 
of the APP and tested the impact of the APP on ABE subcontractors under requirements for 'fair' 
subcontracting practices. The research concluded that the APP acted as a catalyst for 
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formalising the ABE subcontracting sector, and that many ABE subcontractors registered as 
formal business during the period under review. Whilst APP requirements of 'fair' subcontracting 
practices assisted in formalising relationsh ips between prime contractors and ABE 
subcontractors, many of the written subcontracts did not comply with the 'fair' subcontract 
principles required by the APP. It was also found that the majority of prime contractors and 
principal agents were not familiar with the APP specifications in this regard , and that compliance 
monitoring of subcontracting requirements was not evident. Prime contractors and principa l 
agen ts who participated in the research , supported the 'unfair' subcontract provisions pertaining 
to the right of set-off by the employing contractor and 'pay when paid' procedures. Th is in the 
author's view contributed to their inability to implement and monitor compliance of the APP 
requirements in th is area. 
The research also concluded that there was a s ignificant increase in the number of joint ventures I 
fanned between ABEs and non-ABEs with the application of the APP. Whilst there was a lack of 
clarity of each parties' roles and responsibilities in these joint ventures, ABE partners were 
observed to have benefited from these joint ventures via skills transfer and augmentation of their 
own capacity. ABEs, who participated in these joint ventures, indicated that these relationships \ 
were more beneficial to them, than had they acted as subcontractors on these contracts. 
This abovementioned research supports the Cluster 3 subhypotheses, namely: 
• 
• 
The APP promotes joint venture relationships between established contractors and 
ABEB. 
The application of the APP has resulted in better regulated relationships between 
prime contractors and subcontractors. 
9.1.3 Research conclusions 
The Phase 2 research demonstrated through the testing of the abovementioned sub-hypotheses 
that: 
1) The Department of Public WOf1<.s can utitise procurement to promote increased 
participation by small businesses which are owned, managed and controlled by 
previously disadvantaged individuals with nominal increases in construction costs. 
2) There are several COnstraints wh ich differ between construction subsectors which need to 
be addressed to enable ABEs to access markets and to grow to their full potential. As a 




3) Procurement policies can improve access to mar1c:ets and may lead to the establishment 
of enabling and better regulated relationships with larger companies. 
The Phase 2 research accordingly confirms the hypothesis that was tested, namely that: 
The public sector in South Africa can contribute to the increased participation of 
Affirmable Busln .. s Enterprises in the construction Industry via the Implementation of the 
Afflnnative Procurement Policy. 
9.1.4 The significance of the research 
The process of effecting fundamental change in the structure of enterprise participation in the 
construction sector, is complex. Change at scale, which will have an impact, may result from: 
1) A market empowerment process operating in the South African economy in terms of the 
changes in the structure of equity ownership of large firms. 
2) The establishment and nurturing of significant numbers of construction related SMEs owned 
by previously disadvantaged individuals. 
The APP applied by the Department of Public Works used procurement as an instrument of policy 
to support the growth in the participation of ABEs (SMEs owned, managed and controlled by 
POls) in order to redress skewed business ownership patterns in South Africa arising from the 
system of apartheid. The research reported on in Chapter 5, demonstrates an order of 
magnitude increase in ABE partiCipation levels. The author concludes that this demonstrates that 
the APP is an effective policy instrument that should be utilised within the public sector, to 
enhance ABE participation and growth of this sector. 
Through the research into the outcomes of the policy reported in Chapter 5, the author has 
developed various indices, culminating in a simple management tool to interpret, monitor and 
evaluate the APP outcomes. The quadrant comparator, which was developed, can be used to 
reassess policies and to modify or fundamentally change such policies, where it is necessary. 
The research into varying entry thresholds for different constructton subsectors found that ABEs 
impose limitations on their operations by concentrating key areas of operational responsibility on 
the owners and not delegating them to professionally and technically qualified individuals. This 
practice is considered to have more influence on their activities than external subsector 
thresholds. These significance of this, is that the growth in the number of professionally qualified 
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persons with suitable management exposure in the electrical. mechanical and civil subsectors is 
necessary to increase ABE participation in these subsectors, 'rather than the commonly accepted 
supply side measures such as business development and access to finance. 
Research into ABE performance in Chapter 6, demonstrated that there could be performance 
differences between ABEs and non·ABEs with respect to time frames, management factors, 
safety and quality control. The research suggests that the structuring of training and mentoring 
interventions after contract awards, need to be revisited. ~_upply side interventions need to be 
focused on improving ABE performance, rather than generic business skills. The research also 
presents a methodology to assess disparities and performance between ABEs and non-ABEs. 
The research, as such, can be used to benchmark the success or othelWise, of supply side 
interventions. Where there is no disparity in performance between ABEs and non- ABEs, there is 
no justification for supply side interventions. 
The research presented in Chapter 8 on the impact of the APP on contracting relations in the 
construction market, demonstrated that the policy can be used to regu late the relationships 
between ABEs and non·ABEs, and can serve as a catalyst to formalise businesses and widen the 
tax base. The research also demonstrates that contrary to some international studies, jOint ) 
ventures which were structured in accordance with the provisions of the APP, are effective in the I 
transference of expertise, without exposing the client body to significant risk. 
The research has demonstrated that the State can, via appropriate interventions and policy 
choices, including the utilisation of public sector procurement as a mechanism, achieve social 
and economic objectives. This research as such provides a starting point for further research in 
South Africa that focuses on the utilisation of public sector procurement as an instrument to 
realise social objectives. Whilst this research was located within the construction sector, the 
theoretical framework and research methodology adopted, provides the basis for similar studies 
in other industry sectors. This research can provide useful pointers to policy formulators, and 
those entrusted with the implementation of preferential procurement policies, provided for in 
Section 217 (3) of the Republic of South Africa's Constitution, and the recently enacted 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 2000 (Act 5 of 2000). (Refer to 9.5). 
9.2 Recommendations for refinement In the Affirmative Procurement Policy. 




1. For contracts In the Prime (Minor) and Prime (Micro) category, the APP should be 
amended from the assignment of upto 10 points to equity owned by previously 
disadvantaged persons, to the aSSignment of adJudic.tJon points for ABE status. 
Arising from this research, the Department of Public Works is currently allocating adjudication 
points on the basis of ABE status. However, this needs to be fonnally endorsed by the State 
Tender Board, as it departs from the current State Tender Board Regulations. This will not only 
ensure that there is an alignment of the APP for the contracts less than R2 million and con!tacts 
greater than R2 million, but will also ensure that adjudication points are not only assigned for 
ownership, but also for operational responsibility which is included in the ABE definition, thereby 
minimising opportunities for 'tronting ' to access state contracts. 
2. The maximum value of the contract participation goal in Prime (Major) contracts 
above which no further adjudication point8 are awarded, should be Increased for 
contracts having a value of not more than R15,O million and the financial value 
used to demarcate Prime (Minor) contracts should be lowered to R1,O million. 
The author bases this recommendation on the observation that there is limited participation of 
ABEs as prime contractors in Prime (Major) contracts having a value not exceeding R15 million 
and the ABE participation in Prime (Minor) contracts is significantly lower than in Prime (Major) 
contracts. This recommendation will extend the range of subcontracting opportunities down to 
contracts having a value of Ri ,0 million and will create a preference for ABE prime contractors in 
contracts in the range R1 ,O million to R15,0 million. ABE participation will be increased as 
contracts not executed by ABE prime contractors will still secure ABE participation at a 
subcontract level or through joint venture relationships. 
The author proposes that the contract participation goal above which no further adjudication 
points be awarded, is increased from 40% to 100% in respect of Prime (Major) contracts having 
an estimated contract value of less than R15 million. A threshold of R15 million has been 
selected to encourage ABEs currently operating as prime contractors in contracts in the below R2 
million category, to work on larger contracts as prime contractors, whilst affording non-ABEs the 
opportunity to participate competitively in this category via the attainment of appropriate contract 
participating goals. The R15 million upper threshold should be reconsidered and assessed after 
an appropriate period of implementation of this change. It is not recommended that this change 
be applied to contracts in excess of R15 million at this stage, as it is more than likely that the 
contractors participating in construction contracts in excess of R15 million as prime contractors, 
are no longer ABEs as they will in al\ probability have exceeded their tumover thresholds. 
9.9 
This recommendation will also allow statistics linked to ABE participation to be more accurately 
determined, where ABEs execute contracts at a prime contractor level. 
3. The points awarded for development objectives associated with the APP should be 
reduced to a value less than 10. 
The author makes this recommendation based on the observation that the low financial premium 
that has been paid, via the application of the APP, in both Prime {Minor} and Prime (Micro) 
contracts, where direct preferencing has been applied, and on Prime (Major) contracts where the 
contract participation goal has been used as the primary means to ensure ABE participation, has 
been nominal. 
This recommendation if implemented will cause the maximum potential financial premium to be 
reduced from the current 11 ,1% to a significantly lower financial premium. As a starting point, the 
points can be reduced to 5. (This would reduce the maximum potential financial premium to 
5,5%). This arrangement should be reassessed after an appropriate period of monitoring 
contract awards. The benefit of this approach would be two fold viz: 
1) There would be a reduction of risk exposure to the state and to the fiscus, without 
compromising increased ABE participation in construction projects. 
2) The points which are not utilised can be granted for other socio-economic objectives, e.g. 
the addressing of gender imbalances and job creation. 
4. Structured joint ventures using the APP 2 (Affirmable Partners) and APP3 
(Targeted Partners) needs to be introduced to supplement the current targeting 
strategy in the civil, electrical and mechanical subsectors. 
The targeting strategy for ABE participation in the civil, electrical and mechanical subsections 
needs to be modified noting the low level of ABE participation in these subsectors. 
5. The minimum contract participation goal applicable to general, electrical , civil and 
mechanical contracts in the Prime (Major) category of contracts be reduced to 
zero. 
The specification for relatively high minimum contract participation goals in tender documents, 
can lead to distortions in the market and potentially significant indirect (or non-calculable) 
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premiums being incurred. Whilst there might have been a need to specify minimum contract 
participation goals in the early implementation stages of the programme of this nature to ensure 
minimum compl~nce, the author considers such measures to be no longer necessary. 
6. The Department of Public Works, In conjunction with construction industry stake 
holders, via the Construction Industry Development Programme, should develop 
pro-fonna subcontracting contract agreements for the different categories of sub-
contracting that take place on construction projects, and which Include the 'fair' 
subcontracting principles Included In the current APP specifications. 
The inclusion of 'fair' subcontracting principles in the APP specification, and the flexibility afforded 
to prime contractors to develop their own subcontracts which embody th!!se 'fair' principles have 
not resulted in the desired outcomes. If for this reason that these agreements should be 
developed. 
7. A similar process to that outlined for subcontractors, recommendation 6 should be 
adopted to develop a pro-fonna joint venture agreement. 
The research has indicated that requirements of the APP with regard to structured joint ventures, 
have not been captured in the various joint venture agreements, which were analysed. Such 
documentation would facilitate jOint venture formation in accordance with the APP. 
Over and above the above recommendations for refinements to the APP. the author also 
recommends the following : 
1) The methodology of data capture and contract categorisation outlined in the research, 
should be adopted by the Department to ensure a more effective data capturing process 
and a better downstream analysis of data. 
2) The indices developed in Chapter 5, culminating in the development of the quadrant 
comparator should be utilised by the Department to evaluate the outcomes of the APP. 
3) The Department shoukt introduce a system to accredit departmental project managers 
and external consultants, who represent the Department, and administer such contracts. 
The accreditation should be based on demonstrable competence and an undertaking to 
adhere to a code of conduct and to follow departmental procedures. Both will ensure that 
the provisions of the resource specifications are applied, and that compliance is enforced, 
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particularly in respect of joint venture relationships and the conditions of subcontract. 
The author records that on the basis of these research findings , the Department has 
already commenced with a process of accreditation. It is also proposed that the 
Department only utilises the services of persons who are accredited, to oversee the 
implementation of the policy at a project level. 
4) Public sector programs such as the Emerging Contractor Development Programme of the 
Department, should be revisited and re-aligned to include the enhancement of ABE 
performance during contract execution by addressing items where performance problems 
were encountered by ABEs, which are referred to in Chapter 6 of this research. The 
Department's project management cycle for construction projects should also be modified 
to allow a greater flexibility on times for commencement and completion on Prime (Minor) 
contracts to cater for the needs of small contractors. 
9.3 Research Limitations 
9.3.1 Department of Public Works Data Set 
The research was confined to an analysis of the Department of Public Works' data set. The data 
for the general contracting category was well populated, whilst data in the electrical, mechanical 
and civil categories is limited. Whilst this is primarily ascribed to the nature to the work that was 
undertaken by the Department, it does place some limitations on the conclusions arrived at, 
regarding ABE involvement, particularly in the mechanical , electrical and civil construction 
subsectors. In the envisaged roll-out of the APP programme to various provincial works 
departments and local authorities, it would be important to incorporate data from those entities at 
the appropriate time to further populate under represented areas and test the validity of the 
findings of this research in these subsectors. 
9.3.2 Real Time Analysis 
The research focused on the application of the Affirmative Procurement Policy for the period 1 
August 1996 until 1 July 1998. This period of analysis allowed for ABEs that were currently 
operational or were operational prior to the policy application , to access procurement 
opportunities. The author is of the view that the period of analysis was of suffiCient length to 
provide for the representative analysis that is reported on. The author, however, proposes that a I' 
longer research time frame will further enhance the current research findings, as it will allow the 
development and formation of new ABEs to be probed and to track the growth of existing ABEs, 
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as a result of the policy application. A real time analysis of data, taking due cognisance of \ 
relatively long incubation periods, for small construction enterprises to develop, would contribute 
significantly to the value of research, for both policy monitoring and evaluation. 
9.4 FURTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH 
9.4.1 Real Time Analysis 
The author recommends that the Department continue to gather and analyse data on the 
outcomes of the policy in order to assess and evaluate the outcomes of the policy. Research 
which is directed at establishing the absorbtive capacity of small businesses having the same 
turnover thres~olds as provided for in the ABE definition needs to be conducted in each of the 
construction subsectors. This information is required to enable the Department to assess where 
measured participation levels are appropriately located in relation to the probable maximum 
participation level. The research is also necessary to enable the Department to manage the \ 
continuance of the Affirmative Procurement Policy in specific subsectors and for politicians to 
make informed decisions regarding sunset criteria pertaining to the programme. 
9.4.2 The performance of Affirmative Business Enterprise as prime contractors 
9.4.2.1 General 
The author recommends that the Department continues and extends the research reported on 
chapter 6 to all contracts in the price range R100 000 to R2 000 000. The research reported in 
6.3 was directed at general contracts, and was conducted through interviews with project 
managers and principal agents. The author recommends that the scope be extended to all 
contract types. The survey method should be adjusted to provide for data recording by project 
managers. Review of the consistency of data recording should be done periodically by research 
personnel to correct any regional variance in interpretation of data requirements. The extension of 
research across all subsectors will provide for analysis of the full universe of qualifying tenders, 
and will provide comparative inter-sector data. 
The author sought to gather data on external factors that may assist to characterise research 
results, as reported in 6.4. Reliable data could not be obtained for the location of the contract, the 
age of the company and the number of permanent employees. The author recommends that 
these be added to the questionnaire to be completed by the project manager. 
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The author notes that research into company age was conducted through the Registrar of 
Companies. Inadequate information was indicated for a significant proportion of the sample. The 
author recommends that a separate study be undertaken to confirm company status for all 
awarded tenders in the research price range . This research is recommended to test a core 
compliance requirement for APP participation, being formal company status and compliance with 
tax obligations. 
9.4.2.2 Management factors 
With respect to improving the understanding of management factors in contracts in the research 
price range, the author recommends further research. In 6.5.2 the author postulates that a causal 
relationship may exist between timeous submission of payment certificates and credit and 
materials supply problems . The author recommends that a pilot study be instituted to test the 
relationship between employment of quantity surveyors by ABEs and statistical improvement in 
submission of payment certificates. The recommended research should also test for relationships 
between employment of quantity surveyors and improvement in availability of supplier credit and 
materials supply. 
SUCh a pilot study should also be designed to produce data on the relationship between 
employment of quantity surveyors and (i) improvements in product quality by ABEs, and (ii) 
reduced use of sub·standard materials. Both of these factors are shown to increase the risks of 
ABE participation for the department. Such additional research will indicate the extent to which 
these components of the risk can be managed. 
9.4.3 Wider Sampling 
The research conducted into supply side constraints was representative, at approximately 25% of 
the universe of qualifying contracts. The author's intention to cover complex subject matter across 
all of the contract types provided generally indicative data. The author proposes that the 
questionnaire be applied to each qualifying project during the course of the project by the project 
manager. 
The author proposes that data collection in this manner will provide a more complete coverage of 
the questionnaire than was possible in this research. Through this method the coverage of 
research areas with sufficient data for non·parametric analysis will improve. Such analysis may 
be done at the time when sufficient data for an aspect of research is achieved. Comprehensive 
knowledge of the components will expand over time until the full scope of research is covered. 
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Through this method the author proposes that focused analysis and response can take place as 
data quality improves, without the Department having to wait for full data coverage of all 
components of the research. 
9.4.4 Extended research period to teet Impact of supply side Interventions 
The research into the primary outcomes of the Affirmative Procurement Policy reported on in 
Chapter 5 was conducted during a period when supply side measures were in the main not in 
place. The author therefore recommends that future research should focus on the impact of 
supply side interventions on policy outcomes. Such research will give insight into which 
interventions yield value for investment and which do not. 
9.5 WIDER APPLICATION OF THE AFFIRMATIVE PROCUREMENT POLICY 
The time of drafting this concluding Chapter, The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework, 
Act 2000 ( Act No 5 of 2000 ) was enacted by the South African Parliament. A review of the 
contents of this Act indicates that the APP specifications fully comply with the requirements of 
legislation, and it is therefore likely the APP specifications will form the basis of preferential 
procurement policy specifications, not only for other state entities that procure construction goods 
and services, but also for the procurement of goods and services in other industrial sectors. The 
significance of this research therefore, has a wider application beyond the national Department of 
Public Works, to other state institutions that are likely to be developing preferential procurement 
policy speCifications. 
In rolling out the APP to other institutions of government, it is strongly recommended that 
emphasis should be placed on the effective training of personnel entrusted to operationalise and - -- . .. . .. . ... .. .. ' .. -... ... - .. .. .... --
monitor, p~l!qy outcom.e~, ._~d_ !Dl~_ sh0411;t be backed up by suitable data capturing systems. --_ ... "_ ....• - .- -.. - . . - ... . '- - ,.. '.. ..- .-.. _-
These requirements should be factored into such a roll-out programme, as any attempt to 
implement the APP in the absence of a sound institutional framework to do so, is likely to result"in 
negative policy outcomes. Further, should the policy be used in other industrial sectors, it is 
recommended that the turnover thresholds for ABEs operating in different industrial sectors, 
should be amended. The turnover thresholds provided for in the South African National Small 
Business Act. (South African National Small Business Act, Act No 102 of 1996) is very broad and 
needs to be refined. The classification system used in the United States Congress's Small 
Business Administration, based on appropriate size standards applicable to Standard Industrial 
Classifications, could form the point of departure. (Office of Civil Rights and Office of Highways 
Operations, 1990). 
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The APP, although targeting ABEs in a South African context, provides access to markets for 
businesses, however they are defined. An Affirmable Business Enterprise in the generic sense is 
any business which is Maffirmed" or "asserted" strongly. Accordingly an Atfirmable Business 
Enterprise can be defined on the basis of locality, status e.g. small and medium enterprise status, 
and ownership and control by disadvantaged groups e.g. women (Watermeyer, 1998). The 
Affirmative Procurement Policy, with appropriate modifications, could be applied beyond the 
borders of South Africa , to promote the creation of jobs through the promotion of small and 
medium enterprises and the development of local industries or sectors of industries. 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Namibian government have already 
commenced with the utilization of elements of the Affirmative Procurement Policy in their 
activities. The Namibian White P~per on _La.!?our Based Works (Ministry~ 0LWorks, T.@n~P9rt and 
Communications, 1999) has adopted a procurement policy which utilises the mechanisms .!Ind - ~ - - ._-
pro:e<iures associated with the APP to implement their labour based policy for works contracts. 
T~e. ILO has recognised its potential for capacity building for contracting in the construction sector 
(~entall et ai, 1999) and has recently suggested its use to the Indonesian and Thai governments 
t~_ address job creation in those countries. (Watermeyer and Cornish, 1999: Watermeyer et ai, 
1.§J99). It is hoped that these research findings will also assist these countries who are utilizing 
the APP, or derivatives of it. 
9.16 
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